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ART. I.—*A Residence of twenty-one years in the Sandwich Islands; or the Civil, Religious and Political History of those Islands; comprising a particular view of the Missionary operations connected with the introduction and progress of Christianity and Civilization among the Hawaiian people.* By Hiram Bingham, A. M., Member of the American Oriental Society, and late Missionary of the American Board. Hartford and New York. 1847. pp. 616.

It is possible that among the readers of Mr. Bingham's volume are some who read, at the time of its appearance, the history of that voyage of Captain Cook, Clerke and Gore, which gave to the world the first information of the existence of the Sandwich Islands. To much younger persons, however, as well as to these, the two works must appear in wonderful contrast, even when superficially consulted. Between the times of King Terreeoboo, when to be publicly invested with a linen shirt was a high mark of royalty; when the solemn offering of swine, in the successive stages of the living, strangled and baked animal, was the most distinguished honour that could be returned to the foreign "Orono," and that too as a religious sacrifice—and the times of the

Kamehamehas, when mirrors, damask custains, cut-glass lamps, and silk dresses, figure in the apartments of the court, and the deceased members of the royal family lie in state in coffins covered with crimson velvet, and the nobility of France and England negotiate with the Sandwich monarch, in behalf of their respective courts—there is a difference which seems to require more than a life-time to be realized. But above all is this comparison amazing when we compare the embellishments of the two works—the era of discovery in 1778–80, and the missionary era of 1820–47—and see the thatched “Morai” and its crowd of unclothed idolaters in the one, and in the other the Christian churches, built by the people themselves, at their own suggestion, and accommodating, some of them, a native congregation of several thousand willing worshippers, including a thousand communicants. The history of such a change is worthy the pen of a Southey or a Prescott. Their graphic skill and clearness are constantly missed in the volume before us, but it makes great amends to be guided through the progress of the transformation by the very pioneer himself—the first missionary, and after a “residence of twenty-one years.” The work is cumbrous, indigested and heavy, but it is the repository of a mass of authentic facts, which will make it valuable until a more skilful *redacteur* shall take the subject in hand. We shall demand of such an one much condensation and arrangement of the abundant materials scattered in this volume, in the series of the *Missionary Herald*, in the chapters of Captain Wilkes’s narrative of the *Exploring Expedition* and other voyages which give the observations of candid and disinterested visitors, besides the published notes of the Rev. C. S. Stewart and other missionaries. We shall also be disposed to insist on a goodly supply of pictorial embellishments. The natural scenery of these islands must be of a variety scarcely to be found elsewhere in the same compass. The tropical mountains covered with snow, the volcano to which Vesuvius and Etna must be but squibs or rockets, the cascades of five hundred feet and precipices of a thousand, the placid bays, broad ocean and gentle streams, the landscapes enriched with the cocoa nut, bread-fruit, banana, plantain, sugar cane, and cloth plant, must furnish rare subjects for the pencil, even without introducing the thatched cottages, stone churches and living groups that would be scarcely less novel or pleasing to our eyes.

The first visit of an American vessel, twelve years after Captain Cook's discovery, gave little reason to anticipate that civilization and the gospel were to come from our quarter. In February, 1790, two natives stole the boat of Captain Metcalf's ship, and killed a seaman who had charge of it. The people of the island to which the criminals belonged, coming out innocently to trade, Metcalf managed to get their boats collected in a mass on one side of his vessel, and caused a murderous discharge of his guns upon them, which killed more than a hundred of the unsuspecting savages. In a few weeks a remarkable opportunity of revenge offered, and was taken advantage of. Metcalf's own son, not older than eighteen, arrived at the island, as captain of a schooner. A chief, on whom Metcalf had inflicted the degrading punishment of whipping, went on board with a few of his people, threw the lad into the ocean, where he perished, killed four of the crew, and took possession of the vessel.

The history of the several islands, from the period in which they became known to the rest of the world, is one of jealousy and war among the respective chiefs, of every vice in the habits of the people, and of the lowest barbarism in their whole condition. Murder, incest, polygamy, human sacrifices, were fixed customs. The persons of the inhabitants, their hovels, and their habits, were filthy in the extreme. Besides all these destructive causes, vice had introduced diseases which threatened to depopulate the whole country. At this crisis, the hand of Providence opened a wide and effectual door for their permanent relief.

In 1809, Obookiah and Hopoo, two lads belonging to the islands, sailed with an American captain to New York, and accompanied him thence to New Haven. They both consented to remain there and receive the education that was kindly offered them. Obookiah, in the course of a few years, embraced Christianity. These young Hawaiians were among the foreign youth whose condition induced the American Missionary Board to institute their school at Cornwall, and Obookiah died whilst still a pupil. They appear, also, to have awakened that interest for the Sandwich Islands which led the American Board, in 1819, to the resolution of making that group one of their stations. Mr. Bingham, then at the Andover Seminary, was the first to offer himself as a candidate, and he, with his class-mate, Mr. Thurston, being ordained with this view, took their departure in Octo-

ber, 1819, with a physician, two schoolmasters, a printer and farmer, with the wives of the seven, and taking home with them Hopoo and two other Hawaiians. The vessel arrived off Hawaii in the following March; and before the passengers landed they received the amazing intelligence that idolatry had been formally abolished by the authorities of the island. Mr. Bingham's account of this step is not clear, but it is enough to say that it was probably the result of the increasing intercourse with Christian nations, and the desire of the licentious court to throw off from themselves and people certain restraints or "tabus," connected with their superstition. It was, therefore, so far as they were concerned, no better than an atheistical movement, although one that at once removed a mountain out of the way of the Christian missionaries.

The first station occupied was Kailua, on the western coast of Hawaii, under the care of Mr. Thurston, who retains it to this day. Mr. Bingham proceeded at once to Honolulu, on the island of Oahu, distant thirty-six hours by sea. This latter division soon detached two of the teachers to Waimea, on the island of Kauai, and all were favorably received by the rulers, so far as being permitted to make the great experiment. The whole population of the group was then estimated at one hundred and thirty thousand. During the first year the missionaries were enabled to open schools to teach the natives reading and writing in their own language, and to a few English. Of course their writing tasks and primers furnished texts for the first elements of religious instruction, and something was done towards conversing with and even preaching to the people in their own tongue. Early in the second year a church was erected at Honolulu, to the expense of which the chiefs and foreigners contributed. The number of strangers at the islands began about this time to increase, in consequence of the recent discovery of whales off the coast of Japan and Nippon, which made the Sandwich group a convenient harbour for the whaling vessels. These visits, whilst they multiplied opportunities of witnessing the habits of civilized nations, counterbalanced all such advantages by the licentiousness and intemperance which they encouraged. In twenty years from 1824, the arrivals at the port of Honolulu exceeded the annual average of one hundred.

In twenty months after their establishment, the missionaries

had invented an alphabet of the Hawaiian language and had set the press to work. Twelve letters were found enough to express all the sounds of the pure dialect, viz: a, e, i, o, u, h, k, l, m, n, p, w. But to preserve the identity of foreign and scripture names, and to accommodate the written language to some kindred Polynesian dialects, the consonants *b, d, f, g, r, s, t, v* and *z* were incorporated. The chiefs and people began eagerly to examine the primers where they found the strange phenomenon of visible sounds, and were soon able to exchange epistolary notes with one another.

In 1822 the first marriage was celebrated in the forms of Christianity, both the parties being natives, and the man Thomas Hopoo, the Cornwall student, and now a member of the church. In 1823 the Christian rites of burial were first witnessed at the interment of an infant child of one of the missionary families. Three days afterwards, at the king's request, similar services were substituted, at the funeral of one of his relatives, for the usual sacrifices of animals, and the depositing, by night, of the uncoffined remains in the enclosure of the idolatrous *morai*. Soon afterwards the royal authority of Oahu was induced—by what considerations Mr. Bingham does not fully state—to require the observance of the Lord's day, so far as to prohibit labour and amusements. Even the food for the Sabbath was prepared on Saturday. The king was, at this time, a habitual drunkard, though he had fixed a time—five years—to “turn and be a good man.” One of his excuses for not encouraging public worship by his presence was, “I am tipsy, and it is not right to go to church drunk; when I have got through I will come.” One of the courtiers said “when the king attends I will attend;” and another whom the invitation found at cards, “I have business and cannot go—my heart will be with you, though my body is here”—so primitive are these fashionable hypocrisies.

In 1823 the first reinforcement of the mission arrived. Their introduction to the royal family made a decided contrast with the first sight of Sandwich majesty which Mr. Bingham's company had. *Then* but one of the chiefs was decently clad, and that was in a white dimity jacket and nankeen pantaloons, whilst one of the barefooted ladies of rank soon threw off the

cotton gown she had endured through the beginning of the ceremony, and appeared in a robe of unwoven bark cloth. But Mr. Stewart and his companions were received by the king of Kauai in a full dress of silk velvet, and by the principal female chief in robes of yellow and purple satin, and a coronet of splendid feathers.

In that same year the Christians had the happiness of baptizing at Lahaina the mother of two kings, who had persevered, at an advanced age, in learning to read, received gospel instruction with faith, assisted in erecting school houses and a church, and on her dying bed enjoined upon all around her to love Christ, observe the Sabbath, instruct the children in Christianity, protect the missionaries, and follow wholly "the God by whom we may have eternal life in heaven."

At this time occurred one of those detestable attempts to thwart the increasing influence of the ministry upon the morals of the islands, which, proceeding from the very countrymen of the missionaries, as well as others, threw greater obstacles in the way of gospel-civilization than did the heathenish associations and debased minds of the natives. Even while the king was sobered by the death and Christian funeral of his mother, an American resident deceived him into drunkenness and revelry: and another party of foreigners was employed in persuading one of the governors to reject the commonest moral restraints that follow the influence of Christianity. Two men, French and American, went so far as to open a public meeting every Sabbath, with the intention of diverting the people from the services at the church. This project was broken up by its happening on one occasion, that the person whose turn it was to officiate at the mock worship, was so intoxicated that he could not proceed. We mention these incidents because they are specimens of a kind of opposition which religion has had to contend with at the islands from the beginning. In promoting temperance, pure morals and Sabbath-keeping, the missionaries trenched upon a licentiousness that a great number of the sojourners at the ports would fain have maintained untouched.

By the spring of 1824, there were six stations throughout the group, where the missionaries were enjoying the welcome and protection of the chief authorities. One of these was at Kaawaloa, the very spot in Hawaii (we do not become re-

conciled to this new spelling of the Owhyhee of our youth) where Captain Cook was shot in 1779. To this place the Christian ministers had not only been invited, but some of the people, under the encouragement of the chiefs, had actually anticipated their coming by beginning to form schools and maintain religious worship, according to the amount of knowledge they had picked up on visits at the stations. The whole work in Hawaii was now promoted by the zeal of Kaahumanu, a female chief, to whose hands the regency was committed by the king Liholiho, who about this time had sailed on his visit to England, where both he and his queen died in July, 1824. The regent avowed her faith in the gospel, openly announced her determination to make it the religion of her people, and was never wanting in any example to accomplish the great object.

Of Kapiolani, another woman of rank, an interesting incident is related. To appreciate its grandeur, we ought to have in our minds an idea of the stupendous volcano of Kilauea, and associated with it a knowledge of the reverence it had for ages inspired in the minds of the islanders as the residence of their idol Pele. Mr. Bingham's comparisons of this terrific mountain of fire and lava are "a chasm five or six times the depth of Niagara falls, and seven or eight miles in circumference,"—"it would take in entire the city of Philadelphia or New York"—"the fathomless, molten abyss, seven times hotter than Nebuchadnezzar's furnace," and, as a consummation, "had Vulcan employed ten thousand giant cyclops, each with a steam engine of one thousand horse-power, blowing anthracite coal for smelting mountain minerals, or heaving up and hammering to pieces rocks and hills, their united efforts would but begin to compare with the work of Pele here." The size, sight, and sounds of this crater must make it exceed any object of terror known in the natural world. To make this the throne and dwelling of a stern and irresistible deity would seem to place its hold on the superstitious heathen mind beyond the reach of any but such a moral power as must be as great in its kind as that of the hidden fires and sulphur of the volcano among physical forces. But thither went the female Kapiolani, and descending below the rim, over which few are courageous enough to look except after first lying flat on their

faces, she exclaimed, "Jehovah is my God. He kindled these fires. I fear not Pele. If I perish by the anger of Pele, then you may fear the power of Pele; but if I trust in Jehovah, and he shall save me from the wrath of Pele when I break through her *tabus*, then you must fear and serve the Lord Jehovah. All the Gods of Hawaii are vain. Great is the goodness of Jehovah in sending missionaries to turn us from these vanities to the living God and the way of righteousness." The whole company then united, where they stood, in a hymn of praise, and at the chief's suggestion, one of the Christian natives offered up thanksgiving and prayer. It would be difficult to find another scene so sublime as this in the pictures of all history.

We have been struck with the incidental proofs of the superior character and talents of the women mentioned in this history, as compared with the men; and the designation of female regents, premiers and chiefs seems to indicate that this eminence is perceived among themselves. A series of beautiful portraits (moral and intellectual—not physical, probably, for the average weight of both male and female chiefs is said to be two peculs of sandal-wood, or nearly 267 pounds,) might be selected from the passing delineations of this volume. Of Kaahumanu we have spoken. Several examples of her quickness are given. Hearing the question asked, what should be thought of those who prayed for the conversion of others and yet withheld the means, she observed, "such prayers miss their mark." Her reply to a missionary, when they parted on a journey, to go in different directions, was worthy of Queen Elizabeth: "I shall go with you, and you will stay with me." When one of the Romish priests tried to entrap the Princess Kapiolani by asking why pictures were placed in the Protestant religious books, she replied, "to illustrate the subjects taught; and when we understand the subject, we can tear the pictures or throw them away: but you bow down to yours and pray to them." This princess, at a time when the young king gave tokens that he was disposed to relax the wholesome restraints of the temperance laws, uttered the following impromptu:

"Love to thee, my sister Waahila,
My sister Waahila, rain of Kona,
In the days of Kanaloa, descending gentle and fine,
Enlarging the opening blossoms of the *Ohia*."

Thou didst crown thyself with a rainbow coronet,
Richly adorned was the interior of Naniuapo,
Then flourished the shrubbery of Waiakekua.
Thou playest a god to trample down without cause,
Recklessly to confound the right policy :
The bud, the tender shoot, the stem is broken by thee,
The shoot of that which is excellent and holy."

But a still more striking effusion is quoted from a poem written by an old woman, who was a queen at the time of Cook's discovery. She was now a Christian, and visiting at the cottage of a missionary, had her attention arrested by a grape vine shading the door, which at once suggested the evangelical association to be noticed in the following translated passage :

"Once only has that which is glorious appeared ;
It is wonderful and holy altogether.
It is a blooming glory of unwithering form ;
Rare is its stock, and singular, unrivalled :
One only true vine—it is the Lord.
The branch that adheres to it becomes fruitful :
It bringeth forth fruit ; it is good fruit,
Whence its character is fully made known.
Let the fruitless branch of mere show be cut off,
Lest the stock should be injuriously encumbered,
Lest it be by it wrongfully burdened."

More than once it happened, that whilst the heathen of all ranks were in different ways publicly testifying to the supremacy of the only Divine authority, and giving their countenance and coöperation to the plans of the missionaries, visitors of rank and influence from Christian nations not only cast contempt on the advancing reformation, but openly took the side of its enemies. Thus in 1826, the schooner *Dolphin*, of our navy, having put into Honolulu for repairs, began a course of irreligious examples, by appointing the Sabbath for the time of exchanging salutes with the authorities of the island. The reply of the heathen chiefs to the Christian commander was, "we keep sacred the Sabbath, and observe the word of God." The Americans, notwithstanding, made their noisy salute on the Sunday, but the fort on shore reserved its return till the following day. Then the chief officer of the *Dolphin* alleged that the law prohibiting the former custom of licentious females going out to every ship on its arrival, was an insult to the American flag. The Regent—the *new* Kaahumanu, as she was called by the people since her marked conversion—maintained the ground taken by the laws which she was bound to administer. The gallant

commander threatened her with the violence which his men would commit in the town if the old sources of corruption were not re-opened; he charged her with being under the influence of the missionaries, and one of his lieutenants deposed at the official investigation made on the return of the vessel, that the commander had said that the sailors would serve the missionaries right if they should pull down their houses. They did something like it; for coming on shore on the Sabbath, they repaired to the house of the young heir of the throne, where several of the chiefs and others had assembled for worship, broke the windows, demanded with threats that women should be furnished to the crew, and then proceeded to Mr. Bingham's residence, armed with clubs and knives, in pursuit of the missionary. His life was already attacked, when a number of the natives arriving at the house, drove off the assailants with stones and clubs. The commander of the *Dolphin* had the houses repaired, and two of his men put in irons; but the islanders signaled the vessel by naming it "the mischief-making man-of-war."

In contemplating the success of the word in these islands, it is highly important, as well for the instruction of the precedent as for historical connexion, to take notice of the powerful auxiliary that was found in the rulers and heads of the people. As a general fact, the course of the missionaries was not only sanctioned, but actively promoted by the influential chiefs and officers. Many of them, even of the highest ranks, became pupils, and not a few of them converts. Of the latter some showed their zeal by making journeys, for the express purpose of investigating the moral state of their subjects, and of recommending and patronizing the schools and churches. The regent, Kaahumanu, made such a tour of Oahu for a whole month, in 1826, accompanied by Mr. Bingham and more than two hundred followers. These were not merely the retinue of a royal "progress." It was a travelling school, proceeding slowly on their way, the greater number being on foot. Their *insignia* were spelling-books and slates. The Regent addressed the people in their village assemblies, and sometimes offered prayer in meetings of women; the missionary preached, and read the gospel of Matthew, which he had now completed in their own language, and some of his hearers took notes of his

expositions with their slate-pencils, as they sat about on the ground. A head-man of one of the villages on the route, had prepared a spacious tabernacle, screened with cocoa-nut leaves from the sun, and was one of the first inquirers after Christ. "*Aloha iho!*"—*great affection!* he exclaimed with tears, as he listened to the narrative of redemption, and in time became one of the most useful members of the church.

Even on the small scale of a Sandwich island sovereignty, we may observe the natural advantage in favour of Christian missions, when the public authority is on their side. In the dread of a mere state religion, of worldly alliances and reliances, let us not forget the voices of prophecy, reason, and experience, which tell us that in evangelizing a heathen nation, much time may be gained by directing the earliest efforts to the persuasion of those whose conviction of the superiority of Christian institutions would at least remove from the highway many stumbling blocks of prejudice and legalized opposition. Might not the time which is given in such countries as British India, for example, to desultory efforts in collecting straggling groups from the crowds of a *bazaar* or a *mela*, to listen to a few moment's inopportune exhortation, or in a promiscuous scattering of tracts from a boat as it floats along the banks of a river or canal, be given with better prospects of eventual results, to some more direct and elaborate efforts to move the civil power on behalf of the Bible? Not to "the isles" only, but to "the Gentiles unto the end of the earth," "the land of Sinim," and "these from the north and from the west," it is promised that "Kings shall see and arise, princes also shall worship," "Kings shall be nursing-fathers, [nourishers] and their queens nursing mothers" to the spreading church. Should not the instrumentality be accommodated to the direction of the terms of the prediction? At all events, without neglecting the humbler means, might not more be hopefully attempted of direct approach to Rajahs and Sultans, Emirs and Khans, Honorable Companies and Mandarins, Imams and Emperors?

The prohibitions of the moral law were so faithfully regarded by the civil power in the islands, that the malice of the vicious, when disappointed in their object—and such were generally foreigners—was levelled at the religious teachers, whom they charged with introducing the innovation. But here was one of

the strongholds of Christianity. The law was on the side of the truth. The government had adopted the Bible. Vice could no longer riot by legal license. The missionary was protected; for every assault on him was an attack on the law of the land. But he could repel the charge by declaring "we have inculcated on the chiefs, not only the common duties of morality, but we have also taught them that he that ruleth over men must be just, ruling in the fear of the Lord. We have endeavored to convince them that they were set for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of them that do well. We have given them general principles derived from the word of God, together with scripture examples of their application, neither withholding instruction, nor interfering with their authority." Mr. Bingham does not divulge cabinet secrets, but we do not see that any impropriety is chargeable upon the missionaries, if it be true that they used their influence in shaping the course of the inexperienced rulers upon fit occasions, for the maintenance of what was, according to the inspired standard, right. In this incipient stage of their civilization, the rulers, who had just laid aside the club and lance as the chief modes of their administration, were not qualified to govern without advice, and who were more likely to give them good advice than those who had devoted their lives to promote the best interests of the whole people?

Another suggestion on the general economies of foreign missions arises from a plan proposed, though unsuccessfully, by the united missionaries and chiefs in the year 1836. We do not cite the case as entirely approved by our judgment of what is the proper sphere of evangelical action, but as furnishing some illustration of what might be hoped for in not a few countries where the public authorities could be led to originate or second a plan for their fuller civilization. The proposition referred to was substantially as follows. The preaching of the gospel and the introduction of education having prepared the way for the elevation of this once savage people to the rank of a Christian nation, they were now in a condition to receive that kind of refinement and to make that advancement to the higher civilization, which demand a more extensive introduction of the arts and manners of the educated world than could be communicated by the direct application of

missionary labour. The civil policy of the government, also, and the science and application of political economy in relation to commerce, trade, and other great interests, were subjects which required special regard, and seemed to be demanded from other sources than those which had enough already to do in supplying religious instruction. The rulers felt their need of direction, in the enlarged relations of their dominions to the civilized world, the increase of intelligence, and the diffusion of religious principles. The people needed instruction in the handicrafts and professions which the improving state of society demanded. They were in fact Christian children, who had almost every thing to learn to make them capable of directing their government and turning their capacities to the best advantage. It was therefore made the subject of a memorial to American Christians, that a company should be formed, independent of the mission and its immediate supporters, which should encourage the cultivation of whatever the soil could produce, and whatever manufactures could be put into operation. Such a company, it was suggested, might send to the island a superintendent, who should be an able civilian, four agriculturists, a merchant, and a cotton-manufacturer. To these were to be given a competent number of mechanics who should teach the natives their respective trades, and the company should have at least one ship at their service.

Is it visionary to entertain the conception that our Christian laymen will one day find in such auxiliary plans as this, a noble field for their more enlarged and independent contributions to the diffusion of Christianity and its attendant civilization? Is it, indeed, much more than an extension of those high and noble schemes of education which the missions of almost every church now adopt?—the putting into practice the lessons of the seminaries, high-schools and colleges which form a large feature of their operations?

Although the large plan above-mentioned was not effected, the Rev. Mr. Richards was employed in 1838, by the king and chiefs, as their exclusive chaplain and interpreter, and teacher of political economy, law, and the science of government. Of course he resigned his missionary office when he entered on this important employment.

In 1827 a new enemy to the progress of the truth appeared

in the prosperous islands. It came with the sign of the cross and the title of Apostolic Prefect of the Sandwich Islands. It was a Roman Catholic mission, imposing itself on the defenceless tribes under the double authority of Leo XII and Charles X. The queen-regent refused to permit the residence of the priests; but the prohibition was not regarded, and they took up their abode at Honolulu. Their use of pictures, images, rosaries, crosses, smoke, and priestly shows, was eminently calculated to seduce the large number who, by the introduction of Christianity, had lost their idols but had not found Christ. In fact some of those who professed to be converted to Romanism spoke of their deity as a French or Papal being, and different from the God worshipped in the simple rites of the other churches. We see great cause for acknowledging the hand of Providence, that these intruders had not appeared at a less advanced stage of the evangelization of the islands, and that even when they did make their most ungracious onset, their success was so inconsiderable among a people peculiarly liable to be led off by showy appearances.

The Romish priests were repeatedly required to withdraw, but they sometimes denied the authority of the Hawaiian rulers, and sometimes deluded them with pretences of waiting for a passage. The "Apostolic Prefect" himself reported to his French constituents that he kept himself in the islands by a trick, feigning to be unable to pay for the transportation of his company when an opportunity occurred, and when a cheap or gratuitous passage was offered, taking means secretly to persuade the captains to change their minds and demand such an exorbitant sum that it was impracticable to raise it. "The poor governor had a great desire to rid himself of us, but he was still more anxious to keep his money." Such was the guile of this apostle. It was successful until the end of 1831, when the chiefs fitted up their own brig, and positively requiring the priests to embark in it, dispatched them to California.

Effects of the example and principles of the great delusion were now and then manifest in forms strongly illustrative of its true character. At one time a native woman, of immoral life, attempted to make proselytes with the aid of a manuscript directory with which she had been supplied, and at length

undertook to administer baptism, as permitted on emergencies, by the Roman rubrics. The idolatry of the virgin was so congenial to the imagination of the less enlightened, that some of the inhabitants of Puna, a district of Hawaii, canonized a woman who died there, and built a temple for her worship in connection with that of God. Her remains were enshrined and pilgrimages proclaimed as a means of salvation, the authors of the blasphemy maintaining at the same time, that they embraced the gospel in a purer form than that preached by the missionaries. This effort was soon suppressed by the local chief, and the temple destroyed.

In 1836 a new effort was made to secure a foothold for Romanism. A priest was sent from France, and the two who had been deposited in California were directed by their ecclesiastical superiors to return. The young king was now in authority, and directed them to leave the islands. By his order, they were put on board the British vessel in which they had arrived; but no sooner had they touched the deck than the commander and crew left the ship, carrying off their flag, as a token that they considered their rights piratically invaded. The commander of a British ship of war, which just then arrived, set the priests on shore and dismissed the vessel. After several conferences between British and French officers and the king, it was agreed that the Papists should be allowed to remain until they could find a good opportunity of departure; and that in the mean time they should not attempt to exercise their functions. The king, unfortunately, was induced to sign, reciprocally with the French commander, a sort of treaty in which the French and the islanders were allowed to visit each other's dominions freely. This document, which the king doubtless understood as excepting the forbidden residence of the priests, was afterwards made the pretence of gross impositions. At present, however, the priests, including one who at a later date arrived from South America, withdrew. But in July, 1839, the memorable Captain Laplace appeared at Honolulu, in his frigate, the *Artemise*, commissioned, as he set forth in a manifesto, by the king of the French, "to put an end, either by force or persuasion, to the ill-treatment to which the French have been victims at the Sandwich Islands." He demanded, in the name of his government, as the conditions of friendship, equal privileges for the

Roman as the Protestant faith; the donation of a site for a French church; the liberation of any Romanists who might be in imprisonment on charges growing out of their professed faith; and the deposit of twenty thousand dollars by the king of the island, as a security for his good conduct towards France; which sum must be carried on board the frigate by one of the principal chiefs, together with the treaty of friendship, and the frigate be saluted by the batteries of the island. The brave Frenchman closed his message with a significant allusion to "the laudable example" of the queen of Tahiti, in admitting the Romanists, and with a still plainer declaration that if this treaty should be refused, a devastating war should immediately be opened.

Even were the positions sustainable by the law of nations, which are here assumed as to the right of the French king to demand of an independent power the toleration of another religion, and to require a pecuniary pledge of the weaker party when none was offered by the other, it would be still monstrous and disgraceful for a people that had either civilization, religion or chivalry, to make such exactions in such a style. But the Frenchman came flushed with the glory of his success in silencing the poor Tahitians with his cannon, and forcing them to receive the priests and their mummary. He proceeded to make preparations for a bombardment of the town, first offering an asylum in the frigate to such Americans as wished to be out of danger, but expressly excepting the American missionaries. It was evident that there was but one way for the defenceless islanders to save their habitations and their lives from destruction, and their country from subjugation. They must yield to the French frigate whose guns were already pointed on their homes and churches and schools. The king had to make up the sum demanded of him, by borrowing at a high interest. He signed the extorted treaty, and had to submit to the further humiliation of having the peace of the Sabbath disturbed by a parade of the French soldiers, and its worship mocked by a mass publicly celebrated on the shore. But the outrage did not even end here. After the whole prescription had been followed and the salutes exchanged, several additional stipulations were forced upon the king, one of which was that the importation of French wines and brandies should

be allowed at a low duty. The design and effect of this article may be easily judged of, when it is understood that the existing laws, for the purpose of arresting the fearful intemperance which had prevailed, prohibited the importation or distillation of spirituous liquors, and laid an almost prohibitory duty on wine.

If the monarch who lately fled from the Tuilleries before a furious mob, and is now allowed by the charity of his son-in-law to take refuge at Clermont, ever meditates on the retributive dispensations of Providence, he may not consider as too trivial an affair to be put in the list of the provocations of the judgments he is suffering, the mission of the *Artemise* to the islands of Tahiti and Oahu.

We pass over the attempt of the French Captain Mallet, in 1842, and the still more blustering and wanton outrage of the English Lord Paulet, in 1843, (the latter of whom actually took possession of the Islands in the name of the Queen,) because the act of Paulet was immediately disavowed by his government, and both France and Great Britain soon afterwards followed the example of the United States in acknowledging the independence of the Sandwich Islands. We only add here as the latest item of information on the subject of Romanism, that thirteen fresh labourers arrived at the islands in 1846, making the whole number of that faith twenty-two.

In 1831 a school was opened at Lahainaluna, on the island of Maui, for young men who were willing to be qualified as preachers and school-masters. Sixty-seven attended in the first year, being selected from all quarters as the most suitable for the purpose of the institution, and in view of the wants of their respective districts. The course of instruction was laid out for four years. The Report of the American Board for 1847 states that more than a hundred of the graduates of this institution were then engaged in teaching in different places, that more than forty others were in government offices, besides many more in private stations. The mission presses now keep the schools supplied with elementary books, besides the Bible and various religious and other useful works including the *Pilgrim's Progress*, a volume of sermons, *Wayland's Moral Philosophy*, a history of the islands, hymn-books, catechisms and tracts.

A school for the children of foreigners, under one of the mis-

sionaries who resigned his office as such for the purpose, and the settlement of a chaplain, by the Seamen's Friend Society, were among the means of advancing the improvement of the islands caused by the state of religion among the natives. The "Bethel Flag" was thus added to the other signals of a Christian port. "The Hawaiian Teacher," a semi-monthly paper, introduced that mark of popular refinement. Two thousand copies were published. A smaller paper had been issued some months previously, for the benefit, chiefly, of the principal Seminary. Such was the Prussian zeal for education in some parts, that the viceroy of Maui required all the children over four years to attend school, and forbade marriage licenses to be granted where either party was unable to read.

One of the most striking features of the religion of these islands, is the thoroughness of its diffusion from the outset. Christianity pervaded the nation and became part of all its institutions. It was thorough, also, in its being carried out in modes which we are accustomed to associate only with a long-established and advanced religious condition. It would be much to say that in the eleventh year of the mission spacious churches—some of them holding regularly from three to four thousand hearers—were to be found at six stations; that there were fifty thousand readers and learners, more or less, under the direction of Christian superintendents—and that the immemorial license of prostitution and drunkenness had given way to the rigid prohibition of every form of public vice. These were unusual triumphs for the time. But this was not the whole extent of the progress of religion. In 1830, weekly assemblies were held for prayer and conference, such as only the pious and seriously-disposed could be expected to attend, and the aggregate number of those who were accustomed to meet, was not less than fifteen thousand. The sexes held these meetings separately, so that the female members of the mission-families might have the opportunity, so very important in the circumstances, of instructing the converted and serious women, and become better acquainted with their characters. Sometimes divisions or classes were formed, with the best of the native believers as assistants to the missionaries. Then special means were adopted for the instruction of mothers, as heads of families, and their children were from time to time called to

attend meetings of this kind together. Let it increase our admiration of the work of Divine grace to remember, that among the hundreds of mothers thus assembled, happy to have their little ones participating in their new blessings, were many who had with their own hands and feet deposited in the ground, and trodden upon the covering earth, their living offspring! Special meetings for the aged and infirm were also largely attended. "More than a thousand women attended the Friday prayer-meeting on the 8th." This was at Honolulu, the whole population of which district was not more than twelve thousand. How many churches of New York or Philadelphia would it take to make such an aggregate for any week of the year? At another time we read of more than two hundred attending a daily prayer-meeting, in the village of Kailua, beginning an hour and a quarter before sunrise.

Some fine scenes were witnessed in the public gatherings of the transformed generation: as when at a visit of the chiefs to one of the stations in Hawaii, the schools met at night to exhibit their progress in study, and came in single file from all quarters, winding around the precipices at the head of the great bay, carrying torches of the candle-nut, and sounding conchs. They collected with their hymns and scripture lessons, at the spot where Cook fell under the clubs of their grandfathers, perhaps their own fathers. At another time, when a new church was dedicated at Honolulu, and its whole area of 196 feet by 63 was covered with the natives, seated on new mats, the young king, not yet fifteen years old, arose spontaneously, (if we understand the narrative) and uttered a devout thanksgiving to God, and solemnly devoted his kingdom, as well as the house, to His glory. This lad, on other occasions also, made public addresses and prayers, in a very serious and impressive manner, although he was not considered as furnishing evidence of conversion. If he acted purely on his own impulse, the proceedings speak strongly in favour of the impression made on his youthful mind by the sight of Christian order and devotion, and it might have been wrong for the missionaries to check him; but if his public performances of this kind were at all assigned to him as a part for which he was trained, we must consider it at least an injudicious experiment.

Speaking of the advanced standard at once adopted in the

islands, we may add that the highest ground on the question of temperance in drink was willingly taken by a large number of the people, including many chiefs, before there had been much encouragement given in the example of the older Christian countries. There was, indeed, good ground at the Sandwich ports, if any where, for denunciation of "the runseller." The islands were the great dram-shop of the Pacific. The vessels, not only the whalers but the men-of-war, stopped there to revel and to lay in stores of liquor. For the government and people to oppose the traffic and renounce drink, was, therefore, to make a sacrifice of their pecuniary advantage, as well as to deny a strong appetite, and besides, to excite the hostility of some of the most influential residents, not excepting Consuls. Total abstinence from the use of spirituous liquors may well be understood as the only safe injunction under these circumstances, and a refusal at that time to consent to such an agreement, for the sake of its example, might well awaken suspicion of the sincerity of an applicant for church-membership; though we conceive it to be beyond the prerogatives of any church to demand a pledge of this kind as a condition of reception. We have not noticed in this volume any record of such a rule in the churches of the islands; but we are sorry to see that a majority of the mission have gone even beyond this, having as lately as 1843, required of their candidates the entire disuse of *tobacco*. To justify this regulation, the ground is taken that "the cultivation and use of tobacco is an immorality." We do not lament the increasing conviction of the uncleanness, unhealthfulness and impoliteness of the common usages of this odorous and stimulating vegetable; but we were pained, on much higher grounds, to see a body of respectable and pious ministers, teaching a nation just elevated from barbarism, that the smoking of a pipe is an immorality that excludes one from baptism and the Lord's table; in other words he that uses tobacco cannot be regarded as a Christian. If it were not for these relations of the subject, it would be no more than ludicrous to read a condemnation of tobacco, as an "intoxicating solid," and of a Christian solemnly adjudged to be "guilty of smoking." We quote from the report of the American Board for 1846. (p. 180.) We are sorry to find that these views are encouraged by some popular expositors of the scriptures. In

Mr. Barnes's notes on the ninth chapter of first Corinthians, we find the doctrine strongly implied that the use of wine and tobacco is incompatible with "striving for the crown that fadeth not away," and yet no higher immorality is there pretended to be charged against the use of tobacco than that it is "filthy, offensive and disgusting." Mr. Barnes asks with great emphasis, "can a man be truly in earnest in his professed religion; can he be a sincere Christian, who is not willing to abandon anything and everything that will tend to impair the vigour of his mind, and weaken his body, and make him a stumbling block to others?" All this may be, and yet neither church nor commentator may be allowed to decide for the consciences of others what is clean or unclean in meats, drinks and refreshments, and what may or may not impair their usefulness, so as to deny them the name of Christians. It may be very "filthy, offensive and disgusting," for a man to neglect ablution, or shaving, or changing his linen; or in the matter of diet to feast on train oil. It may be well to persuade or shame such an one from his habits, but it would not be well to make a soiled shirt, or neglected beard, or unsavoury dinner, a bar to church privileges, either in America or Kamschatka.

The decease of Kaahumanu the Queen Regent in 1832, was a great affliction to the missionaries and a loss to the church. The dying scenes of the converted islanders are among the most impressive evidences of the intelligent and cordial faith with which the gospel was received. Collected, fearless but humble, thoughtful of all around her, how affecting to hear the once savage woman ejaculating with her dying breath from a Hawaiian hymn—

"Now will I go to Jesus,
My Lord who pitied me,
And at his feet lie prostrate
For there I cannot die;
Lo, here am I, O Jesus,
Grant me thy gracious smile:
But if for sin I perish,
Thy law is righteous still."

The king being still in his minority, Kinau, his sister, was chosen to succeed Kaahumanu as Regent, but soon afterwards the youth of eighteen asserted his competency to take the sceptre in his own hands. Kinau made no resistance—"we cannot war with the word of God between us," was her salutation

and abdication, as she met her brother in the national assembly which he had convoked. He retained her in his council, or cabinet. The young ruler did not fulfil the promise of his childhood when he prayed and spoke at the dedication. He was disposed to yield to some of the chiefs and residents in the new struggle to repeal the prohibitions of selling and using liquors. An infidel chief made strong efforts towards a revolution. Kinau proclaimed a fast. The great body of communicants sustained the more rigid principles. The wavering monarch had to confess "the kingdom of God is strong."

The progress of religion was steady and diffusive throughout the islands from the beginning. Stations, churches, schools, and missionaries had increased beyond what the limits of our rambling sketch have permitted us to mention. But the years 1838 and 1839 are marked as the era of a "great revival." The attention to religion extended to every district. Thousands sought for personal direction and advice. The churches and other places of meeting were thronged. The gospel was preached as often as there was opportunity, and the best efforts made to instruct the awakened. The applicants for church-membership were usually retained on probation for two or three months; yet by midsummer five thousand had been received, and twenty-four hundred left on trial. Six hundred children and youth were reckoned among the converted. The mission-schools were greatly blessed. The whole population appeared to feel the influence of the work. Theft and intoxication were scarcely known, and the Sabbath generally respected. In 1839 the additions to the eighteen churches amounted to 10,725, nearly one half of which were to the one church of Hilo.

In 1839 the whole Bible was printed in the Hawaiian language, the translation having employed a number of hands for fifteen years. In 1840 the king and chiefs adopted a civil Constitution or Bill of Rights and a code of laws, the first fruits, doubtless, of their instructions from Mr. Richards. In these documents the supremacy of the Word of God is solemnly acknowledged, protection guaranteed to all forms of worship, the succession to the throne established in the heir nominated by the king and chiefs, or if no nomination shall be made in the king's life-time, the designation to be by the chiefs and representatives. The islands were to be under the immediate ad-

ministration of four governors, each having his particular district. The chiefs or nobles, together with representatives chosen by the people, form a council, meeting annually to legislate coordinately with the king; the organization being very similar to that of the British Parliament. The judges of each island are appointed by the respective governors, and the king, the premier, and four judges chosen by the representatives, form a Supreme Court. The nobility are limited to the king, a female premier, the four governors, four women of rank and five chiefs. The number of representatives at first was only seven. This sketch shows, perhaps as clearly as any thing else, how radical was the change wrought by the spread of intelligence and religion in the institutions of a country that until this recent epoch had known no law but the will of an ignorant and violent despot.

We should like to transfer to this page the engraved view of a church opened for worship at Honolulu in 1842: a church built of coral rock, 144 feet by 78, with basement, gallery, tower and clock, at an expense of \$20,000, contributed chiefly from the funds and labour of the people, the king heading the list with a subscription of \$3000. In erecting this building the male communicants divided themselves into five companies, who gave their labour in rotation. About the same time that this church was built in Oahu, another stone church was erected in the island of Hawaii 120 feet by 57. The builders were the members of the church. They carried the stones on their shoulders, dived into the bay to bring up coral to be used for lime, to burn which others carried wood from the mountain, and the women took the burnt coral, sand and water, in calabashes or gourds to the place of building; the female part of the work alone being estimated to be equal to the drawing of three hundred and fifty wagon-loads a quarter of a mile.

Mr. Bingham's twenty-one years' residence ended in 1840, the declining health of his wife obliging him to return to the United States. From the annual Report of the American Board for 1847 we gather the latest particulars of the state of the missions. At the dates comprised in that report there were seven stations in Hawaii, five in Maui, one in Molokai, five in Oahu, and three in Kauai, making twenty-one stations. These were supplied with twenty-five missionaries, (including wives,) ten

male and forty-one female assistant missionaries, four native preachers and two physicians, making a total of eighty-one. There were seven boarding-schools, containing two hundred and ninety-three pupils, including thirty-three children of missionaries. The whole number of communicants admitted to all the churches from the beginning to May 1846 is above 33,000. The number now in the churches is about 23,000. Yet according to the table before us the average congregations on the Sabbath cannot much exceed (allowing for two or three imperfections in the report) thirteen thousand. Some of these disparities appear to be very great; as for example the whole number of communicants in good standing belonging to the single church of Hilo is put down at six thousand four hundred and twenty, whilst the average congregation is given at eight hundred and fifty. But on turning to the report for 1846 we find that the people of Hilo assemble every Sabbath in about thirty congregations in different parts of the district. These local meetings have been probably omitted in the table. It is painful to observe that of the whole number of members in all the churches one thousand two hundred and eighty-three were suspended and four hundred and thirty-one excommunicated in the two last years of the table. In two years the different churches contributed in cash \$9300 for building and repairing their churches, supporting preaching and schools, and for other benevolent purposes. In twenty-two months, of the latest date, three hundred and thirty-nine thousand copies of school-books, the New Testament, and the newspaper were printed. In one district singing-schools had suddenly awakened great enthusiasm, so that where the missionary was formerly the only chorister and sometimes the only singer, native choirs and leaders were found to have qualified themselves for this inestimable service. The islanders, however, let it be observed, are beyond the barbarism of giving up the work of singing to representatives. Persons of all ages flocked to the school that they might learn to sing in church.

Whilst so much is to be found in the results of this mission to prove the practicability of evangelizing an entire heathen nation, and the concurrence of all social and civil advancement with the progress of a people in gospel knowledge, and to excite the praise of God's people everywhere for His blessing on

the enterprize, and their prayers for its continuance, yet it should not be concluded that the Sandwich Islands constitute a paradise, in comparison with all the rest of the world. Degradation, sin, hypocrisy, back-sliding, are to be found there, as elsewhere, even among professed Christians. Few of the pious natives have been found suitable for ordination as preachers, and none, as yet, for the pastoral office. Education has not yet had time for its full development among a people whose intellectual strength had degenerated before the counteracting remedy had been applied. The nation is not yet strong enough to stand alone either in its religious or civil concerns. Let not the Missionary Board grow weary of their work in helping them on, nor Christians in sustaining the Board.

ART. II.—*Sketches of Moral and Mental Philosophy. Their Connexion with each other, and their bearings on Doctrinal and Practical Christianity.* By Thomas Chalmers, D.D. and I.L.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Edinburgh, and Corresponding Member of the Royal Institute of France. New York: Robert Carter, 58 Canal Street and Pittsburg, 56 Market Street.

SOME persons entertain the idea that there is very little benefit derived from the study of mental and moral science. They are of opinion, that plain common sense and the Bible, are our surest guides; and that the speculations of philosophers have tended rather to perplex than elucidate the great practical principles which should be the guide of our lives. No doubt there is some truth in these opinions. Men who are governed by the plain principles of common sense, without further inquiry seldom err widely from the truth; while speculative men, misled by their own reasonings, on metaphysical subjects, arrive at conclusions contradictory to evident, intuitive truths. But this very thing evinces the necessity of paying diligent attention to these subjects; in order that the errors of speculative men may be refuted, and that truth—which always has evidence and right reason on its side—may be established, on its true founda-

tion. We admit that the Bible contains the purest and most perfect system of moral duties; but the Bible assumes as true the radical principles of morality; such as that man is a free, accountable, moral agent; that man cannot be under obligations to perform what is naturally impossible; and that all actions which possess a moral character must be in some sense voluntary, &c. Now, in regard to these assumed principles, there may be a diversity of opinion, and errors may be maintained and propagated which tend to subvert the whole system of morality. These errors should certainly be met, and the reasoning by which they are maintained, shown to be sophistical or inconclusive.

Dr. Chalmers, who, like Paul was set for the defence of the gospel, was fully aware of the close connexion which exists between science and religion; and in most of his writings has exerted his mighty mind in opposing the inroads and assaults of error and infidelity, from whatever quarter they might arise. In his Preface to this volume he says, "There seems a special necessity, in the present times, for laying open to the light of day, every possible connexion, which might be fancied or alleged, between Theology and the other sciences. All must be aware of a certain rampant infidelity that is now abroad, which, if neither so cultivated, nor so profound as in the days of our forefathers, is still unquelled and as resolute as ever; and is now making fearful havoc, both among the disciples of the other learned professions, and among the half educated classes of British society." It would be difficult to estimate too highly the labours of this great man in defence of the fundamental truths of morality and religion. He was undoubtedly raised up by Providence to do an important work, for his own and future generations; for his writings will continue to be read, as long as the English language is in use; and when read will produce a salutary effect on the minds of men. As he is now taken from the world, there can be no impropriety in expressing the opinion, that he was the most important author who flourished in the first part of the nineteenth century. Dr. Chalmers made free use of his pen, and his published works are numerous and very important; and none more so than those on Natural Theology, and in defence of Christianity. For some years, he was professor of Moral Philosophy in the University

of St. Andrews, which led him of course to pay particular attention to mental and moral science. He was well acquainted with the writings of his distinguished countrymen in this department of knowledge; and although he was a great admirer of Dr. Brown as a metaphysician, he was not blind to the defects of his system, as appears by his animadversions on some of his theories, contained in the volume, at the head of this article.

The principal object of Dr. Chalmers, in the work now before us, seems to have been to establish a few leading principles, and to correct some popular errors, on the subject of morals. Indeed, nearly the whole book relates to those mental exercises, which he denominates *emotions*; by which he understands all our feelings, except volitions. Dr. Brown used the word with still greater latitude. Under this term, he included also volitions, which in his theory are not different from desires. But we have been accustomed to use the word *emotions*, in a much more restricted sense; as meaning those feelings which terminate in the mind, and which, though they have a cause have no object; such as joy, sorrow, surprise, the feelings of exultation and depression, and such like. We have, therefore, been in the habit of distinguishing, not only between volition and emotion, which is done by Dr. Chalmers; but also between emotion and desire, which are confounded by him. The word *sensibilities* has come into frequent use, as a generic term, intended to comprehend all feelings except volitions; and this term is often used by Dr. Chalmers, in this work. But, in our opinion, there are strong objections to this term, as intended to express our desires; and especially those which have no close connexion with the body. The old division of the faculties of the mind into understanding, will, and affections, pleases us better than any of the more modern divisions; only we would place the affections before the will, as being first in the order of operation. Dr. Chalmers observes, somewhere in this work, that the word *affections*, properly signifies an exercise of mind which have persons for their object. Thus we speak of benevolent and malevolent affections. It is true, that the word is often used in this restricted sense; but it is also employed with much greater latitude, and is often applied to express the condition even of bodies. All words in common use, when introduced as techni-

cal terms in any science, acquire a more precise signification than they have in popular discourse. We prefer the word affections to sensibilities, first because it is the old term, with which even common readers are well acquainted; and again, it does not suggest, as the other term does to us, some agitation originating in the body.

In regard to volition, Dr. Chalmers adopts the definition of Locke and Reid, confining the term to the determination of the mind to act, or not act. A general purpose to perform certain acts, differs from a volition. A general purpose never produces action: a volition is required for every voluntary act. A man determines to go to a certain place to-morrow; this purpose will not have the effect of bringing him there; unless at the time, he puts forth successive volitions to communicate to his body the necessary locomotion. Yet Dr. Chalmers admits, that much of morality and of moral character consists in these general purposes of the mind. They are, in fact, what are commonly denominated *principles*.

One main object of the distinguished author of this work is, to prove that no action or mental exercise can possess any moral quality, unless it be voluntary. This, as a general proposition, will be admitted by all persons capable of thinking on the subject. It is a truism; or rather a moral maxim, which is evident to every mind as soon as proposed. But although this is an intuitive truth, and one which no man in his senses ever denied, yet there may exist enormous errors, in relation to its meaning; and in the application of it. And we are of opinion that while Dr. Chalmers adopts a sound principle, and reasons cogently from it, he has inadvertently fallen into a mistake, which has involved him in much perplexity in his discussions on moral subjects. He uses the word *voluntary*, in the strictest sense, to mean an act or exercise consequent on volition. According to his views, no emotion, that is no desire or affection, can be conceived to possess a moral character, unless, directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely, it be the result of a volition. Now as our affections or feelings are not subject to our volitions, in any other way than as by the power of attention we can bring the objects suited to excite these affections, the difficulty is to see how our emotions acquire a moral quality. The Doctor attempts to explain this difficulty, but in our judg-

ment, he does not succeed in removing it. But we will permit Dr. Chalmers to give his own views in his own words.

"It is well that, amid all the difficulties attendant on the physiological inquiry, there should be such a degree of clearness and uniformity in the moral judgments of men—inasmuch that the peasant can with a just and prompt discernment, equal to that of the philosopher, seize on the real moral characteristics of any action submitted to his notice, and pronounce on the merit or demerit of him who has performed it. It is in attending to these popular, or rather universal decisions, that we learn the real principles of Moral Science.

"4. And the first certainly of these popular, or rather universal decisions, is that nothing is moral or immoral that is not voluntary. A murderer may be conceived, instead of striking with the dagger in his own hand, to force it by an act of refined cruelty, into the hand of him, who is the dearest relative or friend of his devoted victim; and by his superior strength to compel the struggling and the reluctant instrument to its grasp. He may thus confine it to the hand, and give impulse to the arm of one, who recoils in utmost horror from that perpetration, of which he has been made as it were the material engine; and could matters be so contrived, as that the real murderer should be invisible, while the arm and the hand that enclosed the weapon and the movements of the ostensible one should alone be patent to the eye of the senses—then he, and not the other, would be held by the bystander as chargeable with the guilt. But so soon as the real nature of the transaction came to be understood, this imputation would be wholly and instantly transferred. The distinction would at once be recognized between the willing agent in this deed of horror, and the unwilling instrument. There would no more of moral blame be attached to the latter than to the weapon which inflicted the mortal blow; and on the former exclusively, the whole burden of the crime and its condemnation would be laid. And the simple difference which gives rise to the whole of this moral distinction in the estimate between them is, that with the one the act was with the will; with the other it was against it.

"5. This fixes a point of deepest interest, even that step in the process that leads to an emotion, at which the character of right or wrong comes to be applicable. It is not at that point, when the appetites or affections of our nature solicit from the will a particular movement; neither is it at that point when either a rational self-love or a sense of duty remonstrates against it. It is not at that point when the consent of the will is pleaded for, on the one side or other—but, all-important to be borne in mind, it is at that point when the consent is given. When we characterize a court at law for some one of its deeds—it is not upon the urgency of the argument on one side of the question, or of the reply upon the other, that we found our estimate; but wholly upon the decision of the bench, which decision is carried into effect by a certain order given out to the officers who execute it. And so, in characterizing an individual for some one of his doings, we found our estimate not upon the desires of appetite that may have instigated him on

the one hand, or upon the dictates of conscience that may have withstood these upon the other—not upon the elements that conflicted in the struggle but on the determination that put an end to it—even that determination of the will which is carried into effect by those volitions, on the issuing of which, the hands, and the feet, and the other instruments of action are put into instant subserviency.

And again, "That an action then be the rightful object either of moral censure or approval, it must have had the consent of the will to go along with it. It must be the fruit of a volition—else it is utterly beyond the scope, either of praise for its virtuousness, or of blame for its criminality. If an action be involuntary, it is as unfit a subject for any moral reckoning as are the pulsations of the wrist. Something ludicrous might occur which all of a sudden sets one irresistibly on the action of laughing; or a tale of distress might be told, which whether he wills or not, forces from him the tears of sympathy, and sets him as irresistibly on the action of weeping; or, on the appearance of a ferocious animal he might struggle with all his power for a serene and manly firmness, yet struggle in vain against the action of trembling; or if, instead of a formidable, a loathsome animal was presented to his notice, he might no more help the action of a violent recoil perhaps antipathy against it, than he can help any of the organic necessities of that constitution which has been given to him; or even upon the observation of what is disgusting in the habit or countenance of a fellow-man, he may be overpowered into a sudden and sensitive aversion; and lastly, should some gross and grievous transgression against the decencies of civilized life be practised before him, he might no more be able to stop that rush of blood to the complexion which marks the inward workings of an outraged and offended delicacy, than he is able to alter or suspend the law of its circulation. In each of these cases the action is involuntary; and precisely because it is so, the epithet neither of morally good nor of morally evil can be applied to it. And so of every action that comes, thus to speak, of its own accord; and not at the will or bidding of the agent. It may be painful to himself. It may also be painful to others. But if it have not had the consent of his will, even that consent without which no action that is done can be called voluntary, it is his misfortune and not his choice; and though not indifferent in regard to its consequences on the happiness of man, yet, merely because disjoined from the will, it in point of moral estimation is an act of the purest indifference."

From these extracts it is manifest, that the theory of Dr. Chalmers is, that no emotion, affection, or desire of the mind is stamped with a moral quality, unless it is the result of a volition producing it, either immediately or remotely.

To this doctrine we cannot give our assent. So far is it from being true, that every emotion or affection of the mind derives its morality from a preceding volition, on which it depends, that the very reverse is the truth. In our opinion, the morality of

an act of volition is, in all cases, derived from the motive which determines it. When an inquiry is made in a court of justice respecting the criminality of an action, the object is to ascertain the motive which influenced the volition. Suppose the external action be the killing of a man, it is evident that the volition producing the motion of the hand which inflicted the deadly wound, is the same, whatever may have been the motive. The volition to raise the hand and strike, is the same, whether it be done in the execution of law, in self defence, or through malice. Hence, it is manifest that the volition is not that which stamps the moral character of the action, but the motive which governs the volition. In the case just stated, if it be ascertained that the stroke by which life was taken, was in obedience to law, no blame attaches to the executioner. He has performed a duty—and a very painful one. Again, if it be proved that the mortal wound was inflicted on a violent assailant, purely in self-defence, and that the agent had no other way of preserving his own life, but by taking that of the assailant, we exonerate him from blame. But if it appear, on evidence, that the person committing the act was actuated by malice, and that he had long sought an opportunity of taking away the life of his fellow creature, we at once pronounce it a crime of the greatest enormity which a man can commit. Why this wide difference in our judgment, when the external act is in each case the same? Not because the volition was different in each case, for the volition required to give a certain motion to the muscles is the same, whatever be the moral nature of the act. The difference, according to the impartial judgment of all men, arises entirely from the motive from which it was done; and that, in all cases, is some affection or emotion of the mind, which precedes volition and produces it.

Dr. Chalmers was led into the doctrine which he maintains on the subject of the morality of our emotions, by a desire to correct an error which is common in the world; namely, that the mere emotions of sympathy, or other sensibilities arising instinctively from our animal constitution, are virtuous in their nature. Thus many on the sight of objects of suffering, feel at once a lively compassion, and also a tender sympathy. These emotions, whether produced by real or fictitious cases, they persuade themselves are virtuous feelings; whereas, they are

the mere sensibilities of our constitution, which in themselves possess no moral character.

Thus far, his opinions were correct, and the object at which he aimed was important. But, in our judgment, he erred in considering all our emotions as equally destitute of a moral character as these instinctive sensibilities, which have been mentioned. Indeed, he finds fault with Dr. Brown for distinguishing our emotions into such as involve the idea of morality and such as do not. "We think," says he, (pp. 176) "that Dr. Brown has made a wrong discrimination, when he speaks of certain emotions which involve in them a moral feeling, and certain others of them which do not. There is no moral designation applicable to any of the emotions, viewed nakedly in themselves. They are our volitions, and our volitions only, which admit of being thus characterized; and emotions are no further virtuous or vicious than as volitions are blended with them, and blended with them so far as to have given them either their direction or their birth." According to our judgment, Dr. Brown was altogether right in the distinction which he made between two classes of our emotions; and the distinction is very important in an accurate moral system. And Dr. Chalmers, by repudiating this distinction, and confining a moral character to volitions only, has involved his system in difficulties from which it cannot be extricated.

Our venerable author (in pp. 166) undertakes to fix the point at which an act of the mind begins to partake of a moral nature, and, agreeably to his theory, denies that it can possess anything of this character, prior to the volition of the will, consenting to the temptation by which it has been solicited. Now, in the case of the solicitation or impulse from mere appetites, or animal sensibilities, this doctrine is true; but the error as it relates to emotions in their very nature moral, will be manifest from an impartial consideration of a few examples. A man entertains envious and malign feelings towards his neighbour, but though he would be glad to injure him, yet is restrained by the power of an enlightened conscience, from coming to any determination to inflict any injury on him; the question is, are the feelings of envy and malice, which, though they were not strong enough to induce him to form a volition to do wrong to his neighbor, free from culpability? Every one sees, at once, that every degree

of envy and ill-will is sinful, whether it produces a volition or not. So, on the other hand, if we entertain benevolent feelings to our fellow creatures, although it may not be in our power to do them any good, it is evident that these feelings are virtuous, notwithstanding they owe neither their birth nor direction to a volition. Indeed, as we have before said, the virtue or vice of volitions is, in all cases, owing to the emotions or affections by which they are produced. We can conceive of a moral agent remaining long in a state of perfect holiness, without the exercise of volition. Suppose the case of a man or angel, formed in the image of God, possessing the knowledge of God; the love of such a being to the Creator would be perfect, prior to all volition, and this state of contemplation, accompanied by supreme love, might continue for an indefinite time, without any occasion for any act of volition. And, surely, no one can doubt that the supreme love of God is a virtuous affection. It is, truly, the sum of all virtue, the essence of holiness, as it is the obedience which the moral law requires.

We admit, what our venerable author teaches respecting *attention* as a mental operation, depending on the will; but this does by no means remove the difficulty in which his theory is involved. In the feelings of envy and malice, no volition is necessary to their existence; they are, in the order of nature, prior to volition; and so also in the case of love to God, and benevolence to men. Beside, the mere turning the attention to an object does not uniformly produce the affection which corresponds with the qualities of the object. The mind may be in a depraved state, so that it may not be susceptible of the emotions which would be produced in a rightly constituted heart. A man strongly prejudiced is not capable of viewing an object in its true light: his ideas are jaundiced by the existing state of his feelings. Much more will settled hatred prevent us from viewing the character of the object of our malice in an impartial manner, however much we may direct our attention to the object. The views which wicked men take of the character of God produce enmity instead of love, because they are incapable of perceiving the beauty and glory of his moral character; and the knowledge which they possess of the justice and purity of his nature, leads them to the conclusion, that these attributes are arrayed against them, and they therefore cannot but conclude, that He is angry

with them, and disposed to punish them for their sins; on which account, their hearts are filled with enmity toward their Creator and Sovereign. It is evident, therefore, that the power which the will has over the attention, or the direction of the thoughts to a particular object, will only produce the right affection or emotion, when the heart is in a state of purity; or, is in that state in which it is capable of taking correct views of the proper objects of affection, and susceptible of the right emotions under these views.

It may be asked, then, how we dispose of the maxim on which Dr. Chalmers founds his doctrine, and which we have admitted is universally received; namely, that an action to be of a moral nature, must be voluntary? This is a very proper and reasonable inquiry, and deserves a deliberate answer; for we cannot dispute the truth of the maxim; which is, indeed, self-evident. And if Dr. Chalmers has given the true meaning, and made the proper application of the aforesaid maxim, the question is settled. But we are of opinion, that the distinguished author has fallen into a common mistake, both in regard to the meaning and application of this universally admitted maxim. The word *voluntary* is ambiguous; or rather it is used in a more comprehensive, and in a more restricted sense. According to the first, it includes all the exercises of the mind which are spontaneous. As for example, when we divide the powers of the mind into two great classes, the understanding and will; under the latter we include all the desires, affections, emotions and volitions. According to this definition, our desires and affections are voluntary exercises, not because they are produced or directed by volition; but in their own nature, because they are spontaneous. We are as free in the exercise of affection as volition. Every man is conscious that his strongest affections are spontaneous, without referring to any previous volitions. Now in this comprehensive meaning of the word *voluntary* the maxim in question is universally true; but not in the restricted sense in which the word is employed by Dr. Chalmers. If men are accountable for anything, it is for their motives, and these are nothing else but their desires and affections; or as they are called in the new nomenclature, *emotions*. Here we have the true source of moral action and accountability. No volition possesses any moral quality which is not derived from the character of the

motives which produced it, and by which the will was governed. A man wills to turn his attention to the contemplation of the works of God in the universe, the volition by which he determines to perform this act is either morally good or evil, according to the motive which produced it. Suppose the motive was to try to find some such defects in the arrangement or laws of the universe, as would furnish an argument in favour of atheism, or against divine providence. This being an evil motive, stamps the volition with the same moral character. But if the motive be a desire to glorify God by adoring his perfections as displayed in his works, the motive is pious and good, and its character is given to the volition which is the consequence of it. Yet, in both cases, the naked act of volition is precisely the same. Take another example, a man is observed to give a sum of money to a beggar. The volition to perform the outward act of giving is the same, whatever be the motive; but to ascertain the true moral character of the act, we must know the motive from which it was done. If from vain glory, it is morally evil; if from benevolence to a suffering fellow-creature, it is good. But, in our opinion, there is prevalent not only a common mistake respecting the true import of the maxim, that every moral action must be voluntary, but also an error in the application of the maxim. As it is an admitted primary, or self-evident truth, it applies to actions consequent on volition, but not to emotions and dispositions which precede volition. And in this restricted application of the maxim, we may admit the correctness of its meaning, as employed by Dr. Chalmers. Properly speaking, every action of man is voluntary; because nothing, in strict accuracy, is an action of our own, which is not the consequence of a volition. To say then, that every moral action must be voluntary, is intuitively true; because, if not voluntary, it would not be our own; since all our own actions whether moral or not, are voluntary; for man can act in no other way than through the will. In this use of the word, emotions and desires would not be considered *as actions*; an action is always the result of volition. A great part of the disputes which exist on this and kindred subjects, arises from the ambiguity or want of precision in terms. The mistakes into which many fall, respecting human ability, have a near affinity with the errors

of which we have been speaking. It is a maxim, which cannot be contradicted, that no one can be bound to do what is out of his power; or, in other words, that obligation and ability are of equal extent. Now this maxim is strictly true, when properly applied; that is, to actions consequent on the will; but when applied to the affections or dispositions of the heart, the maxim is found to be utterly false; for the more inveterate and deep-rooted a malevolent affection, the less is it under the control of the will; and, yet, the more criminal it is in proportion to its strength. By a misapplication of an evident maxim, a doctrine evidently false has been zealously maintained, in our day; namely, that the most depraved sinner possesses the ability to render instantly all the obedience, which the law of God requires. And from a state of absolute enmity, has power to change his heart to a state of perfect love to God; otherwise perfect love to God would not be an incumbent duty. And according to this, every sinner, however depraved his dispositions or inveterate his evil habits, can divest himself of all sin, and become perfect in holiness, at any moment. Now, these monstrous errors, which contradict the common sense and experience of all men, arise very logically from applying a maxim, which is true only in relation to actions which depend on the will, to emotions and affections of the heart; to which it has no proper application. It would be utterly unjust to require a man to do a work or perform an act, for which he possesses no physical ability, if he willed it ever so sincerely. As for example, to raise the dead, or to lift up a mountain. But, suppose the same man, on account of long indulgence in sin, to be incapable of exercising love to God or his neighbour, his inability to put forth these right affections is no excuse; it is his fault. And there is no injustice in requiring of man the exercise of right affections. It would be a false and dangerous rule, to measure a man's moral obligation by his ability to render complete obedience to the law. The more inveterate and malign a wicked man's hatred of his neighbour, the less ability has he to love him as himself; but the want of such ability, arising from depravity of heart, does not, in the least, lessen his obligation to obedience. If a son have conceived a mortal hatred to his father, so that he cannot think of him without malice; his duty, nevertheless, is to honour him. This, however, is a digression from our

proper subject. Dr. Chalmers entertained no such opinions, as those last mentioned. And, indeed, except in the particular on which we have ventured to animadvert, we have scarcely met with anything in the voluminous writings of this extraordinary man, with which we do not fully concur. And our discussion of this point, has not arisen from any desire to be found arraying our opinions and reasonings against one, with whom it would be the height of arrogance to compare ourselves, *sed humanum est errare*. The greatest men are liable to errors; and their mistakes may be of such a nature that unless corrected and refuted, they will do injury to the cause of truth; and the greater injury in proportion to the eminence of the writer from whom they have proceeded. No man was more ready to correct and retract his errors than Dr. Chalmers; of which some remarkable instances could be given.

Although the volume under review, is principally occupied with the discussion respecting our emotions, and their relation to the will; yet it contains some interesting matter on other subjects.

In the IX. chapter, we have a discriminating discussion "On the Phenomena of Anger and Gratitude, and the Moral Theory founded on them." The remarks of the venerable author on these points are intended to point out the defects of Dr. Adam Smith's "Theory of the Moral Sentiments." While he gives due praise to that distinguished writer for ingenuity and felicitous illustration, he shows very convincingly, the radical unsoundness of his popular theory. The reader will, we doubt not, be gratified with a short extract from this chapter.

"The controversy upon this subject is—whether it is the sympathy which originates our moral judgment, or our moral judgment which regulates and determines the sympathy. Dr. Smith conceived that the sympathy took the antecedency of our moral judgments; and this principle has been conceived by the great majority of our writers on morals, and we think justly conceived, to be erroneous. It is a theory exceedingly well illustrated by himself, and exceedingly well appreciated by Dr. Thomas Brown. In spite of its fundamental error, the book is worthy of most attentive perusal—abounding, as it does, in the most felicitous illustrations of human life, and in shrewd and successful fetches among the mysteries of the human character.

"It is not because we sympathize with the resentment that we hold the action in question to be the proper and approved object of this feeling; but because we hold it to be the proper and approved object of resentment, that we sympathize. And we do so, not on the impulse of principles that are

originated by sympathy; but on the impulse of principles which, original in themselves, originate the sympathy that we feel. When we see an unoffending individual subjected in his person to the wanton insult of a blow, or in his property to the inroad of some ruthless depredation—we do not need to witness the resentment of his bosom, ere a like or a kindred feeling shall arise as by infection in our own; nor mentally to place ourselves in his situation, and thus to ascertain how we should feel aggrieved or affronted by the treatment that we see him to experience. The circumstance of not being the sufferer myself may give a greater authority to my judgment—because a judgment unwarped by the passions or the partialities of selfishness; but still it is a judgment that comes forth without that process of internal manufacture, of which Dr. Smith conceives it to be the resulting commodity. We judge as immediately and directly on a question of equity between one man and another, as we can on a question of equality between one line and another: And when that equity is violated, there is as instantaneous an emotion awakened in the heart of me the spectator, as there is in the heart of him the sufferer. With him it is anger. With me it is denominated indignation—the one being the resentment of him who simply feels, that he has been disturbed or encroached upon the enjoyment of that which he hath habitually regarded to be his own; the other a resentment felt on perceiving a like encroachment on that which might equitably or rightfully be regarded as his own.”

The X. chapter on “Perfect and Imperfect Obligation,” is properly a continuance of the same subject, and contains a number of original and discriminating remarks, worthy the attention of the reader.

ART. III.—*Duelling—Code of Honour.*

A duel is a combat with deadly weapons between two persons agreeably to previous arrangements. It differs from a boxing match because in it no weapons are used. It differs from a rencounter, because that is a sudden combat without pre-meditation. The boxing match and rencounter may be as immoral and as fatal in their consequences as the duel, but neither of them is a duel, neither of them, in our country at least, is regulated by the code of honour.

There have been four kinds of duels in the world. The first was where two hostile armies agreed to select each a champion to meet and fight. Thus David and Goliath fought. Thus Diomedes and Æneas fought. The combat between the Ho-

ratii and Curatii, though not a *duel*, yet involved the same general principle. This kind of combat is not necessarily contrary to sound morality. No man esteems David's conduct, in the matter of Goliath, immoral. The motive to such combat may be the saving of much blood. Whether it will ever again be wise or lawful to resort to this mode of ending contests is a point on which three brief remarks only are offered. The first is that the question cannot arise in our country, the laws governing our armies by their whole scope forbidding it. Another remark is that the consent of the sovereign power would be necessary to give obligation to any contract for terminating hostilities in a given manner upon the issue of such a combat. Such consent can never in our country be given. The third remark is that the whole subject of such combats belongs to writers on the laws of war and not to moralists. Further remarks on the point are not therefore demanded in this essay.

The second kind of duel is not in use amongst us. It was introduced into the South of Europe by the Northern barbarians. It was a superstition. It was an ordeal. Without authority, and therefore presumptuously, and wickedly it pledged divine interposition to show, by the result, who was innocent and who was guilty. Such systematic folly and wickedness all civilized nations now reject. Yet the practice, without, for some time, losing much of its superstition, was engrafted on the chivalry, which at one time so much abounded among the barons and gentry of Europe.

Thus arose the third kind of duel. At first these duellists fought not for themselves, but for some humbler person, or for some fair lady. This system was legalized, and for ages constituted a part of the feudal system. The chief thing noticeable in it was the folly of its origin, and its criminal waste of human life. Although knights commonly fought in harness, and therefore were much protected, yet they became so skillful as frequently to give deadly wounds between the joints of the harness. Great multitudes thus perished.

The kind of duel practised in civilized nations in our day combines most of the evils of former systems. It is maintained to avenge personal and family insults. It cannot be shielded or palliated by the plea of such ignorance as prevailed in the dark ages. It can in no way be justified. "Thou shalt not

kill," is the plain command of the God that made us. No acumen can reconcile the letter of this prohibition with the destruction of human life in a duel. The law is clear. No exception is made in other parts of the divine code in favour of duelling, as there plainly is in favour of taking life in lawful war, in criminal punishments by judicial process, and in defending your dwelling against house-breakers. No man pretends ever to have found in the word of God such an exception. It is not there. The contrariety betwixt duelling and the law of God is manifest and remains in full and undiminished force. The statute is unrepealed. The practice is still maintained. Were the consciences of duellists firmly bound by any law of God, *as such*, they would be bound by this. Nor is this all. The modern duel includes in itself the guilt of suicide. Those, to whom these views can be of any service, will not maintain that man is possessed of the right of taking his own life at pleasure, or of wantonly exposing it to destruction. Nor can it be necessary to prove that he, who voluntarily and unbidden by God puts himself in a position where he is hit by the ball of another, is as truly criminal as if he had fired a pistol at his own body. All this is plain. An acquaintance with the first principles of morals must lead to such conclusions. Respecting many suicides there is room for hope that the fatal deed is not committed until reason is dethroned, and the delirium of a fevered brain holds the sceptre over the man. But no such soothing reflection can be indulged when a man voluntarily, in a duel, exposes his life to danger. He cannot be regarded as mad in any other sense than that the sorcery of sin has destroyed his moral sense respecting a great law of morality. His blood, if shed, is, in a fearful sense, on himself. Though he may from the first intend to fire his own weapon into the air, and may never aim it at any human bosom, yet if he exposes his own body to the fire of an antagonist in a duel, he incurs the guilt of suicide. He is in heart a self-murderer. If he dies in the duel, he dies a self-murderer. He has done what the law of nature and the word of God forbid. The great and peculiar heinousness of this crime consists in this, that the perpetrator of it may die in an act, which admits of neither reparation, nor repentance. Not only his present life, but his eternal well-being are put in criminal and awful jeopardy every time he goes on the field. If

there he falls, and there expires, we are compelled to remember the decision of Him who cannot lie: "No murderer hath eternal life abiding in him." This is as true of a self-murderer as of any other murderer. Moreover, duelling is, in its very nature murderous. The weapons chosen are the weapons of death. The efforts of each are almost without exception for the destruction of his antagonist's life. The fact of a malignant *animus* is proven by all the circumstances attending duels, and especially by aiming a deadly weapon, with practised skill, at the person of the adversary, intending to banish him from this world. This aim is deliberate. Here is more than the guilt of manslaughter. Here is murderous intention and if life is taken, here is MURDER.

This is indeed strong but not rash language. Sir Matthew Hale says: "This is a plain case, and without any question. If one kill another in fight, even upon the provocation of him that is killed, this is murder." Judge Foster says: "Deliberate duelling, if death ensue, is, in the eye of the law, murder." Sir Edward Coke says: "Single combat between any of the king's subjects is strictly prohibited by the laws of the realm, and on this principle that in states governed by law, no man, in consequence of any injury whatever, ought to indulge the principle of private revenge." Blackstone, quoting from Coke, says: "Murder is when a person, of sound memory and discretion, unlawfully killeth any reasonable creature in being, and under the king's peace, with malice aforethought, either express or implied." The entire applicability of this definition to the crime of killing in a duel will probably be granted by all, except so much as relates to malice aforethought. Even a part of this will not be denied, viz.: that if there be malice at all, it is malice aforethought. Is there malice at all? The forbidden act of shooting with intent to kill creates strong proof of malice. "This malice aforethought," says the authority just quoted, "is the grand criterion, which now distinguishes murder from other killing; and this malice prepense is not so properly spite or malevolence to the deceased in particular, as any evil design in general: the dictate of a wicked, depraved and malignant heart: and it may be either express or implied in law. Express malice is when one, with a sedate, deliberate mind and formed design, doth kill another, which formed design is evidenced by external

circumstances discovering that inward intention; as laying in wait, antecedent menaces, former grudges, and concerted schemes to do some bodily harm. This takes in the case of deliberate duelling, where both parties meet avowedly with an intent to murder: thinking it their duty as gentlemen, and claiming it as their right, to wanton with their own lives and those of their fellow-creatures; without any authority or warrant from any power either human or divine, but in direct contradiction to the laws both of God and man." Elsewhere the same thing is illustrated and confirmed by the same able writer. The foregoing authorities have been cited because their statement of principles is clear, and because being made by eminent lawyers and judges, not by divines and moralists, they must have authority with all classes of readers, who regard any human authority with the least respect. Such authorities cannot be suspected of being led away by a wild religious fervour, or by a foolish devotion to a fine-spun theory in morals.

Killing in a duel, then, is murder—intent to kill in a duel is intent to commit murder, and it ought not to be allowed to bear any other name.

Both human and divine laws very properly guard human life with the utmost caution. Blackstone says: "If a man in a populous town throws carelessly from a housetop any tile or timber, and gives no notice to the crowd that is usually passing below, though he may see no one, yet if one thereby be killed, it is not merely manslaughter, but it is murder, and the law assigns the reason that such an act is an expression of malignity against all mankind; and even if he give loud warning, and yet it be in a place, where many persons usually pass, and one be killed, it is man-slaughter, and is punishable by the laws." If these things be so, by what principle is he turned loose unpunished, who not only is careless about human life, but who trains himself to the skilful use of deadly weapons that he may destroy it, meets a fellow-creature by arrangement, and takes away his life? Divine law is no less loud and clear in its demands for the punishment of murder. The great precept given to Noah for the race of man reads thus: "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed." The reason given for this law, however it may be interpreted, is of no less force in this day than in the days of Noah. It is in these words: "For in

the image of God made He man." This reason will have unabated force while the world shall stand. Other parts of scripture show no less clearly the divine mind. In the judicial law regulating murder and trial for murder in the only commonwealth whose municipal regulations God ever enacted, He repeatedly says: "The murderer shall surely be put to death;" and he assigns no other reason than this: "He is a murderer." Num. xxxv: 16, 17, 18, 19, 21. Again, "A man that doeth violence to the blood of any person shall flee to the pit; let no man stay him." Pr. xxviii: 17.

In defence of a practice so repugnant to the laws of God and man, it is sometimes pleaded that duelling is in accordance with a code of laws fit for the government of gentlemen, commonly called THE CODE OF HONOUR.

Whenever a code is mentioned, we naturally inquire for the enacting power. Where is the enacting power here? Who made these laws of honour? God did not. They are utterly repugnant to his revealed will. Nor has any legally constituted legislative body sanctioned them. Nearly all legislatures have condemned them. Yet duellists do not hesitate to bow submissively to these precepts. Nay, numbers of them have called these rules "the commandments," and thus added profanity to their other sins. But what is the code of honour? What does it require? We shall try to answer these questions, somewhat at length. A view of some of the provisions of these laws of blood and murder may lead to a greater abhorrence of them than our readers yet have. Indeed they are so bloody and devilish that it may well be doubted whether any of the laws of Draco were half so well suited to people the grave, or make earth a hell. The reader will know where to affix blame and against whom to indulge disgust, if the details offend him, as we hope they will. A detail of particulars is necessary to a right understanding of the merits of the code. A code of honour was published in Ireland in 1777. It was "settled by the gentlemen delegates of Tipperary, Galway, Mayo, Sligo, and Roscommon, and prescribed for general adoption throughout Ireland." It is still in force, at least in its leading provisions, among the gentlemen of Tipperary and Galway. The whole number of rules settled was thirty-six. To give all would be tedious. The following will be sufficient. "*Ex uno disce omnes,*" and "*Noscitur*

a sociis" are maxims fully applicable to this code. Here they are: "The first offence requires the first apology, although the retort may have been more offensive than the insult: example; A tells B he is impertinent, &c., B retorts, that he lies; yet A must make the first apology, because he gave the first offence, and then (after one fire) B may explain away the retort by subsequent apology. But if the parties would rather fight on, then, after two shots each, (but in no case before) B may explain first, and A apologize afterwards. If a doubt exist who gave the first offence, the decision rests with the seconds; if they will not decide, or cannot agree, the matter must proceed to two shots, or a hit, if the challenger requires it. When the lie direct is the first offence, the aggressor must either beg pardon in express terms; exchange two shots previous to apology; or three shots followed up by an explanation; or fire on till a severe hit be received by one party or the other. A blow is strictly prohibited under any circumstances among gentlemen, no verbal apology can be received for such an insult: the alternatives, therefore, are, the offender handing a cane to the injured party, to be used on his own back, at the same time begging pardon; firing on until one or both are disabled; or exchanging three shots, and then asking pardon without the proffer of the cane. If swords are used, the parties engage till one is well blooded, disabled or disarmed; or until, after receiving a wound, and blood being drawn, the aggressor begs pardon. N. B. A disarm is considered the same as a disable; the disarmer may (strictly) break his adversary's sword; but if it be the challenger who is disarmed, it is considered ungenerous to do so. In case the challenged be disarmed and refuses to ask pardon or atone, he must not be killed as formerly; but the challenger may lay his own sword on the aggressor's shoulder, then break the aggressor's sword, and say, 'I spare your life!' The challenged can never revive the quarrel, the challenger may. If A gives B the lie, and B retorts by a blow, (being the two greatest offences,) no reconciliation can take place till after two discharges each, or a severe hit; after which, B may beg A's pardon for the blow and then A may explain simply for the lie; because a blow is never allowable, and the offence of the lie, therefore, merges in it. N. B. Challenges for undivulged causes may be reconciled on the ground, after one shot. An explanation, or the slightest

hit, should be sufficient in such cases, because no personal offence transpired. But no apology can be received, in any case, after the parties have actually taken their ground, without exchange of fires. In the above case, no challenger is obliged to divulge the cause of his challenge (if private) unless required by the challenged to do so before their meeting. All imputations of cheating at play, races, &c., to be considered equivalent to a blow; but may be reconciled after one shot, on admitting their falsehood, and begging pardon publicly. No dumb shooting, or firing in the air, admissible in any case. The challenger ought not to have challenged without receiving offence; and the challenged ought, if he gave offence, to have made an apology before he came on the ground: therefore children's play must be dishonourable on one side or the other, and is accordingly prohibited. Seconds to be of equal rank in society with the principals they attend, inasmuch as a second may choose or chance to become a principal, and equality is indispensable. Challenges are never to be delivered at night, unless the party to be challenged intend leaving the place of offence before morning; for it is desirable to avoid all hot-headed proceedings. The challenged has the right to choose his own weapon, unless the challenger gives his honour he is no swordsman; after which, however, he cannot decline any second species of weapon proposed by the challenged. The challenged chooses his ground, the challenger chooses his distance; the seconds fix the time and terms of firing. The seconds load in presence of each other, unless they give their mutual honours that they have charged smooth and single, which should be held sufficient. Any wound sufficient to agitate the nerves, and necessarily make the hands shake, must end the matter for that day. In slight cases, the second hands his principal but one pistol, but in gross cases, two, holding another case ready charged in reserve. When seconds disagree, and resolve to exchange shots themselves, it must be at the same time and at right angles with their principals. No party can be allowed to bend his knee or cover his side with his left hand, but may present at any level from the hip to the eye." The above specimens of the Tipperary gentlemen's Code of Honour will no doubt satisfy *usque ad nauseam* every reader. We shall, therefore, give no more of its rules.

The Americans, we believe, have never had a meeting of

delegates to settle the practice of duelling and points of honour. Some fight by the Irish code, some by the French, some by the English, and some by a modification of all these. Some attempts have, we believe, been made to codify or digest the rules for the government of duellists in this country, but American "gentlemen," we believe, prefer, as the French and English do, more latitude than the Irish delegates gave themselves. We are free to say also that the rules commonly holding in this country are not always so sanguinary as those we have just given. But they are still sufficiently bloody to satisfy a most diabolical malice and to fill some parts of the land with murder and lamentation. The following principles may be stated as belonging to the code as practised in America. Some insults cannot be compromised or settled without fighting; a man is responsible for insults given in a drunken frolic; words do not satisfy words, nor blows blows; blows satisfy words; seconds need not see each other load; seconds go armed to the field, first to shoot the adversary of his principal, if the adversary has taken any advantage, and secondly to keep the other second in order; wounded persons are not to be permitted to fight; in slight cases parties may be reconciled so as to shake hands and part friends, after one ineffective shot, even without apology or explanation; if principals will not fight, seconds are to pronounce them cowards, and abandon them on the field; seconds on both sides are to proffer assistance to the wounded; principals must not make mouths, nor use abusive words, nor fret one another on the field; you are not bound to fight a minor unless you have made a companion of him; you are bound to fight a respectable stranger; seconds have absolute control after a challenge is given and accepted; unusual weapons, distances, times and places may be rejected; a father, brother, or son cannot be a second, nor even permitted to be on the field; time may always be claimed to make a will; &c., &c., &c. Respecting this code in all its modifications, it may safely be stated—

1. That it is shockingly immoral both in its precepts and penalties, both in theory and in practice. It violates all the charities of life, all the moral obligations, under which men live. It tramples on the laws of God. It defies the laws of the country. It reputes forbearance a weakness, and forgiveness a meanness. It exalts diabolical passions to a seat among the highest virtues.

It puts revenge and murder above patience and meekness. A system more immoral in principle and practice could not be devised.

2. This code is full of absurdity. It places the aggressor and the aggrieved on the same footing; or if the aggressor be the best shot or the smallest mark, it gives him the advantage. If a man be injured and venture to complain, by this code he may be compelled to go to the field and lose his life and have his wife written a widow and his children orphans. There is hardly an end to the ridiculous doctrines, which may be fairly drawn from its rules.

3. This code is useless. It elicits no truth in any controversy. It determines not who is innocent, or who guilty. By common consent it proves no man a hero. It seldom proves a man a coward. It does not even prove a man to be a good marksman, or a good swordsman. Innumerable cases show the truth of this last remark. In 1815 the English almost invariably killed the French officers with the sword, the former unskilled and the latter expert swordsmen. A few years ago —, no shot with a rifle, killed —, who was one of the sharpest shooters with that weapon. Duelling cannot add to the solid reputation of any man. Surely it never adds to the comfort of the duellist himself.

4. This code is very bloody, not only in its laws, but also in its results. During the first eighteen years of the reign of Henry the Fourth, 4,000 gentlemen perished by duels in France alone. In 172 consecutive duels 63 persons were killed and 96 wounded and 48 of them desperately. This last statement is made on the faith of an official paper which was prepared in England. A few years ago four individuals were killed in four successive duels in the same section of our country. Some men have fought ten, others twenty, and some as high as thirty duels, and in a majority of cases have either killed their antagonists or given a dreadful wound. There was such a man in this country a few years ago. He has now gone to eternity. Such men become a terror to all around them. In some parts of our country there is scarcely a family of high standing whose peace has not been disturbed, or whose dreadful fears have not been awakened, or whose joy has not been turned to mourning at some time by the worship of this modern Moloch. In the space

of eighteen months three of the friends of the writer of this article fell in duels. This code smells horribly of blood.

Indeed, it is impossible to look into the code of honour, however it may be modified, without observing at every step its utter contrariety to right, and truth, and reason and charity. It is variable. A challenged adversary disarmed "must not be *killed* as formerly." Neither is there any certainty, except in the death of one of the parties, that a serious quarrel can ever be settled. The old maxim, "*Interest reipublicae finem esse litium*," can have no place here. A man may be challenged, fight, be disarmed, yea, be "well-blooded," and yet after all be called out again. Nor is it true that the lie and the blow are the two greatest offences." Seduction and murder are worse in the judgment of all men except duellists. Why would it not do as well to ask pardon or make an apology before two shots, or one shot, or a hit as before? It is worthy of notice, that gaming, racing, &c., are in the Irish code connected with duelling, and if common fame does not lie beyond her wont, there is much cheating at gaming, racing, &c. He who is cheated, however, must by this code pocket his loss, and say not a word. This code calls not for evidence, but a pistol. If A calls B impertinent and B retorts you are a liar, why does not the lie satisfy for the charge of impertinence? Or if A strikes B with his hand and B *canes* A soundly, why must B go further? Because the spirit of *vengeance* is the spirit of this code. Why may not a father, a brother, or a son be present at a duel and witness the valour of a son, or brother, or father, or at least close their eyes if killed? Because the yearnings of natural affection may be too strong to allow the work of murder to proceed gracefully and coolly. Why may not a gentleman fight a minor under any circumstances? Because it would be cruel to kill the poor boy, or send him home to his mother with a mortal wound? But is it more cruel to write a woman childless than to write her a widow, and her children orphans? This code requires principals to be passive except as directed by seconds. The second keeps the honour of his friend. What right has any man to become passive in an affair involving murder? Can there be any thing more preposterous than two men shooting at each other because the seconds "will not decide or cannot agree, whether A or B gave the first offence?" Why

may not an apology be given after the parties take position on the field? Reason would say that an apology for a wrong was always due and was always in order. Why should a man be allowed to call another to account for an offence not stated? But has this code no tender mercies? Yes! but they are few and soon told. You may claim time to make a will. How benignant and considerate! If one party be wounded, the second of the other party should proffer assistance. A very good and soothing nurse must he be, who has just loaded the pistol by which I have been mortally wounded! These are all the tender mercies of the code. A short story of tenderness, to be sure. But there is gallantry in a duel! aye, ladies's honour is to be protected. But how can it benefit a lady that her favourite should be shot down? If anything of passion or unfairness appear in these views, let it be shewn, and it shall be esteemed as it deserves. But it is hard to write on such a subject with the *sang froid*, with which one would eat a beef-steak, or despatch a melon. Indignation, if ever justifiable, might rise high when speaking of this bloody and murderous code.

Some may say that the practice of duelling maintains in the world much of that courage, which is so useful in emergencies, and so ornamental to human character. We do not deny the value of true courage. It is an enviable quality. But what is it and who has it? Is it recklessness of life? Does it delight in the smell of blood? Is it malignant as a fiend? No man has true courage except so far as he is a good man. "The righteous are as bold as a lion, but the wicked flee when no man pursueth." Burke says: "The only *real* courage is generated by the fear of God. He who fears God, fears nothing else." Addison says that courage "is that heroic spirit inspired by the conviction that our cause being just, God will protect us in its prosecution." Even Seneca, whose mind was unenlightened either by Christianity or modern civilization, says that "courage is properly the contempt of hazards *according to reason*; but that to run into danger from *mere passion* is rather a daring and brutal fierceness, than an honourable courage." Cicero, in some respects the greatest of heathen philosophers, says, "that sort of courage which disregards the rules of justice, and is displayed, not for the public good, but for private

selfish ends, is altogether blameable; and so far from being a part of true virtue, that it is indeed a piece of the most barbarous inhumanity." Plato says, "As that sort of knowledge which is not directed by the rules of justice ought rather to have the name of design and subtlety, than wisdom and prudence; just so that bold and adventurous mind, which is hurried on by the stream of its own passions, and not for the good of the public, should rather have the name of *foolhardy* and *daring*, than valiant and courageous." Addison elsewhere says: "Courage that grows from constitution, very often forsakes a man when he has occasion for it; and when it is only a kind of instinct in the soul, it breaks out, on all occasions, without judgment or discretion; but that courage, which arises from a sense of duty, and from a fear of offending Him that made us, always acts in an uniform manner, and according to the dictates of right reason." That admirable writer, the Duc de Sully, whose cool and generous courage was never questioned, speaking of duels, says: "That which arms us against our friends or countrymen, in contempt of all laws, as well divine as human, is but a brutal fierceness, madness, and real pusillanimity." When courage is calm, rational, firm, mild and just, all good men respect it and do most reverent obeisance to it. It is truth and justice and honour sitting on a throne of virtue. It has no malignity. It neither raves nor rages. It never secretly thirsts for vengeance. It is no more like the false courage of the duellist than gold is like cinders. That destitution of nervous sensibility, which enables some to wear an aspect of indifference in the midst of danger, if a good quality at all, is possessed in a much higher degree by the opossum or the oyster, than by any of your point of honour men. True courage, therefore, is neither evinced nor promoted by duelling. None will deny that cowards go to the field, and act with apparent coolness. And no one, whose opportunities of observation have been considerable, doubts that on an amiable man the effect of killing an antagonist in a duel is to make him nervous, restless, timid and melancholy. Some such seem to anticipate the pains of hell. A dreadful sound is in their ears. Their punishment seems to be greater than they can bear. Two young bloods were about to fight not long since. The seconds of each applied to a famous duellist, who had killed

his man, for some instruction how to proceed. To each of them he said before they left him: "Be sure that you arrange things so that both the principals shall be killed." He said this in a very serious way. The inference drawn by both from what he said, was, that, in his judgment, life was intolerable to a duellist, who had killed another.

A good writer, speaking on this subject, supposes the duellist to have escaped hanging and all legal consequences, and to be still in the bosom of his family and friends, and then says: "How fares it with him in the court of conscience? Is he able to keep off the grim arrests of that? Can he drown the cry of blood, and bribe his own thoughts to let him alone? Can he fray off the vulture from his breast, that night and day is gnawing his heart, and wounding it with ghastly and amazing reflections?"

Whether it is that God has done it for the defence of men's lives, or whether it is the unnaturalness of the sin, or whatsoever else may be the cause, certain it is, that there is nothing which dogs the conscience so incessantly, fastens upon it so closely, and tears it so furiously, as the dismal sense of blood-guiltiness. The man perhaps endeavours to be merry; he goes about his business; he enjoys his cups and his jolly company; and, possibly, if he fought for revenge, he is applauded and admired by some; if he fought for a mistress, he is smiled upon for a day. But when in the midst of all his gaities, his conscience shall come and sound him in his ear: "Sir, you are to remember that you have murdered a man, and, what is more, you have murdered a soul, you have sacrificed an immortal nature, the image of God . . . to a pique, a punctilio, to the love of a pitiful creature, lighter than vanity, and emptier than the air; and these are the worthy causes for which your brother now lies in the regions of darkness and misery, without relief, without recovery; an eternal sacrifice to a short passion, a rash anger and a sudden revenge."

For a system thus composed and bringing forth such fruits who dares to apologize? The system was born in superstition, nourished in depravity, and justified only by the frenzies of passion. It is a system forbidden by all sacred principles of law, reason, morals and religion, against which the solemn protesta-

tions of the living, the keen regrets of the dying,* the unsheltered orphanage and the early widowhood of thousands lift up their awful voice; a system, whose habiliments are rolled in blood, whose tender mercies are refined cruelty, whose brightest hopes are turned into the agonies of the damned by the fearful looking-for of judgment; a system, which outrages all the charities of life, invades the sanctuary of domestic love, and pours horror and anguish into the bosoms of the innocent and unoffending.

Shall any rise up and demand that we award to such a system the meed of honour? The demand can never be granted. Humanity and God forbid it. Honour is a sacred thing. Honour is not lawless. Honour is not cruel. Honour delights in the approbation of the good and the wise who never approve of murder in a duel or in any other way. Honour is tender-hearted, humane, generous. Honour never contemns the ties of humanity. Honour casts from her even her own rights, when insisting upon them does a great wrong to others. Honour never willingly mingles the tears of widows and orphans with the blood of husbands and fathers. Honour is far above pure selfishness. She looks at the things of others. She bows to the majesty of law; she listens to the conclusions of reason and the dictates of conscience; she obeys the voice of God.

So long as this system shall find defenders and advocates amongst us, human life will be wasted on punctilios, transcendent worth and talent will be the mark, against which pique and ambition will direct their deadliest shafts, the land will be polluted with blood, the tokens of heaven's wrath against the land will be seen in the untimely death of men, whose services were demanded both by their families and by the state, and the monuments of our wickedness will be found in every graveyard, and there will come upon us the curse of them, that build a town with blood and a city by iniquity, for the stone shall cry out of the wall, and the beam out of the timber shall answer it. Have not sighs enough been heard and groans enough been uttered, and widows enough been made, and babes enough been thrown fatherless upon that hand of charity which has nothing in it, and gray hairs enough gone down sorrowing to the grave, and blood enough been spilled to satisfy the most

* See Alexander Hamilton's dying views of duelling.

deluded devotees of a system, which has made many a spot in our land an Aceldama and a Golgotha, a field of blood and the place of a skull?

CAN ANY THING BE DONE TO ARREST THE EVIL? is a question of great importance. It may with confidence be answered in the affirmative. Public sentiment can be rectified, where it is now wrong. A code allowing fornication, adultery, drunkenness, extreme revenge, cruelty to inferiors, a refusal to pay just debts, and murder, cannot bear the test of serious and thorough examination. Let all, who hate deeds of blood do their duty and much can be done to stay the destroyer. Now is a good time for the friends of law, order and religion to exert themselves. The laws of the states are strongly against it. The judiciary of the country is openly on the side of law and peace. When the judges of the Supreme Court of the United States were invited by a committee of the House of Representatives to attend the funeral of Mr. — they conferred together on the subject, and, “after mature deliberation,” adopted the following resolutions:

“Resolved, That the justices of the Supreme Court entertain a high respect for the character of the deceased, sincerely deplore his untimely death, and sympathize with his bereaved family in the heavy affliction which has fallen upon them.

“Resolved, That with every desire to manifest their respect for the House of Representatives, and the Committee of the House, by whom they have been invited, and for the memory of the lamented deceased, the justices of the Supreme Court cannot, consistently with the duties they owe to the public, attend in their official characters the funeral of one, who has fallen in a duel.

“Ordered, That these proceedings be entered on the minutes of the Court, and that the Chief Justice enclose a copy to the chairman of the committee of the House of Representatives.”

Such mildness and firmness, such sympathy for the suffering and such determination not to swerve from duty are above all praise. The example set was worthy of its authors and their high station. If all men in high places would equally do their duty, thousands would bless them.

The course of our present Chief Magistrate, both before and since he began to fill his present office, deserves high admira-

tion. When Speaker of the House of Representatives he fearlessly performed his duty in the face of taunt and provocation. He is now commended in no quarter more than by some at least, who gave the highest provocation. Since his term, as President, commenced, he has dismissed from the Navy every one, from a Commandant to a Midshipman, who has engaged in a duel. Duels in the regular army seldom occur. There has not at any time been a duel between officers of the army, who had been trained at West Point. This speaks well for that institution. May our Naval School at Annapolis prove as great a blessing in this respect. Let all men, who administer the laws follow these bright examples of fearlessness in the discharge of duty. And let all men, who revere law and love their kind, testify against the practice. Let mothers teach their sons that killing in a duel is murder; let wives soothe their irritated husbands, and assert their rights not to be left mourning widows; let young ladies discountenance the gallants, who come into their society, reeking with blood; in short, let all persons unite and do their duty in this behalf and the work will be done. Especially let the pulpit and the press do their duty, and we may hope for better notions, better principles, better rules for the government of gentlemen, and less of the awful work of this "*bellum inter duos*."

Let all men calmly and seriously settle the point that they never will fight a duel. Let no man put off the decision till the day of temptation shall come. That will be the time to *try* principles, not to *form* them. In arriving at conclusions, let every man well weigh what is said by a good writer: "In the judgment of that religion, which requires purity of heart, and of that Being, to whom thought is action, he cannot be esteemed innocent of this crime, who lives in a settled, habitual determination to commit it whenever circumstances shall call upon him so to do. This is a consideration which places the crime of duelling on a different footing from almost any other. Indeed, there is perhaps no other, which mankind habitually and deliberately resolves to practice when the temptation shall occur. It shows also that the crime of duelling (in this sense of pre-conceived determination to commit it whenever the occasion may demand) is far more general among the higher classes than is commonly supposed, and that the sum of the guilt, which this practice

produces is great, beyond what has perhaps been ever conceived. It will be the writer's comfort to have solemnly suggested this consideration to the consciences of those, by whom this impious practice might be suppressed. If such there be, which he is strongly inclined to believe, their's is the crime, and their's the responsibility of suffering it to continue."

The question may still be asked, what is a gentleman to do, who is slandered and insulted and wronged? The answer is, let him appeal to his good character, let him make a public defence by speech and the press, or let him apply to the laws of the land. If these will not defend him, he has a bad cause, or the matter is not worth contending for, or he is called to exercise that fortitude which is at times the sublimest of virtues, magnanimity in adversity. "It is the glory of a man to pass over a transgression." But, says one, what shall I do, if challenged? The answer is plain. Reply, if you truly can, as Col. Gardiner: "I am not afraid of fighting, but I am afraid of sinning." If you cannot say you are not afraid of fighting, say, "I am afraid of fighting, but far more afraid of sinning." There has never been a duel, in which the challenged might not have assigned reasonable, strong and, in the judgment of all good men, satisfactory reasons why he should not accept. "I neither am, nor wish to be, a murderer," any but a murderer might truly assign, and it would be sufficient.

This article, already long, would be imperfect, if it failed to convey a clear and distinct statement that an awful responsibility rests upon seconds. In a large number of cases they are no less guilty and in some cases they are certainly more guilty than the principals. There is no more solemn office than that of counsellor, especially in so awful a matter as that involving life. The penal statutes of no state or kingdom, so far as we know, is too severe against this class of evil-doers.

It is not customary, nor does it coincide with our ideas of fitness, often to quote poetry on such a subject, but the following lines are so well written and so pertinent to our purpose that we are constrained to insert them. They are from Pollok, who is describing the world of lost men. He says:

"With groans that made no pause, lamenting there
Were seen the duellist and suicide.
This thought, but thought amiss, that of himself

He was entire proprietor, and so
When he was tired of Time, with his own hand
He opened the portals of Eternity,
And sooner than the devils hoped, arrived
In Hell. The other, of resentment quick,
And for a word, a look, a gesture, deemed
Not scrupulously *exact* in all respects,
Prompt to revenge, went to the cited field,
For double murder armed, his own, and his
That as himself he was ordained to love.
The first, in pagan books of early times,
Was heroism pronounced, and greatly praised
In fashion's glossary of latter days.
The last was Honour called, and spirit high.
Alas! 'twas mortal spirit, honour, which
Forgot to wake at the last trumpet's voice
Bearing the signature of time alone,
Uncurrent in Eternity, and base.
Wise men suspected this before; for they
Could never understand what honour meant,
Or why that should be honour termed, which made
Man murder man, and broke the laws of God
Most wantonly. Sometimes, indeed, the grave,
And those of Christian creed imagined, spoke
Admiringly of honour, lauding much
The noble youth, who, after many rounds
Of boxing, died; or to the pistol shot
His breast exposed, his soul to endless pain;
But they who most admired, and understood
This honour best, and on its altar laid
Their lives, most obviously were fools; and what
Fools only, and the wicked understood,
The wise agreed was some delusive shade,
That with the mist of time should disappear."

The author of this article, though from education, principle and profession never inclined, nor invited to take part in any affair of honour, has seen something of the misery brought on by duels. He has heard the father's deep lament, the sister's awful shriek, the mother's heart-rending soliloquy, the child's piteous cry of anguish, all brought on by the duel. God of mercy! stop this dreadful and needless effusion of human blood.

ART. IV.—*Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Leben, beschrieben durch Karl Rosenkranz.* Berlin, 1844. 8vo. pp. 566.

LITTLE addicted as we are to swear to the words of Hegel, we own we have read this memoir, by one of his most enthusiastic followers, with uncommon interest. The portrait at the beginning detained us long; it is a head not to be soon forgotten, suggesting as it does a sternness of profound thought which is almost oppressive. It is impossible to contemplate the character of one who has given form to the chaos of pantheistic error in our day, without a curiosity to know something about its development. Dr. Rosenkranz has afforded us the means of gratifying this desire.

George William Frederick Hegel was born at Stuttgart in Wurtemberg, August 27, 1770, and was the eldest son of George Lewis Hegel. His boyish days passed by, without anything very remarkable. He loved the peculiarities of his native country, and in all his works indulges in Swabian provincialisms. He was a promising school-boy, and at eight years of age received from his preceptor as a prize Wieland's translation of Shakspeare. The first work, which seems to have made a lively impression on him, was the *Merry Wives of Windsor*. We shall not follow him through all the gradations of his youthful curriculum. It was regular and complete, especially in all that relates to the ancient classics. The Greek Tragedy engaged much of his attention, and as long as he lived he retained his admiration for the sublimity and pathos of the *Antigone*. The deep love of Grecian beauty with which he was smitten abode with him, and perpetually re-appears in his works. His biographer speaks of the numerous common-place-books and epitomes, produced during this period, and still extant among his papers. In philosophy he already began to read Locke, Hume, and Kant. But the first decided tendency towards this field of research, is observable in a little manuscript of 1785, filled with definitions of philosophical terms.

From his earliest years and throughout his life, Hegel bestowed great pains on transcribing. It is wonderful how he found time for this: in later years his books are laden with excerpts from the *Morning Chronicle*, the *Reviews*, the *Courier*,

the *Constitutionnel*, the *Journal des Debats*, the *Jena Literaturzeitung*, and the like. The ease and fluency of his style was greater in his earlier than his later years: like Bentham, he required a perspicuous interpreter for his theories: we are however among those who admire his gnarled, oaken diction. His oral delivery is admitted to have been always bad; he superabounded in gesticulations, which were out of harmony with what he was saying, and his enunciation was such as drew ridicule from those who could not cope with him in argument. Hegel was eminently social: Rosenkranz tells us that he took snuff, and was very fond of chess and of cards, in which points he was like Kant. In his study-arrangements he abhorred every thing that savoured of niceness and coxcombry: his simple writing-table became famous for the picturesque disorder of papers, letters, and snuff-box.

Hegel went to the university of Tübingen, expecting to devote himself to the ministry. He heard lectures from Schnurrer and Storr on Exegesis, and from Flatt on Philosophy. Flatt was an acute but liberal opponent of the Kantian system. The *Stift*, or Theological Seminary connected with the university was not agreeable to the young theologian, and he complained of its conventual seclusion. There is reason to think that nothing displeased him more than certain remains of evangelical strictness. The students had to preach, and Hegel took his turn, in 1792, exercising his gifts on Isaiah 6: 7, 8. Few particulars are accessible respecting Hegel's student-life. He was a jovial companion, and sometimes visited scenes of conviviality. In consequence of being visited with something like an academical censure for his irregularity in study, he suddenly made a complete change in his way of life, turned into application with extraordinary zeal, and for weeks together slept upon his sofa. During this period he was a liberal in politics and even a revolutionist. It is a fact worth noticing, that on a certain Sunday morning in spring, Hegel and Schelling marched out of Tübingen, with some friends, to a neighboring meadow, for the purpose of planting a tree of liberty. He gave however few tokens of greatness. When in later years he attained to high distinction, his old college comrades were amazed and would exclaim—"Well, this is what we never expected of Hegel." He was not addicted to the company of

ladies, and was nowise remarkable in knightly exercises. Indeed he seemed older than he was, so as to be nicknamed the Old Man. Yet he was beloved, both in town and seminary, for his uprightness, heartiness and frankness. He sometimes visited the neighboring towns with his friends, and not always with the necessary permission of superiors.

This was the epoch of the first French Revolution, which produced extraordinary awakening of mind in young Germans, many of whom saw in it tokens of the regeneration of Europe. A political Club was formed in the Tübingen *Stift* or Seminary; but this was betrayed, and the duke Charles broke it up. Hegel's father was a decided aristocrat, and earnest controversies took place between him and the young man. The latter, a diligent student of Rousseau, was a leading orator in the club. Great as was the change of his opinions in after life, he never lost a warm sympathy for all that was genuine in the French liberalism of that day. His Album attests his youthful zeal, in such watch-words as *In tyrannos—Vive la liberté—Vive Jean Jacques—Fatherland and Freedom.*

In 1790, he took his Master's degree, under the protectorate of Storr. His Dissertation was *De limite officiorum humanorum, seposita animarum immortalitate.*

His two companions most worthy of note at Tübingen were Hölderlin and Schelling. In Hölderlin Hegel found the love of Hellenism concentrated, and he was ardent in his wish to transport some of the beautiful enthusiasm of Greece into the dry religion of Germany. Hölderlin also was a Swabian. He commenced his romance, Hyperion, at the Seminary. In 1791 he wrote in Hegel's album, as his symbolum, Ἐν καὶ πάν. These young men, with Fink, Renz, and some others, gave themselves to the study of Plato, with high enthusiasm: they also read Kant and Spinoza. Schelling joined their group in the autumn of 1790. His father was a dignified clergyman at Bebenhausen and afterwards at Maulbram. When he brought his son to the *Stift* at Tübingen, he designated him as *praecox ingenium*. Hegel was five years older than his precocious friend; but a common zeal for freedom and philosophy drew them together in the club.

After returning home from the university in 1793, Hegel took a place as private tutor in Bern. It may be remarked

that Kant, Fichte, and Herbart were all private tutors. It was Hegel's lot to reside in a number of interesting towns, long enough to become intimate with all their great peculiarities; Stuttgart, Tübingen, Bern, Frankfort, Jena, Bamberg, Nuremberg, Heidelberg, and Berlin. To the close of life he was in the habit of making extensive tours. In 1795 he visited Geneva, and in 1796 the Bernese Alps. Rosenkranz assures us that during his sojourn in Switzerland, Hegel entirely emancipated himself from the dead theology of Tübingen, by which we may understand the orthodoxy of Flatt and Storr. He read Paulus, Grotius, Kant, Fichte, Spinoza, Marivaux's romances, Forster's travels, and the journals. His mind was much interested in the history of the Jewish nation, in regard to which his opinions suffered frequent change, so that all his life long, says Rosenkranz, it tormented him as a dark enigma.* He was furthermore concerned about the points of "guilt and penalty, law and fate, sin and atonement." But the philosophical element was rapidly gaining on the theological. In the year 1795 he compiled a life of Christ. In Tübingen he had taken a lively interest in comparing Christ and Socrates; but being then "drunk with Hellenism," he gave the palm in several particulars to Socrates. His studies in Switzerland took another turn. He here treats Christ as a pure exalted divine man, triumphing over vice, falsehood, slavery and hate. He summarily dispenses with all miracles; and the biographer speaks with admiration of the liberality then prevalent, which could honour the Christianity of one who did not believe in the miracles as matter of fact.

The relation of Hegel to Schelling, during this period, is an interesting one. Closely allied as they were, they were very unlike. Schelling was rapid, enthusiastic, imaginative, fluent, copious in poetical expression; the system of Hegel grew up by slow and imperceptible degrees. He was a most laborious student of preceding systems, as all his writings show: it was by a tardy and laborious process that these works became assimilated in his mind, so as to form the material of his own theory. Bachman, in 1810, likened Schelling to Plato and Hegel to Aristotle; the *mot* has passed into a proverb. Yet the comparison

* See also Hagenbach *Encyklopaedie*, § 59, note 10.

is only partially just. "Schelling's sanguine restlessness and combinatory daring were doubtless necessary, to break an outlet through the strait in which Idealism was involved by the subjective extreme; but Hegel's thorough erudition, self-denial, patience, and critical coolness, were not less necessary, to impose due form on the chaotic tumult which followed that outbreak." It has further been common to characterize Schelling as poetical and modern, Hegel as abstruse and scholastic. But Hegel is really more original than Schelling, and in the form of his teachings less scholastic and more modern. Rosenkranz adds, with a sarcasm which we only half comprehend, that in the relations of life Schelling was assuredly the more modern; in science, he is half covered with the grey robe of the scholastic, but when, as academical president, he appears to do honour to the birth-day of a king or the obsequies of a Talleyrand, he is radiant with elegance. The two young men kept up an active correspondence, chiefly on philosophical subjects. About the same time Hegel produced a mystical poem, entitled *Eleusis*, which contains some pregnant intimations of his future doctrines.

In January 1797, he accepted a situation at Frankfort on the Main, in the house of a merchant named Gogel, by which step his circumstances became much more easy. The same city, it has been observed, was the cradle of Goethe's poetry and Hegel's philosophy. Here he found Hölderlin, Sinclair who had studied at Tübingen, Zwilling, Muhrbeck, Molitor, Ebel, and Vogt. It was a great change, from Bern, with its patriarchal aristocracy, to commercial Frankfort. His interest in political problems was revived, and he began to make those inquiries into the idea of a State which resulted in his celebrated theory.

Here also he resumed his examination of the notion of positive religion. But at the same time his system of universal philosophy was germinating within him. He is said to have arrived at this by imperceptible degrees. It is likely that he was stimulated by the advances of his young friend Schelling. While at Frankfort he supplied himself with the best editions of Schelling's works and the Greek classics. He particularly studied Plato and Sextus Empiricus. Already was he diverging widely from Schelling, in taking his point of departure from Logic, and in denying the emptiness which had always been

predicated of dialectical forms. Though emancipated from the old theology, he schemed a plan so wide as to embrace universal being, and hence his system was in a measure theosophical. He read the middle-age mystics, constructed a "triangle of triangles," and speculated upon the Trinity. The manuscripts of this period reveal the sketch of a complete system. In this appear the fundamental tenets of his later works, especially the place of Logic as the corner-stone, his division of the Idea into two opposites, and his notion of Nature as thought externalizing itself. Hegel entertained the belief, that, as Catholic Christianity was a great improvement on Gentilism, so true Philosophy would in time develope an equal improvement on Catholic Christianity.

In 1799 his father died, and it became necessary for him to go to Stuttgart for a time. In 1800 he made an excursion to Mentz. The description of his person, in one of his passports, is worth preserving. "Agé de 30 ans, taille de 5 pieds 2 pouces, cheveux et sourcils bruns, yeux gris, nez moyen, bouche moyenne, menton rond, front médiocre, visage ovale." In the same year he expresses to Schelling his desire to leave Frankfort, and to go to some city where he might have cheap living, good beer, a small acquaintanceship, and if possible a Catholic community, in order to study that religion more closely. He soon removed to Jena, "the philosophic Eldorado." Fichte, charged with atheism, had gone to Berlin. Tieck also had removed, and Novalis was dead. Schelling, who had come from Leipsick as professor extraordinary, had lost the charm of novelty. But the city was full of young philosophers, incited by the speedy rise of some whom we have named. Old Hennings and Ulrich kept on indeed reading their old logic and ethics, but *privatim-docentes* "were all the while flying in and out, like pigeons at a pigeon-house." There were such names as Schad, Fries, Krause, Gruder, and Ast. The ambitious desire to be made professors was extraordinary. To this focal point came Hegel, to add himself to the numerous Swabians, in 1801. As the theme of his 'Habilitationssertation' Hegel chose the Law of the Planetary Distances. His papers show, at earlier dates, extracts from Kant's treatises on Mechanics and Philosophy, and from Kepler and Newton. The Disser-

tation is extant, in Latin. He here sets himself in array against Newton's theory of tangential forces, with regard to which he retained a certain bitterness all his life. Kepler was not only a German, but as Rosenkranz reminds us, a brother Swabian, and Hegel labours to exalt him above his English rival. He was equally opposed to the Newtonian optics. English and American savants are sometimes astonished when they come to learn how cavalierly the greatest names in their philosophy are treated by the Germans, and become more prepared for the exorbitancies of the German metaphysic, when they find the Newtonian theory, the doctrine of refraction, and the theory of polarized light, scouted as so many figments. It is really difficult for a philosopher of any other nation to read with coolness what Goethe has the assurance to say of Newton, in his work on Colour;* and with what contempt he records Voltaire's admiration of the English.† Hegel was early instructed in Newtonianism, but his subsequent idealism made it impossible for him to explain the heavenly motions by the limitations of finite mechanics, or by centrifugal and centripetal impulses. The dropping apple, which suggested gravitation to Newton, was wittily called by Hegel the "astronomical *fall of man*." His Dissertation was for Kepler, against Newton; it unfolded the relations of time and space, square and cube, right-line and curve, circle and ellipse. With Schubert he loved to view the series of planets, as a line of varying degrees of cohesion. It is the remark of Rosenkranz himself, that the same epoch which saw Newton degraded, in honour of Kepler and Goethe, saw the revived glory of Paracelsus and Jacob Boehm.

To his dissertation, Hegel appended certain theses, which are in the spirit of heroic paradox; the itch for startling novelty was never more remarkably betrayed. We cannot refrain from annexing them, though they must remain in their obscurity. 1. *Contradictio est regula veri non contradictio falsi*. The notion of the true is always accompanied by that of the false. Truth, so far from being a somewhat exempt from negation, is the positive negation of its negation. As Spinoza says, *Verum est index sui et falsi*. This constantly reappears in the Hegelian system; and our reader is requested to bear it in memory. 2.

* Farbenlehre, vol. iii. p. 27.

†Id. p. 102.

Syllogismus est principium Idealismi, the germ of his whole system. Here we discern the logical basis of his theory. 3. *Quadratum est lex naturæ, triangulum mentis*. 4. *In Arithmetica vera nec additioni nisi unitatis ad dyadem, nec subtractioni nisi dyadis a triade, neque triadi ut summæ, neque unitati ut differentiæ est locus*. 5. *Ut magnes est vectis naturalis, ita gravitas planetarum in solem pendulum naturale*. 6. *Idea est synthesis infiniti et finiti, et philosophia omnis est in ideis*. 7. *Philosophia critica caret ideis, et imperfecta est Scepticismi forma*. 8. *Materia postulati rationis, quod philosophia critica exhibet, eam ipsam philosophiam destruit, et principium est Spinozismi*. 9. *Status naturæ non est injustus et eam ob causam ex illa exeundum*. 10. *Principium scientiæ moralis est reverentia fato habenda*. 11. *Virtus innocentiam tum agendi tum patiendi excludit*. 12. *Moralitas omnibus numeris absoluta virtuti repugnat*.

Our readers will agree with us that this is a psychological curiosity; it is however a slender specimen of the author's rage for paradox. In English ratiocination, point-blank contradictions infer absurdity and falsehood; and few readers ever perused for the first time even Kant's famous Antinomies, without a start; but not so in Germany. The mind closes its eyes to propositions such as *Sein-Nichts*, and "God is the universal nothing."*

It was adventurous to approach the circle of Schelling's popularity; he was about this period lecturing on the system of universal philosophy, on æsthetics, and on encyclopædia. Schelling's style and delivery were fascinating; he added to this the nimbus of a philosophical revolutionist. Against all this, Hegel came quietly forward, *privatim docens*, for a fee of three dollars. In logic and metaphysics he had, in 1801, eleven hearers. In the next five years, he went on, lecturing on his system of speculative philosophy, in these divisions, "*a. Logice et Metaphysice sive Idealismum transcendentalem; b. philosophiam naturæ; c. mentis*;" and for one semester on pure mathematics.

In 1802 and 1803 Schelling and Hegel were united in conducting the Critical Journal of Philosophy; the labour was however mostly Hegel's. To an insinuation in a Stuttgart

* See this identity demonstrated, Michelet ii. 721.

print, that Schelling had brought in Hegel as a sort of creature and philosophical bully, the latter replied roundly, "The author of this report is a liar, and as such I designate him in these words." In one of the contributions of Hegel, abstracted by his biographer, we find some characteristic views of religion, which connect themselves obviously with certain rising opinions of our age. A philosophy, he teaches, which is not in principle religion, is no philosophy. Religion, without historical relations, is inconceivable. As polar opposites, the only two possible forms of religion are Heathenism and Christianity. Heathenism is the elevation of the finite to the infinite; Christianity is the becoming finite of the infinite, or God becoming man. But a union of these opposites is necessary, of which union the first appearance will be in the form of speculation, revealing the *absolute Gospel*; so that Christianity is the way to perfection; but not the perfection itself. Heathenism is the beautiful deification of nature; Christianity, through nature, as the infinite body of God, looks into the inmost mind of deity. In Heathenism, predominates the cheerfulness of immediate, actual, atonement; in Christianity, the pain of atonement in process. To the former belongs Symbol; to the latter Mysticism. The world's problem is to bring together the depth of Christian atonement and the beauty of Grecian life. Hegel was naturally drawn to admire some things in Schleiermacher's Discourses on Religion; suggesting the flight from all that is actual to an eternal world beyond.

It deserves notice, that notwithstanding the alleged obscurity of Hegel's writings, he confines himself more than any of his countrymen to plain indigenous *words*. Kant's nomenclature is proverbially hybrid and pedantic. Hegel here acts on a principle which we would gladly see prevalent among ourselves: he prefers common words. He cannot for example see why such words as *quantitative* and *apodictic*, should be preferred to good old stout, pregnant terms of Teutonic origin. "It is peculiar to the highest cultivation of a people, to *speak in the language of all*." Men allow themselves, says he, the grandiloquent phraseology, because in this they can utter trivialities of which they would be ashamed in their homely dress. There are many, who hide common thoughts in a masquerade of expression.

It must be obvious, that to attempt even the slightest abstract of the system of Hegel, now in development during these years, and embracing the whole cycle of human knowledge, would more than occupy the entire space which remains of our present number; we must therefore limit ourselves more strictly to biographical notices. The influence of Hegel on a few students of Jena was daily greater and greater. His regardlessness of externals, and his profound earnestness and zeal for reality, could not but give intensity to his teachings, far beyond that of mere rhetoric. His eye was large and contemplative. His voice was heavy, without being sonorous, but indicative of occasional deep feeling. There was something almost repulsive in a first view of his noble features, till they were seen to be informed by inward mildness and friendship. A peculiarly benevolent smile played upon his countenance, modified by a somewhat of sly, ironical, and biting. Through all, there was reflected the tragic mein of the philosophic hero, struggling with the enigma of the universe. Such is the portrait of his admirers.

Upon the students as a mass Hegel made little impression; they regarded him as an obscure person. Those who were minded to depart from the old professors, generally preferred Fries, who was at that time rising to notice. There was a smaller circle however, which was beginning to take the new influence. In 1805, Hegel received an appointment as professor-extraordinary. At this period he was brought into some connexions with Schiller and Goethe; the genius of the latter was however particularly foreign from his abstruse inquiries.

The catastrophe of Jena, in 1806, swallowed up for a time all other interests. When the cannonade became more and more violent, Hegel took the last portion of the manuscript of his "*Phænomenologie*," then going through the press, abandoned his other papers and books to their fate, and took refuge in the house of the Prorektor Gabler, which was protected by the presence of a superior French officer. After the battle he returned to his house, and found everything thrown into confusion by the soldiery. It has sometimes been said, that Hegel completed his *Phænomenology*, under the thundering cannon of the battle of Jena. On the day of Napoleon's entry, he says in a letter to Niethammer: "The Emperor—that world-soul—I saw ride through the city to a reconnoissance. It is indeed a

wonderful experience to behold such an individual, who, here, concentrated at one point, sitting on a horse, grasps at the world, and rules over it."

He was, however, beginning to look for other situations. Jena had become, as he said, like a cloister. Everything was narrowed, and governed by a clique. Interests predominated which were unknown in all Germany, except Jena and Weimar. Books were in authority, of which scarce a hundred copies reached the public. He was invited by Niethammer to be editor of a Journal at Bamberg; and the next year he went there, finding many attractions in its catholicity. Here were Niethammer and Paulus. There was a French theatre, in which he sometimes saw Talma in the great tragic parts. He edited the newspaper until the autumn of 1808. In November, 1808, he left Bamberg for Nuremberg, and shortly after published a pamphlet beginning with these words: "Germany is a State no longer." The south western countries of Germany, that is to say, Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria were more than any others suffering, in respect of education. Two conflicting interests prevailed by turns, the monastico-scholastic and the utilitarian. Classical antiquity was invoked, to mediate between the two. An Institution of learning had been founded in Nuremberg, and Hegel was called to be its rector. Some said this was yoking the speculative Pegasus to the school-wagon; but at a time when Napoleon was oppressing the universities, the chief field of hopeful action was in the gymnasium. As university-teachers, Fichte, Schelling, and Steffens are said to have accomplished little from 1808 to 1813. In his very boyhood, Hegel betrayed a pedagogical *tic*; for eight years he was a domestic tutor; his acceptance of the Nuremberg place needs no apology. He gave himself to his new employment with eager zeal. In philosophy and religion, he taught in all the classes. His paper lay before him, though he did not read it, but spoke at his ease, freely scattering his snuff, right and left. Each student was to write out one fair copy from this dictation. He allowed interruptions and questions. The young men were kept in awe by his profound seriousness, and absorption in things of moment. This respect was increased by the many-sidedness of his mind. When colleagues were indisposed, Hegel was ready to take their chairs; thus, on emergencies, he carried forward, without

interruption, the classes in Greek, and in the Differential and Integral Calculus. When, incidentally, he commended Herder's *Cid*, and the *Sacontala*, these books were immediately procured and devoured by the young men. When a youth asked direction in philosophy, he dissuaded from the popular works, and recommended the reading of Plato and Kant. He was no friend to student's sports, and, snuffer as he was, denounced the pipe in a way almost savage. He used to send for the "Abiturients," to give them a word of grave counsel, about their conduct at the university. The Gymnasium flourished under him. In politics he maintained neutrality, though in the town he was thought to be on the French side. In religion he was very grave and respectful. The Roman Catholic students were required by the statutes to attend mass daily, and the Protestant to go to church weekly. He seldom appeared in public places, and always in the same garb; hat and grey coat, with scrupulous whiteness of linen. His evenings were all at the Museum, for he was all his life a devoted news-paper reader. His chief companions were Seebeck and Paulus. The history of his rectorship is marked in the five discourses, which his office required of him, at the stated collation of prizes.*

In 1811 Hegel was married; his wife was his delightful opposite, or rather supplement, in regard to her grace and loveliness. By marrying he deviated from the path of metaphysicians: Bruno, Campanella, Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche, Leibnitz, Wolf, Locke, Hume, and Kant, were bachelors. Mrs. Hegel was light, etherial, full of vivacity and fancy. The love-poems, which are preserved, have quite a glow for a metaphysician of forty:

"Doch wenn durch Rede sie dem Munde
Der Liebe Seligkeit
Nicht auszudrücken gab, zum Bunde
Der Liebenden verleiht.

"Sie ihm ein innigeres Zeichen;
Der Kuss die tief're Sprache ist,
Darin die Seelen sich erreichen,
Mein Herz in Dein's hinüberfließt."

He was not unmindful however of the prose of wedlock, but, like Schiller, kept up the old Swabian custom of an interleaved almanac, in quarto, by way of household journal. At the close

of every month accounts were settled; it were well if the like punctuality reigned among untranscendental philosophers. The children kept an old-fashioned savings-box. To the day of his death he maintained these usages, together with the old national customs of *Zehrfennig*, *Ehrenpfennig*, and *Nothpfennig*. In common times, they kept only one maid-servant: his house was neat but plain; no antichamber, no hall; the guest opened the front-door directly on the hospitable sitting-room.

From 1812 till 1816, is the period of Hegel's Logic. The preface to the first edition bears date March, 1812, that of the third, July 1816. It is known that with him logic is every thing. It is the province of the Idea *per se*; not merely a formal, but a real science; not a frame-work, receptive of this or that, but a method in which as a process the absolute itself partly consists. Thoughts are the universe: and the laws of thought, are the laws of the Universe, that is, Logic. Objective thinking is the material of pure science, and logic is the system, not simply of ratiocination, but of pure reason. It is truth itself, not a bare method of truth; and thus it is a representation of universal Mind, that is of God. Thus Logic became, of a sudden, speculative theology. The notion of the logical idea is the notion of God. So soon as his book was out, he was assaulted, upon the alleged identity of Being and Not-being, (*Sein* and *Nichtsein*.) There ensued a humorous correspondence between him and Pfaff, a learned and witty man, who professed that Hegel's Logic was nothing but a bundle of postulates. One of Pfaff's letters is thus addressed: "Philosopho mathematicus infestissimus, Salutem;" another: "Philosopho novi mundi intelligibilis inventori Mathematicus incapax, sciendique cupidus, Salutem."

The next removal was to Heidelberg, which took place in the autumn of 1816; it was caused by Hegel's earnest desire to resume academical employment. He was called to Heidelberg as professor of Philosophy. For the third time he found himself in the same city with Paulus. Mrs. Paulus was a humorous and sociable woman, who received Hegel kindly, sometimes wrote comic billets to him, and sometimes joined him in a game at cards; an amusement not forbidden it seems in the families of rationalistic clergymen. Here he was brought into connexion with Voss and Daub. In writing to his wife,

whom he had left ill at Nuremberg, he says, the principle at Heidelberg is, "Every one for himself, and God for us all." "Yesterday" writes he, "I began my lectures, but certainly the number of hearers is not so encouraging as I was led to expect. If not perplexed and impatient, I was assuredly surprised, to find things so different from what had been reported. For one course I had only four hearers. Paulus consoled me, by telling me he also had read to four and five." Soon however he had twenty on Encyclopaedia, and thirty on the History of Philosophy. He was enchanted with the natural scenery of the environs, and often alluded to it in his letters. Clad in his unchangeable grey, he was often seen and met by the students engaged in Socratic musings, among these picturesque walks, and occasionally there was one who ventured to join him. Stories are told of his absence of mind. In the summer of 1817, after a heavy rain, he crossed over the university square, when the ground was moist, and left one shoe in the mud, without ever discovering his loss. During this period he carried out his theory, in its application to Aesthetics and the Fine Arts, being doubtless stimulated by the beauties of nature, and the numerous works of sculpture and painting, around him.

The following reminiscences of a student, the Baron Boris d'Yrkull, from Riga, will cause a smile; he came to Heidelberg in 1817. "I had scarcely arrived," says he, "when I made it my business, after looking about me, to visit the man, of whose person I had formed to myself the most impressive images. Conscious of my defect of science, I prepared my phrases, and went, not without dread, yet with confidence, to the professor, whom, to my no small surprise, I found to be a plain and simple man, who spoke with dulness, and uttered nothing remarkable. Disappointed with this impression, though attracted by Hegel's friendliness, and by a certain air of kind yet ironical courtesy, I went, after taking the professor's tickets, to the first bookseller, bought such works of Hegel as had then appeared, and sat myself down snugly in my sofa-corner to read them. But the more I read, and the more I essayed to read with attention, the less I understood, so that after torturing myself an hour or two over a sentence, without being able to understand it, I laid the book aside: yet out of curiosity I went to the lectures. I am bound in honour to say, that I did not comprehend

my own notes, and that I lacked all preliminary studies, in reference to the department. In my straits I now went again to Hegel, who after listening to me with patience, set me right in a friendly way, and advised me to take several *privatissima*; Latin reading, rudiments of Algebra, Physics, and Geography. This occupied a half-year; sorely enough for a fellow of six and twenty. For the third time I resorted to Hegel, who received me very kindly, but could not forbear laughing, when I communicated my propædætic cross-bearing. His counsels were now more precise, his interest in me more lively, and I frequented his courses with some profit. A *Conversatorium* of Dr. Hinrichs, in which debaters met from all the four faculties, and in which the exposition of the *Phaenomenology* of Mind afforded the clew, proved instructive. During the next two semesters, Hegel came sometimes to me, but oftener I went to him, and accompanied his secluded walks. He often said to me, that our over-wise age could be contented by nothing but a sound method, which tames the thoughts and conducts to realities; that Religion was philosophy in presentiment or inkling, and Philosophy religion in full consciousness; both in different ways seeking the same end, namely God. I must never trust a philosophy which was either immoral or irreligious." This young nobleman became quite a traveller. He was at Ephesus, in Sweden, at Paris, at Rome, every where carrying with him a copy of Hegel's Logic. In one of Hegel's letters to d'Yrkull. he uses language which we cite as certainly applying to America, no less than to Russia: "You are so fortunate as to have a country which occupies a large place in the field of the world's history, and without doubt has a yet higher destiny. Other modern states, according to all probability, have to a certain extent already attained the term of their development; some of them have perhaps passed beyond the point of culmination, and are stationary. Russia, on the contrary, even now, it may be the strongest among the powers, bears in her bosom a vast potentiality of developing her intensive nature."

At Heidelberg Hegel gave to the press his *Encyclopædia* of Philosophical Sciences. The admirers of Hegel are accustomed to refer to the first edition, as having most of the author's freshness and power. He also resumed journalism, in the philosophical department of the *Heidelberg Year-books*.

In 1818 he received a call to a professorship in the University of Berlin, which from that time became the theatre of his fame and influence: he had for some years longed after the Prussian capital, and he entered on his new residence with great animation. It was only by gentle degrees however that he attained to eminence in Berlin. Soon after his arrival, Solger writes to Tieck: "I was anxious about the impression our good Hegel would make. Nobody speaks of him, and he is quiet and laborious." Solger, who had come to Berlin as professor in 1811, was only one year the colleague of Hegel; for he died in 1819. He was, according to some, the last link of the chain between Schelling and Hegel. He coincided with the latter in extraordinary and startling tenets respecting nonentity: as for example, that the absolute cannot be thought of as positive, but by means of the negation of itself; and that God, in order to create the world, reduced himself to nothing.* Much as the names of Hegel and Schleiermacher have been connected by their adherents, they by no means coalesced at Berlin. Rosenkranz even speaks of it as remarkable, that differing as they did, they should have avoided open rupture. The first important labour of Hegel, in his new position, was the revision of his work on Law and State. In his anti-Newtonian zeal, he devoted a series of lectures to the exposition of Goethe's hypothesis of Colour. In 1821 Goethe sent him a drinking-glass, with a very flattering inscription. Hegel replies, among other things, that wine has always been a great uniter of natural philosophers, as showing so clearly that there is a spirit in nature. The Hegelians have loved to dwell on the identity of Hegel's speculation and Goethe's poetry.

At this point in his history, Hegel became obnoxious to vehement censure, on account of his theological tendencies. Now it was that he was marked by his opponents as a pantheist. So far as we can learn, the dispute began with the philosophers of feeling, (as a certain school was called,) against whom Hegel made a demonstration, denying that feeling could ever be made a principle of science. In his opposition to the theology of feeling he was clearly seen to reflect on the particular opinions of

* Rosenkranz, p. 326.

Schleiermacher's Dogmatik. In reference to the founding every thing on feeling, he used to quote from the *Xenien*,

“Lange genug kann man mit Rechenpfennigen zahlen,
Aber am Ende—da muss man den Beutel doch ziehn.”

He denounced the attempt to found a scientific theology, not on revelation as a fact, not on the church as a symbol, not on the Bible as primitive tradition, not on anything objective, but on reflexion, on pious feeling, on the empirical subject: the latter is what he represented Schleiermacher as doing. About this time great horror was excited by a saying of Hegel, to wit, that if the feeling of absolute dependence was the essence of Christianity, then a dog was the best Christian! Various attempts have been made to explain the passage in which this is asserted.*

Berlin afforded Hegel great advantages for the cultivation of taste in the fine-arts. He was passionately fond of music, and had the eye of a painter. His followers boast of him as the only systematic philosopher who embraced the whole field of art in his survey; that no one has developed so profoundly and extensively the idea of art, nor with equal precision determined and characterized the epochs of its history. Indeed there are many who altogether dissent from Hegel's system in general, who nevertheless admit the value of his aesthetical works, as presenting a classification of the arts, with new views and admirable criticisms.†

In 1817 and 1818, Victor Cousin, in company with a son of the Duke of Montebello, visited Germany. He spent some time in Heidelberg, where he saw much of Hegel. In 1821 he dedicated his edition of Proclus to Hegel and Schelling, and in 1826 his translation of Plato's *Gorgias* to Hegel. In 1824, he made another journey to Germany, and was thrown into prison in Berlin, upon some political suspicion. It was by the interposition of Hegel, that he was liberated. The influence of Hegel's system on Cousin is very apparent; but his modified Germanism is a weak dilution of the original matter. As Hegel once said to the Baron de Reiffenberg, who asked a brief expo-

* “Gründet sich die Religion im Menschen nur auf ein Gefühl, so hat solches richtig keine weitere Bestimmung, als das Gefühl seiner Abhängigkeit zu sein, und so wäre der Hund der beste Christ, denn er trägt dieses am stärksten in sich, und lebt vornehmlich in diesem Gefühle.”

† The *Aesthetik* fills three volumes of the late edition.

sition of his theory, "Monsieur, cela ne s'explique pas en Français."

In 1822-3 Hegel first lectured on the Philosophy of History, a subject with which his name will always be connected; and to which we will revert. Fichte, Schiller, Herder and Stutzmann had previously laboured in this field, but no one went further than Hegel, in the attempt to reduce the series of historical events to the category of cause and effect. The idea of endless progress lies at the bottom of his theory; a progress in which all that is possible becomes actual, and yet the possible is not exhausted. This connects itself very naturally with the idea of an impersonal God, constantly coming to development and self-consciousness in secular events. The ever-moving waves of this progress disturb the surface of an ocean, which is none other than God. Nature is the machine in quietude; History is the machine in motion. Nature stands related to History, as Creation to Providence; History is Nature all alive. The history of the East was pondered by Goethe and Hegel, with great interest, in their respective manners. We find much in the chapters of Hegel upon India and the Orientals which is not only novel and ingenious, but sound; and there is a singular freshness about his representation of the Hellenic period, which to him is the favourite one. If Rosenkranz is to be believed, there were many things in Oriental mysticism, which Hegel greatly preferred to the form of religion known by us as evangelical; the "modern self-plaguing," he calls it, "hypochondriac vanity, hypocritical sanctimony," "lacrymose narrowness," and "biblical base-money and spiritless servility."* The pantheism of some like-minded young Germans led them to a proper Indomania.

By degrees Hegel had attained the summit of reputation. It was the fashion in Berlin to hear him. Men of all ranks, students from all parts of Germany and all countries of Europe flocked to listen to the magical words which he uttered, as he fumbled among his papers, hemmed and hawed, and stammered out his meaning. The culminating point was perhaps the birthday festival of 1826.

In the Berlin Critical Year-book, Hegel wrote in connexion with Barnhagen, Marheineke, Schulze, Boeckh, Bopp, Gans and Hotho. These labours brought him into connexion with Wil-

* *Life*, p. 379.

liam von Humboldt; some of whose judgments concerning Hegel it will be worth while to extract. "Hegel" said Humboldt, "is certainly a profound and singular mind, but I cannot think a philosophy of this kind will ever strike deep root. For myself, thus far, after all my efforts, I cannot become reconciled to it. Obscurity of expression may be the hinderance. This obscurity is not engaging, or like that of Kant and Fichte, colossal and sublime, like the darkness of the grave: it springs from visible helplessness." "Even on ordinary topics, he is far from being easy or noble. It may proceed from a great defect of fancy." "The public seems to me to fall into two classes, with reference to Hegel; those who adhere to him unconditionally, and those who cautiously go about him as a rough cornerstone." In the appendix to his philosophy of Religion, Hegel has a treatise on the arguments for the being of a God. He here records and passes judgment on the cosmological, ontological and teleological arguments. Rosenkranz endeavours to show from this essay that Hegel maintained the personality of God: but the very terms in which he expresses this show that there is something essential omitted. He objects to the term *person*, and suggests the substitution of *subject*. Elsewhere, we are informed, Rosenkranz proposes the phrase *personality of Mind*.* "God," says Hegel, "is activity, free, referring itself to itself, abiding by itself: the fundamental limitation in the notion, or in all ideas of God, is that he is himself, as intermediation of himself with himself. If God is defined as Creator only, his activity is regarded as simply outgoing, self-expanding, as contemplative production, without return into itself." The world, according to him, is as eternal as God.

It is hard for an American mind to comprehend the protestantism of certain German philosophers, who appear to surrender the very fundamentals of all religion. In 1830 Hegel pronounced a discourse at the festival of the Augsburg Confession. He had from his youth been an avowed Lutheran, and had even manifested some zeal for the distinctive tenet of the eucharist. He now lauded the Augsburg Confession, with special reference to justification by faith alone, as the Magna Charta of Protestantism. It should be observed that he was at this time

* Hegel's *Lehre von der Religion u. Kunst*. Leipzig 1842, p. 6

rector of the university. The question is still mooted among his followers, how far he was a believer in evangelical religion. The right-hand Hegelians represent him as maintaining the full personality of the Deity, and as defending historically the literal views given by the scripture of the person of Christ. So says Morell, (p. 479), adding "These opinions there is every reason to believe, very much accorded with those of Hegel himself, who even professed his belief in the ordinary faith of the Lutheran Church." But in direct contradiction to this, he elsewhere says, (p. 473) "With him God is not a *person*, but *personality* itself, i. e. the universal personality, *which realizes itself in every human consciousness as so many separate thoughts of one eternal mind.*" This we believe to be exactly the truth, and thus we understand Rozenkranz as asserting the "personality of mind." God is not, as with Spinoza, the universal substance; yet we might say God is the universal thought. The idea of the absolute, is the absolute itself. The thought of God is God. God exists in the thoughts of him. Or otherwise, "God is the whole process of thought, combining in itself the objective movement as seen in nature, with the subjective as seen in logic, and fully realizing itself only in the universal spirit of humanity."

For such views of God the way was prepared by Fichte, who had long before maintained, that "pure thought is itself the divine existence."* We are enveloped in mists when we read the transcendental writers on these topics; and many who are not reputed pantheists use a language which is much to be watched. There is no phrase more common among the later German writers on religion than *God-consciousness* (Gottesbewusstsein.) At first this seems very innocent, as importing the intimate sense of God's presence with the soul, *conscientia Dei*: but on careful comparison we find at length that this consciousness of God is God himself; which we take to be the meaning not only of Hegel, but of many followers of Schleiermacher. This recognition of God in mind, easily connects itself with the recognition of God in nature. It is God, perhaps, (says Fichte) who lives behind all these forms; we see, not himself, but his covering; we see him as stone, herb, animal, see him when we rise higher, as law of nature, as moral law and yet

* Michelet, Gesch. d. Phil. II. 199.

all this is not He; but he is the one, indestructible form of reflection, the infinitude of the life within thee. In the daring play of terms, in which the names of God and eternal things are used as counters, or as x and y in algebra, the results of philosophizing are sometimes odd and sometimes dreadful. In analytical mathematics we sometimes reach a point where the symbols break down under us, ceasing to have any real applicability, or representing imaginary or impossible quantities; such as the square-root of minus five. Precisely thus, as it seems to us, German philosophers deal with abstract terms, subjecting them to operations and transformations, in which the mind ceases to comprehend, and therefore has no test of verity. Applying this to the case in hand, we are startled when Oken tells us, that Man is that idea of God, in which God is altogether his own object; that Man is God, represented by God; that God is man, representing God in self-consciousness.*

Hegel died of the cholera in its most concentrated form, on the 14th of November, 1831. Since his death no one philosophical teacher has attained to the same acknowledged eminence. Schelling, his early friend, and long his rival, survives, and continues, in a new scheme of philosophy, to contend with the Hegelians, who have gone off in various directions, to the right hand and to the left, as it is called. Seven of the most distinguished pupils of Hegel combined to bring out an edition of his works; Marheineke, Schulz, Gans, von Henning, Hotho, Michelet, and Förster. The edition is in seventeen octavo volumes. We would refer our readers to Morell's History of Modern Philosophy, for some account of the controversies which have ensued upon Hegel's death.

The system of Hegel is known as that of Absolute Idealism. It does not take its beginning from the subjective *Ego*, the creative self of Fichte; nor from the objective absolute of Schelling. It starts, as no preceding system of metaphysics ever did, with Logic, and this is its great claim to originality. The formal logic of Aristotle and the Schools, was a scheme of categories, figures and processes, equally applicable to any and every subject of ratiocination, and therefore itself without contents; a vehicle for all reasoning. From a science thus empty, nothing of course

* Michelet II. 428.

could be deduced, of ontological or psychological truth. But Hegel conceived the thought that there was that in logic which was constant and substantive, and which might redeem it from the imputation of vacuity. All ratiocination being reducible to the form of the syllogism, and every syllogism being made up of propositions, the germinating point of all reasoning was found to be the assertory part of the logical proposition, the declaration of being, the substantive verb, *EST*, *SEYN*, *BE*. Logic is the science of Thinking; and Philosophy is a view of the absolute self-development of Thought. Thoughts are the elements: we have nothing else to begin with. Thoughts are the true and only concrete essences. Logic, being the description of these thoughts, is the description of the laws of the universe. "Everything comes to this," says Hegel, "to conceive and express the True; not as Substance, but as *Subject*." Mind is the opposite of matter. Matter gravitates toward a centre, something out of itself: Mind is all in itself, self-contained, self-moved, free. Pure free thought, absolute knowledge, is the true essence of things. The life of Science, is therefore the life of the Absolute itself. Thus Aristotle taught, that in immaterial things, thought and its object are one and the same. The Method is the same with what is methodized.* The system of Logic in no respect differs from its contents and object. The processes of this logic, unlike all preceding ones, are the processes of thought, that is, the processes of the things themselves. This is what is called the *Absolute Method*, and is that in which Hegelians chiefly glory. This method is the *πρὸς στῶ* of philosophy. The work of thinking is not a mere operation 'in one man's brain, but contains in it all being and all the contents of truth. The Categories, which Aristotle had emptied of their contents, are now restored to their glory: Logic and Metaphysic are brought into indissoluble union.

All science and all existence begin with one and the same *punctum saliens*, which is expressed by the verb *ESSE*. Pure Being is the simplest, widest, vaguest, and therefore emptiest, of all thoughts. Nothing can be ascribed to it; nothing can be predicated of it. Turn your mind upon it—and what is it? How like to very nothing? Pure *esse*, as well as pure *cogitare*,

* *Encyclopaedie*, Vorrede, p. 30, ed. 1830.

is a mental abstraction; bare, illimitable, undefinable, abstraction, with no tincture of actuality. To arrive at this pure Being, we must abstract every notion of limit or definition. The *Esse* can be thought of, only by absolute abstraction. To think of pure *esse*, I must think, not of *a*, or *b*, or *c*, (and so *in infinitum*). What then is it that I herein think of? It is nothing. Here we arrive at the startling dogma of Hegel's system, to wit, Being and Nothing are the same: *Sein* and *Nichts* are identical.

Logic therefore begins with the assertion *Est*, which is radical in every syllogism, and from the consideration of *Being* and of *Nothing*, goes on to construct the system. Every thought, involves, according to Hegel, its own negation. This is true not only of the radical thought, *Esse*, or *Being*, but of all and every thought. Nothing is the never-absent opposing pole of Being. Eliminating by degrees every term in the complex of universal science or universal existence, we at length come to bare *esse*, and so to zero. Without the idea of nothing, we never could have had the idea of being.

Logic divides itself into three parts; the Doctrine of *Esse*; the Doctrine of *Essence*; and the Doctrine of Conception or Notion (*Begriff*) and Idea; agreeably to these three aspects, respectively; 1. Thought in its immediateness,—*Notio per se*; 2. Thought in its reflexion and mediateness, the *esse per se* and the phenomenon of *notio*; and 3. Thought in its regression into itself—the *Notio in et per se*.

Returning to pure *esse*, or Being, *the Absolute is the Esse*. This pure Being is pure abstraction, as said above, and so is the absolute-negative, or Nothing. It follows therefore that the *Absolute is Nothing*. This prepares us for the expression, often quoted, that "God is the universal Nothing." Hegel himself reminds us, that the Budhists make nothing the principle of all things.* The Nothing is the same that the *Esse* is; the truth of *esse* as well as of Nothing is the oneness of both; this oneness is the *fieri* (Werden). Hegel owns that for the understanding and conception, the proposition that Being and Nothing are one and the same, is paradoxical, so that a learner might believe it could scarcely be uttered in earnest. But he goes on to sur-

prise us, by declaring, that they are not only the same, but are also different.* *Fieri*, (Werden), for which we possess no English word, is the true expression of the resultant of Being and Nothing, or the unity of both. Whoever thinks of *fieri*, or the *coming to be* (becoming), finds on analyzing his thought, that two elements are present, namely, first *not being*, and, secondly *being*; here is the union of the two; *fieri* is the unity of *esse* and *non-esse*. The notion of *Beginning* leads to the same result: Beginning is the transition from nothing. This is diametrically opposed to the ancient and still prevalent fallacy, *Ex Nihilo Nihil fit*; which, says Hegel, is the very basis of Pantheism.*

From the idea of Being, Hegel goes on to develop that of Existence. Then he treats of Essence, and of Phenomenon. For a general schedule of Hegel's Logic we may refer to Morell, who seems to have deduced it chiefly from the Encyclopaedia. Our purpose has been only to indicate the starting-point of the system: it could not be reasonably expected of us, in a few pages, to enter into details. No abstract of ours could make it intelligible to the reader; and he who seriously proposes to examine the wonderful structure, will not be content with any epitome, including even that of the author himself, in his *Encyklopaedie*, but will resort to the original statements in the first volumes of the collection, on the Science of Logic. The sketches, given in the histories, Rixner's, &c., are so meager as to be unintelligible. Morell has afforded us the only view accessible to an English reader, and has merited well of the public, by his assiduity and labour. But Michelet has given the only extended report of Hegelianism, of which we suppose the author would not be himself ashamed. It has the advantage of being written by a pupil, an admirer, and a friend; and though Michelet is regarded by some Hegelians, as too rationalistic, and too ready to identify faith and reason, going further in this way than Rosenkranz and Marheineke, we are disposed to regard him as a faithful interpreter of his great master. He is one of the liveliest writers who ever treated on philosophy, and represents

* Ib. 103. † Encykl. p. 107. Frank u. Hillert, p. 47.

himself as occupying the *juste milieu*, between the contending factions.*

The controversies which have arisen from Strauss's Life of Jesus have caused Hegel to be claimed on both sides, with much heat and assurance. One large party (and their opinion on these points seems to be widely diffused) deny the personal God of Christians. In the endless progress of events and cycles of history, the Infinite is coming to self-consciousness. It emerges to this chiefly in human minds, and in some more than others. As substance, God exists elsewhere: as spirit, only in human minds. Something of this has been lamely reproduced among ourselves by Theodore Parker; but in this country it soon falls into cold, blank, old-fashioned, blaspheming atheism. Abroad, speculative theologians adhere to the tenet that the idea of God is God. The divinity is an ideal, a mental God, *Deus cogitatus*. There is no extramundane consciousness of God, and therefore no personality. To be consistent, God must know nothing of himself; he is beholden to man for this knowledge. God, as spirit, exists only for spirit. God contemplates himself in all minds. This is the true idea of God's immanence in the world. "Theistic Hegelians," says the German Michelet, "who maintain the personality of God in a world beyond our sphere, must, for consistency's sake, deny that God is cognizable. But how then can they remain in the (Hegelian) school?"†

According to these extreme Hegelians, Christ, more than all other men, thought himself one with God; therefore God was one with him, and Christ is simply the highest manifestation of God. Michelet very clearly proves the Straussianism of Hegel, by citations from his lectures. Baur thus represents the Hegelian doctrine as to a historical Christ: "God becomes man, not as a single, once-happening, historical fact, but by an eternal limitation of the essence of God, whereby God becomes man, in time, only so far as he is man from all eternity."‡ Michelet speaks for the whole school, as holding that God eternally becomes man.

* "So schlage ich die Coalition des Centrums (ohne welche es weder Fisch noch Fleisch, ein niederträchtig Grau, wäre) mit der Linken Seite vor." II. p. 659.

† Michelet, II. 648.

‡ Die Christliche Gnosis, 715.

While the more abstruse parts of Hegel's system have worked themselves but slowly into the thinking of the popular mind out of Germany, his views of development and progress in human events, or of the law of free phenomena, that is, of the Philosophy of History, have been seized upon with great avidity. In France, Victor Cousin has been a most celebrated advocate of these views; but even in America, no one can look back a few years, without observing that the whole tone of our public men has changed, and that the phrases, "progress," "necessary development," and "God in history," occur with marked frequency.

Dr. Gans ascribes to the Italian philosopher Vico, the first distinct enunciation of the opinion which has since become common, that the events of history follow a law as necessary as those of physics. The subject has since that time been touched in some of its parts, by Montesquieu, Bossuet, Leibnitz, Lessing, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Schiller, William von Humboldt, Görres, Steffens, and Rosenkranz. But the attempts of all these shrink before the vastness of Hegel's plan. Here we see the popular notions on this subject compacted into one consistent whole, and so identified with theological philosophy, that all history becomes a realization of absolute Mind, or God. The volume of Hegel's complete works, the Ninth, which is occupied with this subject, is made up of lectures, from his own briefs, and the notes of his students during 1822 and the next nine years; the last edition having been brought out under the care of his son, Dr. Charles Hegel. Except a certain characteristic knottiness in the introductory lecture, the whole of this volume may be read with great interest, even by those who reject the theory. The knowledge involved is vast, the classifications are beautiful, and the racy and sometimes acrid wit of the author gives sapidity to every page.

The key to the whole Philosophy of History is found by Hegel in the famous old saying of Anaxagoras, that *Nous*, or Reason, governs the world. In its religious shape, this is familiar to us, under the form, Providence governs the World. But Hegel means far more than this. That Reason, which governs the world, is free, self-disposing Thought.* God, the absolute

* *Werke*, ix. 17.

Reason, is everlastingly developing himself in History. God is not incomprehensible, or rather, according to Hegel, God is knowable. It was long enough common, to see God in beasts, insects, flowers, and shells; why not, Hegel asks, in events, in history? Mind or what is the same thing, perfect Freedom, the self-disposing, as opposed to matter, is perpetually realizing itself in History.

A specimen of Hegel's manner may be given in his threefold classification of nations; for he abounds in trilogies. The three classes are the Orientals, the Greeks, and the Germans; these terms being taken with great comprehension. The Orientals know not as yet that Mind, or Man as such, is free. Not knowing that they are free, they are not free. They only know that the individual is free; but such freedom is only wilfulness and wildness. The Greeks first arrived at the idea of freedom; but neither they, nor the Romans, knew that all men are free; Plato and Aristotle knew it not. The Germanic nations, under Christendom, first came to the recognition of universal freedom. The World's history is the progress of conscious freedom. Hence the classification: the Orientals, who knew that *one* is free; the Greeks who know that *some* are free; the Germans, who know that *all* are free; that man, as such, is free.

The progress of events in history is a necessary development, wherein God accomplishes his own end. He can have no end out of himself. "God, as an infinitely perfect being, can will nothing but himself, nothing but his own will." The great actions of history proceed from what may, in general terms, be designated as human passions: "nothing great in the world is performed without passion." These passions are working perpetually towards the great rational end; and thus the idea is actualizing itself. Beyond the intention of the individual actor, there is a hidden, but awful end.

World-historic individuals (to use Hegel's phrase) are those in whom the great world-historic idea is embodied. They represent the era. They concentrate in themselves the spirit of the age. They cannot but be just what they are, and when they are. Their own passions may govern them, but these passions work out the idea of that particular stage of the general plan. Cæsar was ambitious; but Cæsar filled just the place assigned

in the development. "Those are the great men of history, whose own individual aim contains the substantive will of the spirit of the age, or World-spirit." They see beyond others, as mountain summits catch the earliest rays of the rising sun. They press on, through conflicts, and even through crimes, towards the accomplishment of the universal idea. Only the next age can understand them. They are producing epochs in the world's history, when they seem to be only intending their own private objects. Their function was to catch sight of the general, necessary, impending stage in the world's progress, and to concentrate all their powers on accomplishing it. The heroic men of an age are therefore the farsighted men: their acts, their speeches, are the best of their times. They learn nothing from past history. "For the far-advanced spirit is only the inward, unconscious soul, of all men living, brought to consciousness in these great minds."* This is the very reason why the masses are seen to follow such men. Here is the idea of the "manifest destiny," placed on philosophical grounds. Here is Pope's couplet generalized into its law:

"If plagues or earthquakes break not heaven's design,
Why then a Borgia, or a Catiline?"

The fate of such individuals as mark an epoch has seldom been happy. The end is attained, and then these men fall away, like the petals around the fruit. "They die early, like Alexander; are murdered, like Cæsar; are transported to St. Helena, like Napoleon." Hegel still more distinctly avows this historical fatalism, when he gives examples. For instance: Alexander of Macedon (so he says) ravaged Greece in part, and then Asia; Alexander is therefore set forth as rapacious. He did this out of ambition, and lust of conquest; and the proof is, that he did those things, which resulted in fame and power. Where is the schoolmaster, who has not demonstrated, concerning Alexander the Great and Julius Cæsar, that these men had such and such passions, and were therefore immoral men? Whence it follows, forsooth, that he, the schoolmaster, is a most excellent man, because he has had no such passions; the proof being that he never overran Asia, or conquered Darius and Porus, but was willing to live and let live. "The man, as a private

* Werke ix. 39.

person, must eat and drink, like others; must stand in relation to friends and acquaintances; must have feelings and boilings-over of the moment. No man is, therefore, a hero to his valet-de-chambre, as the proverb declares; to which (says Hegel) I added—and Goethe repeated it ten years after me—the reason is, not that one is no hero, but that the other is a valet-de-chambre. The latter pulls off his lord's boots, helps him into bed, knows how he relishes his champagne, and the like. Such historic persons fare badly when represented by valet-historians; by these they are levelled with their own valets, and placed on the same plane, or it may be even a little lower than the plane, of these sagacious judges of human character. The Thersites of Homer, who rails at kings, is a permanent figure of all ages.”*

The grand conclusion, to which all Hegel's speculations on History and Politics tend, is, that *the actual world is as it ought to be*; that the true Goodness, the universal divine Reason, is at the same time Power, bringing itself into actuality. “This Goodness, this Reason, in its most concrete conception, is God.” God governs the world: the matter of his government, the realizing of his plan, is Universal History. In the clear light of this divine Idea, says Hegel, which is not mere idea, all outward seeming falls away, as if the world were a senseless, perverse accident. But we must leave the consideration of a subject, which is rapidly and dangerously coming into notice, under the labours of inferior minds, and which connects itself plainly with the developments of the Church. This we suppose to be the only one of Hegel's works, which would endure translation into English.

We cannot contemplate with gravity some of the speculations, found in modern German works. The very language becomes barbarous. On sacred subjects it is horribly like the wildest ravings of the Hindoos. Mathematics and Physics are mixed up with theology; thus Oken is represented as saying, “God can come into time, only as radius.” “The line is a long nothing, the superficies a void nothing, the sphere a thick nothing; in fine something is only nothing endowed with predicates: all things are nothing with different forms; God is a

rotating ball; the world is the rotating God.* We must not smile at this, lest we incur a censure for our Anglo-Saxon shallowness. The same theosophist tells us that God before he created the world was darkness, and in the first act of creation became fire. We wonder no longer at the honour bestowed on Jacob Boehm. As Hegel declared that such things cannot be expressed in French, so we are sure they can be neither comprehended nor tolerated in English. Our language suffers a dreadful violation in the attempt. Germans in passing through Pennsylvania, often smile at the changes wrought in their own language. We wish our neighbours would confine their emendations to the German; but our vernacular also suffers, and we have from the same prolific land such mongrels as "surrogate," "stand-point," "world-religion," "ground-proof," "extraanthropological" and the like. Our ears have already become familiar with the *me* and the *not-me*. Copying Bardili and Herbart too closely, we may arrive at *Pferde-ich*, the "Horse-me." "The experience of beasts, says he, has also the categories, only they cannot maintain them." The shield against all raillery is the immanent conviction of transcendental Germans that they are the depositories of all knowledge. To them, Germany is the world. In their catalogues of works on theology recommended to students, there is in general an ignoring of all English ones. Prussia, said Sietze, "is a giant-harp, strung in the garden of God, to lead the chorus of the world." This beats Jonathan's talk of "the great nation." None have been more ready than we to give honour to Germans, for their great contributions to learning, criticism, and history: for their ever-varying and barbarous metaphysic, we owe them no thanks. While we write, some new dream is doubtless supplanting the old one. It is pleasing to observe that the great image is less strong, and that the feet and toes, part of potter's clay and part of iron, indicate that the kingdom shall be divided. In conclusion we protest against the charge that this is an *American*, as against a German opinion. Holy and wise men among the Germans themselves, such as Hengstenberg and Neander, have expressed their abomination of these fatal errors more strongly than we.

* Michelet ii. 430.

In the foregoing sketch of Hegel's life, we have put a constraint upon ourselves, and following his ardent admirer, have set forth at length his great abilities. To give an abstract of his system we have not attempted. Even Morell who, if any one, could have done it, has failed to furnish to English readers an intelligible view of the whole. To his epitome however we would refer, as the best extant. One closing word, as to the proclamation in Germany of bans between Hegelianism and evangelical Christianity. At a first view, it might appear, that the great philosopher, and his adherents of the extreme right, were deeply concerned for the interests of spiritual Lutheranism. They use its terms, *de industria*, and have the name of God, of the Holy Trinity, and of the Spirit, continually in their mouths. A little study suffices to show, that to every one of the familiar phrases of religion; they have annexed notions of their own. This is the most dangerous mode of bringing in heresy and infidelity. The very words of the Westminster catechism may be rehearsed from a professor's chair, and then explained to mean the exact reverse of their true import; this adds perfidy to falsehood. We do not charge it on the Hegelian divines, but employ it as an apt illustration. As a celebrated theological innovator of New England used to say of his novel expositions of the quinquarticular controversy, that he was "only taking the bear-skins off Calvinism;" so Strauss, while he is offering Christianity a holocaust in Hegel's temple, calls it a simple "cutting away of the extra fat of the church-dogma."* If we must choose, let us have an open enemy. Like Ajax, we pray for conflict in the light. Socinianism, about Boston, already affects half the language of the church: it will probably be her next finesse to return to the whole Athanasian creed, with private meanings of her own.

* Streitschriften, Heft iii. p. 59.

- ART. V.—1. *Wissenschaftliche Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte.* Ein Compendium der gesammten Evangelienkritik mit Berücksichtigung der neuesten Erscheinungen bearbeitet von Dr. A. Ebrard. Frankfurt a. M. 1842. 8vo. pp. 1112.
2. *Chronologische Synopse der vier Evangelien.* Ein Beitrag zur Apologie der Evangelien und evangelischen Geschichte vom Standpuncte der Voraussetzungslosigkeit. Von Karl Wieseler, Licentiat und Privatdocent in Göttingen. Hamburg. 1843. 8vo. pp. 496.
3. *Versuch zur Herstellung des historischen Standpuncts für die kritik der neutestamentlichen Schriften.* Eine Streitschrift gegen die Kritiker unserer Tage von Heinrich W. J. Thiersch. Erlangen. 1845. 8vo. pp. 443.
4. *Beiträge zur Evangelien-Kritik,* von Dr. Friedrich Bleek. Berlin. 1846. 8vo. pp. 284.
5. *Kritische Untersuchungen über die Kanonischen Evangelien, ihr Verhältniss zu einander, ihren Character und Ursprung.* Von Dr. Ferdinand Christian Baur, ordentl. Professor der ev. Theologie an der Universität zu Tübingen. K. v. O. w. K. Tübingen. 1847. 8vo. pp. 626.

THE New Testament, like the Old, has a well defined class of historical books, apart from the detached and incidental statements of fact in the prophetical and doctrinal divisions. The Historical Books, properly so called, are five in number, the Four Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles. Taken together they contain the history of a period little less than sixty-five years. The only difference of their contents is that the Gospels are the history of the life of Christ on earth, the Acts that of his church in its first organization and extension. The closing point of the Gospels and the starting point of the Acts are one and the same, viz. the ascension of our Saviour. This gives to the whole history a character of perfect continuity. At the same time it affords a convenient principle of subdivision.

The word *εὐαγγέλιον*, denoting good news or glad tidings, is employed in the New Testament history to signify the annunciation of the Messiah's advent, and of the new dispensation or economy which he came to establish, under the name of the kingdom of heaven or of God. As the first preaching of Chris-

tianity necessarily turned much upon the personal history of our Lord himself, it was natural that his history, when recorded, should receive the general name of εὐαγγέλιον. Whether it is ever so applied in the New Testament itself, may be considered doubtful. Some have imagined that when Paul says, more than once, *according to my gospel*, he not only uses the word in this sense, but applies it specifically to one of the four gospels now in our possession. This, however, is a mere conjecture. The designation of these four books as Gospels is traditional but very ancient. The titles form no part of the text, but run back far beyond the reach of our investigations. The oldest form appears to be the one retained in most modern versions, *the gospel according to Matthew, Mark, &c.*, which does not mean, as some seem to imagine, that they were not really the authors of the books, but simply penmen, i. e. passive instruments by which they were reduced to writing. The meaning rather is that, although four in number, they are really one history; that Matthew did not write one gospel, Mark another, Luke a third, and John a fourth; but each a different form of the same gospel, hence called by one of the Fathers εὐαγγέλιον τετραμόρφον.

This designation leads us to consider more attentively one of the most striking features in the gospel history or life of Christ. While every other extended portion of the sacred history, both before and after, is presented to us in a single narrative, or at most in two, as in the case of Kings and Chronicles, the concurrence of three being restricted to a few limited periods, this important chapter in the history of the church is spread before us in four different shapes, all alike canonical and presenting the same evidence, inward and outward, of divine authority. The final cause or providential purpose of this singular arrangement, if not wholly inconceivable, would lead us too far into speculation to admit of being here discussed. Some light however will be thrown upon it by the proposed examination of the mutual relations which these books sustain to one another.

The points of resemblance are, that they all contain the life of Christ, and especially the record of his public ministry, beginning with his baptism and brought down below his resurrection. They are also alike in exhibiting the same Christ, as to character and doctrines and the main points of his history. The at-

tempt made by some ingenious Germans, in our own day, to establish a difference and indeed an incongruity between the Jesus of John's gospel and the Jesus of the other three, is one of the most signal failures upon record in the annals of fanciful and paradoxical speculation. The alleged discrepancies are absolutely nothing in comparison with those between the Socrates of Xenophon and Plato, or the Napoleon of the French and English writers.

But with this remarkable agreement in the general there are still more remarkable differences of detail, from which arises the main difficulty in the vindication and interpretation of the gospel history. Had the four books been only so many paraphrases of the same substantial narrative, the difference of language might only have served to clothe the matter with an agreeable variety. Had the facts recorded been precisely the same, but in a different arrangement, the mere difference of order would have created no more difficulty than that of expression. But in point of fact, these four books, notwithstanding their resemblances, are as really distinct compositions as any four books in the world upon one and the same subject. Each contains something found in neither of the others, and that not only as to form but substance. Some things are found in only two and wanting in both the others. But besides all this, what is common to two, three, or all the gospels, is often variously expressed, and introduced in different connexions, and in some cases with an account of the accompanying circumstances, which, at first sight, is not only different but contradictory.

In making these comparisons, it soon becomes obvious that the variations of the four from one another, both in general and particular, are very far from being equal. The first two, according to the usual arrangement, are, in almost all points, nearer to each other than either of them is to the third or fourth. The third, however, is immeasurably nearer to the first and second, in the general character of its contents, as well as in detail, than it is to the fourth, which is thus left standing by itself, as less like any of the rest than they are like each other. We thus obtain a twofold classification of the gospels, one of which divides them equally, combining Mark with Matthew, and Luke with John; the other placing Matthew, Mark, and Luke, in common contrast with John. The latter division is

the most important, and the one most commonly adopted by the modern writers, who habitually call the first three the Synoptical Evangelists, because they admit, to a great extent, of being arranged and exhibited in parallels, while a large part of the matter contained in the fourth gospel has nothing corresponding to it in the other three. This distinction has no doubt been pushed too far in theory, and in practice has led to a distorted view of the whole subject; but the principle on which it rests is a sound one, and a knowledge of it is necessary to a correct understanding of most modern writers on the life of Christ.

Before proceeding to inquire more particularly into this mutual relation of the gospels, it will be convenient to advert to the testimony of tradition as to their names and order; not as finally conclusive, but as furnishing a hypothesis, from which we have neither right nor reason to depart without necessity. Nothing indeed can be more unreasonable than to reject a tradition, intrinsically credible, simply because its truth is not demonstrable. And yet this is the principle, on which the reasoning of the German neologists most commonly proceeds. That a fact is attested by an ancient uniform tradition, instead of being recognized as *prima facie* evidence of its correctness, seems to be with them a reason for rejecting it, and for giving the preference to any new view of the matter, which is not absolutely impossible and self-contradictory. The necessary tendency of all such reasoning is not to establish any one historical theory at the expense of every other, but to discredit history in general. The only alternative presented to us is, to renounce all history as fable, or to hold fast to the testimony of historical tradition, until forced to abandon it.

With this view of the matter, we cannot but feel some degree of interest in the traditional nomenclature and arrangement of the gospels. As to the first point, the tradition is a uniform one; no names whatever are connected, in ancient usage, with the gospels, but the four which we attach to them. As to the order, there is more variety. Some ancient versions, and some Latin Fathers, place Matthew and John, or John and Matthew, first as being apostles, while Mark and Luke, or Luke and Mark, stand after them as being merely apostolical, i. e. the pupils and companions of apostles. Another arrangement, mentioned by one of the Greek Fathers, puts together in the

first place the two gospels which contain the genealogies, i. e. Matthew and Luke. But with these exceptions, the whole current of tradition sets in favour of our usual arrangement, and of its being founded on chronology. It may indeed be represented as the unanimous voice of all antiquity that Matthew wrote first and John last, and even with respect to Mark and Luke, the testimony is scarcely less explicit. Origen says expressly, that Matthew was the first in order, Mark the second, Luke the third, and John ἐπὶ πᾶσι. Various attempts have been made in modern times to discredit this tradition, each of the gospels, in its turn, being proved to be the oldest or the latest, according to the exigencies of the case. Some of the grounds, on which these several opinions rest, will be considered in another place. For the present it will be best to assume the old arrangement as the true one, until it can be brought to some more decisive test than that of fanciful conjecture.

It is a much more serious question, how the seeming inconsistencies of these four narratives may be removed, and their contents proved to be harmonious. This is a subject which has exercised the minds of the ablest interpreters of scripture from the earliest times. The progress of inquiry and discussion has however shown the necessity of a previous question—namely, how can the resemblance and the difference of the gospels be accounted for, without denying the veracity of either? Some of the older writers were contented with referring the effect to inspiration. But as inspiration did not supersede the influence of circumstances or individual peculiarities, it still remains a question, how four historians of the same events, even admitting them to be inspired, were led to tell the truth in forms so various, and sometimes seemingly so inconsistent, while at the same time they agree in minor points where discrepancy might have been expected.

Another and a larger class would solve the difficulty by supposing that the subsequent writers made use of the earlier books and thus became, in some degree, assimilated to them. Under this general hypothesis various particular conjectures have been entertained; one writer supposing that Mark followed Matthew, and that Luke made use of both; another that Luke followed Matthew, and Mark both, &c. &c. This theory, in one or another of its modifications, has proved satisfactory to most of

the earlier writers; but the modern critics have found it insufficient to account for the omissions and additions on the part of the later and dependent writer.

This has led to the hypothesis of a common source, from which, and not from one another, the four gospels have derived their striking points of similarity, while their independent use of it accounts for their no less striking points of difference. The first form in which this hypothesis presents itself is that of a common written source, or original gospel, now no longer in existence, but from which the four still extant are derived. However plausible and simple this hypothesis may seem when first propounded, it was soon found to be encumbered with great difficulties, to remove which other secondary suppositions became necessary, the increase of which, to meet the growing exigencies of the case, has furnished one of the most striking illustrations of the complexity of error, as compared with the simplicity of truth. Eichhorn, the leading advocate of this opinion, finding that the simple supposition of an *Urevangelium* was insufficient to account for coincident expressions, proceeded to add to his original idea, a succession of imaginary transcripts, versions, and interpolations, till he reached the number twelve. Thus besides the Aramaic *Urevangelium*, he assumed a Greek translation of it, then an altered text both of the version and original, then a mixture of two or more, &c. The extravagant length to which this theory was carried by Eichhorn in Germany and Herbert Marsh in England, has had the salutary effect of making the whole thing ridiculous, and adding new weight to the fatal objection, urged from the beginning, that if such a gospel ever existed, its disappearance and the silence of antiquity respecting it, are far more unaccountable than anything to be explained by supposing its existence.

This gave new credit to the doctrine of Schleiermacher, that the resemblances and differences of the gospels are to be ascribed, not to one common source, but common sources or materials. He supposes that long before a continued or complete history was attempted, particular facts or discourses were reduced to writing, and that out of these detached reports the extant gospels were compiled. But, although in a less degree, the objection still lies against this theory, as well as that of Eichhorn, that it assumes the existence of writings, which are

not now extant and of which we find no mention in antiquity, except in a dubious phrase of Papias, upon which Schleiermacher puts a meaning altogether different from the obvious and common one.

A third solution, proposed by the modern German school of critics, is that of Gieseler, who supposes that the substance of the gospels was preserved for many years by oral tradition, and at last reduced to writing in the different forms which had arisen in different places, or under the influence of different leaders. He even goes so far as to suppose that the preachers who were sent forth by the apostles were taught to relate the gospel history in certain forms of speech, some of which were common to the different schools or methods, which accounts for even verbal coincidences, while the diversities are such as would naturally spring from the diversity of schools and methods. The objection to this theory is not so much its assuming the existence of an exclusively oral tradition for so long a time, as its want of agreement with the specimens of apostolic preaching recorded in the Acts of the Apostles. From these we learn that their discourses were not purely historical, but argumentative; that their object was to prove the Messiahship of Christ; and that they fastened upon those points of his history which contributed to this end, passing by the rest, or taking it for granted, as already known, at least to Jewish hearers. In conformity with this state of the case, a distinguished Roman Catholic writer, not long since deceased, Hug of Freyburg, in his Introduction to the New Testament, reproduced, in a new form, the abandoned doctrine of a mutual dependence and a direct influence of one evangelist upon another. His ingenious argument in favour of this doctrine involves a multitude of minute details, which cannot of course be presented here; but the outline of his theory deserves to be recorded, as well on account of its intrinsic value, as because it constitutes a necessary part of the history of opinion on this subject.

He supposes that for many years after Christ's ascension the details of his history were familiar to the people of Palestine, and that the preachers of the gospel merely singled out the facts on which they wished to found their arguments and exhortations. But as that generation passed away, and the Jewish commonwealth approached its end, the detailed knowledge of

the history was in danger of being lost, which could only be prevented by an authoritative record. To give this record the required authority, it was obviously necessary that it should proceed from an inspired apostle, in the choice of whom we may suppose that some regard would be naturally had to his previous habits and qualification for the task. Now several of the twelve we know to have been fishermen, and most of the others, it is natural to suppose, were equally illiterate. The only one of the number whose professional employments are known to have accustomed him to writing, is Matthew the Publican, who in that capacity had been under the necessity of keeping registers and accounts. Now to this apostle a uniform tradition ascribes a long continued ministry in Palestine, and another still more uniform the authorship of the first of the four gospels. He would however naturally frame his work, not with any reference to the usages or rules of historical composition, but to the wants of the church and of the ministry. If, as we have seen to be most probable, the apostolic preachers took for granted the details of Christ's biography as known to their hearers, and only drew upon them for arguments in proof of his Messiahship, it was natural that Matthew, in the case supposed, should form his work upon the model of this oral preaching, making it not so much a history as a historical argument, and merely adding the details, which the oral preachers took for granted. Such, in Hug's opinion, is precisely the character of Matthew's gospel, one obvious design of which is to establish Christ's Messiahship by comparing the events of his life with the prophecies of the Old Testament. Hence his arrangement is not strictly chronological, but puts together things which are connected logically or in reference to his argumentative design.

This gospel would of course soon gain currency and general circulation, and as other apostles were still living and engaged in active labour, they would naturally use the book in their instructions, or at least refer to it, commenting on it, and completing its statements from their own recollection. For such a task none would be better qualified or more disposed than Peter. If he did undertake it, we may readily suppose that as to many points he would enrich the narrative with new details, and this recension of the first gospel would of course be reduced to writing, sooner or later, by himself or others. And as Peter's course

of life had not been such as to prepare him for literary labour, it is natural to inquire whether there was any one specially connected with him, upon whom the labour might have been devolved. Now we learn from the Acts of the Apostles, that the house to which Peter immediately resorted after his release from imprisonment, was that of a woman named Mary; and that this woman had a son named John Mark; and in the first epistle of Peter, Mark is mentioned as being with him and as joining in his salutations, which makes it not improbable that Mark was his amanuensis upon that occasion. Now to this same John Mark the tradition of the early church unanimously ascribes the composition of the second gospel, and with equal unanimity represents it as having the authority of Peter, although with some variety of statement as to its having been dictated by him, or sanctioned by him after it was written, or composed after his death from recollection of his oral teaching. This tradition is confirmed by the internal character of the gospel, which often adds to Matthew's general statements such details as would be apt to dwell in the memory of an eye and ear witness of Peter's ardent and observant character. As to the variations, Hug accounts for some of them by supposing that Mark intended to reduce Matthew's argumentative narrative to a more historical form, and therefore transposed some events so as to bring them into more exact chronological order. This theory of the origin of the second gospel destroys two common assumptions of the older writers, viz. that Mark is an epitome of Matthew, and that Matthew is the standard of chronology, to which the other gospels are to be assimilated.

The church was now in possession of two gospels, stamped with apostolical authority. In the second of these a step had been taken towards the construction of a regular history. To complete this would of course be an object of effort and desire with many. As the number of attempts increased, the necessity must arise of some authoritative work adapted to the same end, i. e. giving a still more complete view of the history as such, than either of the previous gospels. Such a work is that of Luke, the preface of which speaks of various attempts as having been already made to complete and arrange the history. The body of the work too gives the early life of Christ with a minuteness wholly wanting in the earlier gospels.

Thus far the histories had been framed with reference merely to the wants of the infant church, while still united and of one mind. But in a very few years a new form became necessary, in consequence of heretical perversions and schismatical divisions. The character and work of Christ began to be questioned or misrepresented. It was desirable therefore that his history should be written with express view to vindicate his claim to be the Son of God. So far as we know, only one of the apostles lived to see these changes. This was John, who succeeded Paul at Ephesus, and lived to an extreme old age, in the very focus of heretical and heathen speculation. To him all antiquity ascribes the last of the four gospels, which declares itself to have been written for the very end above described. John xx: 31.

We have thus the genesis of our four gospels hypothetically accounted for—the first, a historical argument to prove the Messiahship of Christ, with a detail of facts which had before been preserved by tradition—the second a recension of the same, more historical in form and chronological in order, and with many particulars supplied by Peter's recollection—the third, composed under Paul's authority, and designed to supersede unauthorized attempts at a complete biography—the fourth to vindicate the sonship and divinity of Christ in opposition to nascent heresies, by the last survivor of the apostolical body.

This theory of Hug is to us the most satisfactory that has ever been proposed, when considered as a whole, and without insisting on the truth or necessity of all its suppositions in detail. It does not exclude Gieseler's doctrine of an oral tradition, but assumes it till the close of the first generation after the events, which is as far as it can be reasonably carried. The objections made to the theory of succession and dependence by some later writers do not strike us as conclusive. The main one is that if Mark read Matthew, Luke Mark, and John Luke, we cannot account for their omitting so much which they found recorded by their predecessors. But this objection rests upon the false assumption, that each expected and designed to supersede his predecessors by completing what they had left unfinished. The correct supposition seems to be, that each subsequent writer expected those before him to retain their place in the sacred canon and to be in the hands of all Christian readers, which left him

at liberty to retain just as little or as much as suited his own special purpose. That each gospel after that of Matthew was meant to be exclusive of the others, and that each was intended merely to supply what the others had omitted, are opposite extremes, alike untenable. Assume the first, and it becomes impossible to account for the existing variations; assume the second, and it is equally impossible to account for what is common to them all. The correct idea is, that each subsequent writer wrote with a distinct understanding that his book was to accompany but not to supersede the others, and yet each wrote a book complete in itself, and in reference to its specific purpose.

What this specific purpose was in either case, forms part of a more general inquiry as to the characteristic and distinctive features of the four evangelists, including their peculiarities of plan, style, tone, and spirit. The old interpreters, and the great mass of ordinary readers, are disposed to overlook such diversities and to regard the gospels as in these respects alike. But the contrary is rendered a priori probable by the very existence of four gospels. Why should there be more than one, if they were not intended to exhibit different phases and to make different impressions of the same truth, one and indivisible? This antecedent probability is confirmed by a minute investigation of the gospels, one of the good effects which has resulted from the modern critical and even skeptical discussions of the subject. That the old and popular opinion was erroneous, and that the gospels have their marked peculiarities, compared with one another no less than compared with other writings, may be satisfactorily proved by a comparison of their style and diction. This is the more conclusive because founded upon slight diversities, which no writer could have studied or intended, and which no reader would observe, unless comparing the four books for the special purpose of detecting such peculiarities.

From the striking results of this induction we shall offer a few samples. The adverb *εως* *then*, as a connective particle, is frequent in the gospels, and a cursory reader might suppose that it was equally frequent in all four; yet a careful comparison has shown that the word occurs in Mark but six times, in John ten times, in Luke fourteen times, i. e. in all three thirty times while in Matthew alone it occurs nearly ninety times, i. e. thrice as often as in all the others put together. In like manner, Mark

uses the adverb εἰδώς in his first chapter oftener than either Luke or John in his whole gospel. The preposition σύν is used by John but twice, by Matthew thrice, by Mark five times, and by Luke (in his gospel and the Acts together) seventy-five times. The word χάρις is unknown to Matthew and Mark, and occurs in all John's writings only four times, while Luke (in his two books) has it twenty-four times. The cognate words σωτήρ, σωτηρία, and σωτήριον, which occur seventeen times in the writings of Luke, are not found once in Matthew or Mark, and only twice in John. The verb εὐαγγελίζομαι is used by Matthew once, by John and Mark not at all, while Luke employs it five and twenty times. The verb ὑποσπέρω occurs thirty-one times in Luke and Acts, once in Mark, and not at all in John or Matthew. The double ἀμὲν (verily, verily) at the beginning of a sentence occurs twenty-four times in the gospel of John, and no where else in the New Testament.

Can these peculiarities be accidental? The more unimportant in themselves, the more unlikely to be studied or intentional. Indeed they seem to have escaped all readers until modern controversy brought them within the scope of microscopic criticism. To us, these facts, and a multitude of others like them, seem conclusively to settle two points. The first, and most important in itself, is the unity of the several gospels, as opposed to the idea of fragmentary compilation. The other, bearing more directly on the subject immediately before us, is the fact, that the evangelists have marked peculiarities, which may properly be made the subject of investigation.

These peculiarities are not confined however to the use of certain words and phrases. They extend to the whole shape and structure of the books. There has been no little speculation as to the precise design of each evangelist and the specific class of readers whom he had in view. There can be no doubt that the attempt to distinguish has, in this as in all like cases, been carried to excess. But it is equally clear that the distinction is a real one. The fact that Mark frequently explains Jewish usages, while Matthew never does, is almost sufficient of itself to prove, that the latter wrote for Jewish and the former for Gentile readers. This conclusion is confirmed by the comparative frequency with which Matthew cites the Old Testament. Luke, unlike the others, wrote both his books with

primary reference to an individual reader, named Theophilus. But whether he was a Jew or Gentile, is a matter of conjecture and curious speculation, which will probably never be determined. In John the line of demarcation seems to vanish, probably because he wrote when Jews and Gentiles had long been merged in one new body, and the divisions which existed were not so much national as doctrinal.

Connected with this subject of characteristic differences between the gospels is that of their original language. The obvious adaptation of the first to Jewish readers agrees well with the tradition that it was originally written in Hebrew, i. e. in the Aramaic dialect vernacular in Palestine. The ancient writers are remarkably unanimous in their assertion of this fact, which is therefore commonly received. Some have supposed however that it may have arisen from an idea that what was written for Jews must be written in Hebrew; whereas Greek was almost universally understood even in Palestine. No one of the Fathers professes to have seen the original Matthew. All quote the Greek now extant. Some of the latest writers, influenced by this fact, yet unwilling to reject so clear and constant a tradition, have combined the two by supposing that Matthew wrote first in Hebrew, but afterwards rewrote the book in Greek for a larger circle of readers, and that this second edition gradually displaced the other. There is also an old tradition, but neither so ancient nor so extensive as the other, that the gospel of Mark was originally written in Latin. As to John and Luke, there is no diversity of judgment or testimony. With respect to this whole subject of the points of difference between the gospels, it is chiefly important to avoid extremes. The attempt to make everything characteristic and distinctive, is as unreasonable as to overlook the points of difference altogether.

But how are the contents of these four gospels to be wrought into one coherent narrative? This question has been agitated from the earliest times. The first harmony of the gospels (Tatian's *Diatessaron*) is no longer in existence. The oldest extant is that of Augustin. In the middle ages Gerson is eminent as a labourer in this field. Among the Reformers, Calvin gave particular attention to the harmonizing of the gospel narrative. In the age succeeding the Reformation, the most noted names are those of Osiander and Chemnitz or Chemnicus. In later times

the harmonies are almost innumerable, the last and one of the best being the work of an American scholar.

Of more importance to our present purpose than the titles or succession of particular harmonies, are the principles on which they have been framed, and the means employed to overcome the difficulties of the subject. The oldest writers seem to have recognised and exercised the right of transposition and new combination. But Osiander and his followers rejected this method as derogatory to the inspiration and infallibility of the sacred writers. They assumed it as a principle, that exact chronological order is essential to the truth of history, and that this order is observed and equally observed by all the four evangelists. Where the same thing appears to be assigned to different dates by two or more of them, this theory compels us to regard the identity as only apparent, and to assume the repeated occurrence of events almost precisely similar. This is not only unnatural and without analogy, but founded on a false assumption. Chronological order is not essential to the truth of history. A biographer of Bonaparte might bring together in one chapter all the facts of his domestic history; in another his military progress; in a third his legislative and administrative acts, &c. Another might present the very same facts in the order of their actual occurrence. Yet the first would be as true as the second and as really a history, though not so chronological. The fallacy arises from the common but gross error of confounding chronology with history, the science of dates with the science of events. A merchant's ledger is as true a history of his transactions as his day-book, though the order be entirely different.

The inconveniences of this hypothesis were found on trial to be so extreme, that a later school of harmonists, with Chemnitz at their head, returned to the more natural and reasonable freedom which had been practised by Augustin, Gerson, and Calvin. In carrying out the principle, the question soon arose, what is the standard of chronological exactness? Some assumed one of the evangelists as strictly chronological in order, and tried to assimilate the others to him. But this method, being doubly arbitrary in its principle—first, in assuming that one alone was chronological throughout, and then in determining which one it was—must of course be precarious and diver-

sified in its results, according as the honour of priority in this respect was given to Matthew, Mark, Luke, or John.

From this by reaction sprang an opposite extreme, that of denying all attention to chronology in any of the gospels, and leaving the arrangement of the facts to the caprice of the interpreter. Bengel deserves the praise of having first clearly laid down and applied a rule, by which both of these extremes might be avoided. His principle is this, that we are not to assume that either of the evangelists gives us the precise chronological order of events, unless he says so, or affords some intimation of his purpose. Two facts succeeding one another without any such intimation, may have been chronologically successive, and must be so treated if nothing appears to the contrary. But they may also not have been so, and therefore if another writer states them in a different order, there is no contradiction, although it may be difficult in that case to determine the true order, which for that very reason may be looked upon as unimportant. If for example one historian should say that Taylor conquered the Mexicans at Buena Vista and at Palo Alto, a reader without other means of information, might reasonably conclude that the former victory was first in date. But if he should read in another author, that Taylor conquered the Mexicans at Palo Alto and at Buena Vista, he would remain doubtful as to the priority. There would however be no contradiction, but a mere ambiguity. And even if the second writer said that Taylor conquered the Mexicans at Palo Alto and *afterwards* at Buena Vista, this would decide the question of chronology, but it would not discredit the authority first consulted, which states the facts as truly as the other, though with less chronological precision which it does not undertake to give. Again: the statement that the battle of Buena Vista was *after* that of Palo Alto, might by itself be understood to imply that no other battle intervened. But if a third authority declared that the victory of Monterey was between the others, this would be perfectly consistent with the second statement, although more explicit.

These supposed cases will illustrate the varying practice of the four evangelists in reference to the chronological order of events. Sometimes they are merely put together, without any chronological specification. Sometimes one event is said to have happened after another. In other cases it is said or indi-

rectly represented to have followed it immediately. In comparing the four narratives, it is plain that they could contradict each other only when two or more employ this last mode of statement. That is, if one says that *a* was immediately followed by *b*, and another that *a* was immediately followed by *c*, the accounts are contradictory. But if one says that *a* was followed by *b*, and another that *c* intervened between them, there is no contradiction nor even inconsistency, because an event may be remotely followed by another, and yet immediately by one entirely different. And yet it is from discrepancies of this last class that the chronological objections to the truth of the gospels are almost exclusively derived; whereas the other case of two irreconcilable exclusive statements nowhere occurs.

This principle of Bengel has been carried out with great ingenuity and skill by Ebrard, who makes it the basis of a detailed chronological arrangement of the gospel history. It is indeed applied by all the modern writers of authority, with a surprising uniformity in the general results, although with many variations as to minor points. So far as our inquiries have extended, every question as to the succession of events, which is at all material to the history, has now been satisfactorily settled. Those which remain are for the most part such as neither can be nor need be certainly decided. If this be so, the harmonizing of the gospels has been brought to a high degree of perfection.

This affords us the occasion to say something on a point of some importance. The legitimate use of Harmonies is threefold, apologetical, exegetical, and historical. Their apologetical use is to prove the consistency and truth of the narratives by bringing them into juxtaposition. This alone is not in all cases sufficient without explanation, but it furnishes the necessary basis and material for the vindication of the sacred history. The exegetical use of harmonies is to make the narratives illustrate each other, one supplying what another omits, or stating clearly what it states obscurely. The historical use may be considered as included in the exegetical or as one of its results. By bringing all the testimony at one view before us, it enables us to digest the whole into a comprehensive narrative, adapted to our own wants, and not merely to the primary purpose of the sacred history itself.

With respect to all these ends, it is sufficient that the Harmony be used as a book of reference, and this we take to be its legitimate use. Its abuse consists in substituting this artificial arrangement for the gospels in their proper form, in the habitual reading of the scriptures. This would be inadmissible even if the narratives were identical in plan and purpose, because their admission to the canon would still show that they were meant to be separately used. How much more is this the case when each has a distinctive character, the unity of which must be destroyed by mixture with the rest. We have seen reason to conclude that the gospels are not mere histories but historical arguments. This is particularly true of John and Matthew. Each, as a whole, was intended and adapted to produce a definite impression, which can only be marred and falsified by a mechanical amalgamation.

The necessity of this effect has been exemplified in English literature and within a very few years. Few books in our language have acquired greater popularity than Boswell's *Life of Johnson*. However little respect may be felt by the reader for the writer, the work itself is universally regarded as a masterpiece of personal history. Nay the very defects of the author contribute to its excellence, by making it as correct a picture of himself as of his subject. The book has perfect unity. From the beginning to the end we find the same Johnson and the same Boswell. After the work had been a favourite of the public more than forty years, a distinguished public man, of more reading than good taste, John Wilson Croker, prepared a new edition, in which all the other histories of Johnson are incorporated piecemeal into Boswell's text. The result is that the amount of curious information is perhaps more than doubled, but the charm of the biography is gone; its unity and individuality are utterly destroyed; and the final compound, though invaluable as a storehouse of facts, is almost unreadable. This recent and familiar case may serve to illustrate the effects which must arise from a sheer substitution of the best digested harmony for the four gospels as the Holy Spirit gave them, and the canon of Scripture has preserved them. Let them still be read as independent narratives intended to produce their own distinct impressions, whatever aid we may derive from harmonies in proving their consistency or in expounding their contents.

These remarks have reference only to the reading of the gospels as a part of scripture, in which no tampering with the text should be allowed. The considerations stated do not militate at all against the framing of a continuous narrative for our own use or that of others from the combination of these several testimonies. But in so doing, instead of attempting to retain the words of the original record, it is better to depart from them, and thus to keep our own imperfect digest of the matter altogether separate from the form in which it has been clothed by inspiration. Had only one such narrative been given, nothing more would have been necessary than to expound it. But as four have been given, it becomes us to leave them as they are, and yet to frame a digest of the facts which they record, but not to merge the former in the latter. Such a digest of the gospel history would be eminently useful in popular instruction. A thorough and masterly exhibition of the life of Christ could not fail to be one of the most interesting and attractive means of ministerial influence. Of all the ways in which it may be used, by far the most effectual, in our opinion, is, by weaving into a connected narrative the facts contained in all the four evangelists, according to the best harmonic methods and the last results of sound interpretation, but without parade of learning or unnecessary reference to disputed points. This method strikes us as decidedly superior to any other that could well be practised. If you take up a single gospel and interpret it, you give the people only what they have already or may have at pleasure, while at the same time the form of detailed exegesis is apt to be repulsive. If you adopt an apologetic method and avow your purpose to defend the gospel against all attacks, the polemic tone of the discussion renders it less edifying, and without extraordinary skill more doubts will be suggested to your hearers than either you or they can solve. If on the other hand, you make it your object to exhibit all the facts in one connected narrative, you give them what they have not in the text of scripture, and what they cannot procure for themselves without great labour, if at all, while at the same time you have the opportunity of settling many difficulties without any formal discussion by the very form of statement and the arrangement of your facts. The simple statement of a fact in its true connexion may require a previous exegetical investigation, of which no part

is subjected to the senses of the hearer or the reader. In prosecuting this design, as the matter must be drawn from all the gospels indiscriminately, and without exclusive reference to either as a standard, a well digested harmony will be found a useful guide, and we are happy to be able to recommend the cheapest and the most accessible—that of Dr. Robinson, published both in Greek and English—as the best with which we are acquainted. From the order of that work a popular lecturer would seldom have occasion to depart, and might therefore refer his hearers to it as a kind of syllabus, containing not only the plan but the materials of his instructions.

With respect to the principles on which the teacher should proceed in digesting these materials, we need hardly say, that he must necessarily assume the inspiration of the gospels and their consistency with one another. This gives of course a complexion to the subject wholly different from that of works in which the contrary rule is followed, viz. that the writings shall be assumed to differ, until they are proved to be agreed. This leads us, to conclude with some account of the skeptical opinions which have become current in our own day, with respect to the evangelical history or Life of Christ. Of these we should not speak at all, if by that means our readers would for the first time be apprised of their existence. But as these opinions are industriously propagated, not only in Europe but among ourselves, not only in learned but in popular works, such scrupulous reserve becomes both inexpedient and impossible.

Towards the close of the last century a great revolution took place in the theological and biblical literature of Germany. Some of the leading scholars of that country lost their belief in the divine authority and inspiration of the scriptures, while they still continued to make them the subject of learned investigation. In this they differed from the French and English Deists, whose attacks upon the Bible were for the most part as illiterate as they were spiteful. In reference to the gospels, one of the first effects of this unhappy change was the appearance of the so-called natural method of interpretation, which maintained the historical truth of the narrative, but denied its supernatural facts, which must therefore be explained away. Thus Paulus, one of the most eminent leaders of this school, maintains, that when Christ is said to have walked upon the sea, it means that

he walked round it; and that when Ananias fell down dead, it was in consequence of Peter's stabbing him with a concealed weapon. The same writer, or another of the same class, understands by the narrative of our Saviour's feeding the five thousand, that he set the example of hospitality to his disciples, and they to such of the multitude as had provisions, until all were fed. These instances will show, better than any description, the character of this school of interpreters. Their violent wresting of the scriptures was but a desperate struggle between unbelief in miracle and inspiration, and a desire to maintain the credit of the gospels as mere history. The absurdities to which the attempt led soon showed that the two things were incompatible, and that the only rational alternative was to admit the miracles or to deny the truth of the history, in whole or in part.

The next step was to deny it in part. Another school arose, of which DeWette may be represented as the leader, who received the statements of the gospel in their obvious and true sense, but rejected all that was miraculous as myths or fables. To this school many thanks are due for exploding the unnatural method of interpretation practised by their predecessors, and for the labour which they have bestowed upon the philological interpretation of the gospels. But they were obviously inconsistent in rejecting one part of a narrative as fabulous, and receiving all the rest without a scruple as historical, as if fictitious writers only dealt in supernatural events, and as if whatever is not impossible must needs be true. It was not to be expected that this unphilosophical and arbitrary doctrine would continue long to satisfy the minds of men who had renounced all faith in miracle and inspiration, as being not merely unreal, but impossible.

Accordingly there now arose a third school of interpreters who rejected the whole history as fabulous. At first, they were contented with a skeptical denial of the possibility of ascertaining what was true and what was not true in a history, of which some parts, as they supposed, were demonstrably incredible. By degrees however, the incredible parts became greater and greater and the residuum which might by possibility be true diminished in proportion, till at last the only truth acknowledged was a fine thread of authentic narrative, with a huge mass of fable strung upon it, and by some even this scanty remnant of reality

was mythified, and the whole regarded as a fiction. Strauss, the able leader of this whole school, undertook to show the genesis or organic development of the myths which constitute the gospels. The germ of all he supposed to be the Jewish doctrine of a Messiah, founded on misinterpretation of the Old Testament prophecies. Jesus, whom he acknowledged to have really existed, claimed to be this Messiah, and his followers gradually fabricated incidents in proof of this pretension, till by long accretion, their oral tradition took the form now reduced to writing in the gospels.

Upon this captivating theory several later writers have endeavoured to improve, but with indifferent success. One supposes the extant gospel history to have been produced by turning the parables of Jesus (a Jewish teacher) into literal narratives relating to himself. To illustrate moral changes, he related once a parable in which water was miraculously changed to wine, and this was afterwards, with or without design, transformed into the history of such a miracle wrought by himself, &c. Another writer of this school regards the gospel history as a fictitious illustration of rabbinical maxims, still recorded in the Talmud. A third goes to the opposite extreme of denying the existence even of a Messianic doctrine among the early Jews, and supposes the gospel history to have grown out of internal conflicts and disputes between the Jewish and the Gentile Christians. Further enumeration or description would be useless: what has now been said will serve to characterize this whole system of opinion, if it is entitled to the name. It is easy to perceive how it has gradually spun itself out of the original error of rejecting supernatural events as incredible and insusceptible of proof by any evidence whatever. There is also a gradual decrease of reverence for the narrative and for Christ himself. The *natural* interpreters were led into all their absurdities by their desire to vindicate the truth of the history without believing the extraordinary parts of it. The *rational* interpreters admitted the history to be sometimes false, but still maintained that it was true at other times. The *mythical* interpreters, regarding the whole as fiction, and Christ himself as an imaginary personage, lose of course even that small remnant of respect for him and his biographers, which appeared to be retained by their predecessors. The lowest representatives of

this school may be said to treat our Saviour with contempt; they deny the perfection of his character, the wisdom of his teaching, and the purity of his moral system; they even ridicule his words and actions. And thus, by a natural process of development, the German form of unbelief at last approximates, in tone and spirit, to that gross and frivolous infidelity of France and England, from which at first it seemed to stand aloof.

The whole tendency of these opinions, it will be perceived, is negative. They pull down without attempting to build up. They are contented with destroying all certain ground of belief. Another school has now arisen which attempts to do the positive part of the same work. The leader of this forlorn hope is Baur of Tübingen, a man of great ability and learning, but perverse and self-sufficient in a rare degree. Like Ewald in the books of the Old Testament, he discovers in each of the first three gospels two or more distinct compositions, one the original framework or foundation of the history, the others incorporated with it afterwards. These elements the critic claims the power of distinguishing, and his strength is chiefly spent in exercising this discriminative power, but in a way which to all except himself seems wholly arbitrary and gratuitous. He admits the unity of John's gospel but denies its apostolic origin, and represents it as a pure fiction, designed to illustrate the one favourite idea of a divine λόγος, borrowed from the Greek philosophy. This view of the fourth gospel is the more remarkable, because the unbelieving critics had for half a century or more regarded it with special favour, as the only genuine and truly apostolic gospel, by comparison with which the others must be judged, and to whose authority, in case of discrepance, their credit must be sacrificed. The sudden turn here made by Baur, and the confidence with which it is defended by himself and his adherents, may suggest a doubt, if nothing more, as to the certainty of all such reasoning, if such it may be called, whether used by himself on one side, or by his predecessors on the other side of the same question.

As to the refutation of these doctrines, it is not to be effected in detail but in the principle. They all rest on the assumed impossibility of miracle and inspiration. If this *πρῶτον ψεύδος* is not acknowledged as self-evident—for they attempt no proof of it—its specific applications and remoter consequences cannot shake our faith. Another view of all such

speculations, which to us is reassuring is, that they may be applied with equal plausibility to any other case whatever, not excepting the most recent and familiar history, of which we are ourselves the witnesses, or of which we can no more doubt than we can doubt our own existence. If then such reasoning proves that the events recorded in the gospels never happened, it may be used to prove that nothing ever happened at all; and we may surely be contented with a certainty as great as can exist in any other case whatever.

That the premises from which we draw this inference are true, any man may determine for himself, by an endless variety of experiments. Without going out of our own history, we might prove, by the fair use of this German calculus, that our Revolutionary War is a mere fiction either accidental in its origin, or meant to shadow forth certain doctrines or disputed questions in the politics of later days; that such a revolution never could have sprung from an occasion so contemptible: that the stamp-act is a mythus occasioned by the discussion of the question of international copy-right; that the character of Washington is unnatural and evidently feigned as the exponent of a great idea; that Franklin is an emblem of philosophy combined with practical sagacity; Witherspoon of civil and religious wisdom in harmonious combination; Lafayette of European chivalry allied with American patriotism; that the character of Benedict Arnold is as clearly fictitious as that of Judas Iscariot, &c. &c.

If the illusion should in this case seem to be unduly favoured by the lapse of time, it would be easy to effect the same thing in relation to the very latest chapter of our history, and to prove, in the most conclusive German style, that a war, like that of the United States with Mexico, is a sheer impossibility, except as a philosophical mythus. Who can believe that such a force was conveyed to such a distance and at such expense for such a cause as that assigned? Who can believe in the rapid succession of victories by two invading armies, with scarcely an attempt at effective resistance? The triumphant march from Vera Cruz to Mexico is stamped with every attribute of fable. The plan of the battle of Contreras was a subject of dispute between two generals for months; it consequently never was fought. The very names of the generals in this pretended war are almost all significant, and therefore evidently not historical.

Who can believe that the conqueror of Mexico happened to be named *Winfield*? The very appropriateness of the title shows that it was given to him *ex eventu*. This suspicion is confirmed by the co-existence on the roll of such names as Taylor, Wool, Werth, Twiggs, Pillow, Quitman, Shields, every one of which, with very little twisting, may be turned into an emblem or a symbol, and thus made to prove the whole affair a myth. However trifling this may seem, we solemnly affirm, that after carefully examining the gospels, with a view to the objections of this school of critics, we can find no argument employed by them which may not be applied to our contemporary history, not only with as much, but with greater plausibility. A kind of reasoning therefore which demonstrates every thing demonstrates nothing. A storm or an earthquake is to be dreaded because it may destroy one place while it leaves all others standing; but no one trembles at the revolution of the earth, because by moving every thing alike it shakes down nothing. There is no unfairness in comparing the ultimate discoveries of the German skeptics with the English caricature which represents a crowd of malcontents vociferating "No corn laws!" "No excise!" "No house of lords!" and one more thoroughgoing and consistent than the rest crying out "No nothing!"

In the foregoing pages we have simply stated, no doubt somewhat crudely, the impression left upon our minds by a perusal, more or less attentive, of the latest works upon this interesting subject. We have made no attempt, of course, within such limits, at exhaustive fulness or at systematic order. We have not even had a constant or exclusive reference to the works named at the head of the article, less for the purpose of defining our own subject than for that of marking some important steps in the progress of investigation and discussion for the last seven years. That the works enumerated are all German, is because the publications on the subject, during the same period, in other languages, and especially in English, so far as our information goes, either take no notice of the latest forms of unbelief, and of the specious reasoning by which they are commended to the common mind, even in England and America, or err in the opposite extreme of misplaced admiration and feeble concession. Of the five books named, the first three are substantially defensive of the truth, the fourth a kind of neutral estimate of both

sides, and the fifth a learned and ingenious specimen of the skeptical criticism in its latest and most fearless exhibition.

In this, as in other parts of sacred learning, we still venture to indulge the hope that the results of German industry and talent, confused and noxious as they now may seem, are yet to furnish the material for invaluable additions to our literary stores, adapted to that purpose, not by foreign but by native hands. Even in reference to the historical part of scripture much remains to be accomplished. The humblest Christian and the most conceited smatterer may agree in the opinion that the gospel history is a field long since exhausted in the Sunday school and Bible class, and that all the subsequent discussions are mere garbage. But even garbage has been known to enrich the field which former harvests seemed to have exhausted; or to change the figure, even the slain carcasses of heresy and paradox have yielded nutriment to faith and reason, so that "out of the eater came forth meat, and out of the strong came forth sweetness."

SHORT NOTICES.

ART. VI.—*Bishop Hughes Confuted.* Reply to the Rt. Rev. John Hughes, Roman Catholic Bishop of New York. By Kirwan. New York: Leavitt, Trow & Co. 1848.

Bishop Hughes made a great mistake in noticing Kirwan. His letters could not be answered, and anything written about them, and especially to their author, not being an answer, must be a failure. We presume there never was a case of controversy, in this country, where the advantage was so entirely on one side, or as to which public opinion is so unanimous. Kirwan is completely victorious, and bishop Hughes as completely discomfited.

There are various legitimate methods of controversy. Kirwan, in the first instance, adopted one of the safest and the most effective. He undertook to exhibit Romanism in its practical operation on himself. This he did simply, truthfully, and therefore powerfully. All that Bishop Hughes had to say, in

his first series of letters, about the nature and authority of the church, was entirely aside of the mark, as an answer to Kirwan. It had no tendency to counteract the impression made by his book. And as to the Bishop's second series, addressed to Kirwan himself, being a direct attempt to break the power of that writer's letters, the failure is only the more conspicuous. Kirwan has assailed Romanism on her weakest side. It is a monstrous system of conscious deception. The most absurd of Popish legends is more credible, than that the educated prelates and priesthood of that church believe what they teach. We do not deny the possibility of their believing the system of doctrine contained in the decisions of Trent and in the Roman Catechism, but we hold it to be impossible that they should believe in the pretended miracles and legends of all sorts, which are constantly receiving their sanction. Do all the clergy of Naples believe in the miraculous liquefaction annually of the blood of St. Januarius? Do the Pope and Cardinals believe in the genuineness of the relics with which their churches are filled and which they encourage the people to reverence? It is not one priest or one bishop, who is guilty of this deception, but it belongs to the church. It is built on "lying wonders," and the full, honest declaration of the truth, even of what the Romish hierarchy know to be truth, would go far to destroy the whole system. We have never heard this feature of Romanism defended on any other principle than that of "pious frauds." We never saw any one who pretended to think that the priests themselves believe the legends they constantly sanction and circulate. We wish Kirwan would take up and press this view of the matter. Let him collect authentic accounts of the sanction given by the Romish authorities, in all countries, and even in our own times, to the most obvious and wicked impositions on the credulity of the people. The question must force itself on the minds even of the most bigoted, whether a system can be true which rests so extensively on known and deliberate deception.

1. *Memoir of Clementine Cuvier*; with reflections by Rev. John Angell James.—2. *A guide to Acquaintance with God*. By Rev. James Sherman, Minister of Turrey Chapel, London.—3. *Great Truths in simple words*, for little children.—4. *The Bible True, and Infidelity Wicked*. By Wm. S. Plumer, D.D.
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These are a few of the recent publications of the American Tract Society which have come under our notice. We are filled with admiration and gratitude when we contemplate the magnitude of the operations of that blessed institution. With its numerous steam presses at work night and day, it is still unable to supply the demand for its publications. The spacious building erected only a year or two since for its accommodation, is already altogether inadequate to its wants. We understand that in its resources and operations, the Society has increased nearly fifty per cent during the year, and that it is still on the advance, sending out literally a flood of sound religious publications over the whole land. In these days when all power seems concentrating round the press, every Christian must rejoice to contemplate such an agency for good as the American Tract Society, which by its books and colporteurs, is penetrating even the darkest portions of the land, to which the living preacher seldom or never comes.

The Faith of Former Times. A Sermon by Daniel Dana, D.D. Minister of the Gospel in Newburyport. Boston. Crocker & Brewster. 1848.

The Fathers and their Childrens. Two Sermons, preached on Fast Day, April 6, 1848, in the Second Presbyterian Church, Newburyport. By W. W. Eells. Boston. Crocker & Brewster. 1848.

These discourses have a common object. They are designed to raise a voice of warning at the defection of the churches of Massachusetts from the faith of former times. We of course sympathize with their authors in their attachment to the old doctrines, and we fully recognise the duty and wisdom of raising the voice of admonition and alarm, when those doctrines are openly impugned or secretly undermined. On this point there can be no dispute. As to the extent of the defection, and especially as to the correctness of the representation given in Mr. Eell's second sermon, we find the orthodox of New England are by no means agreed. It is evident, however, that it is high time that the attention of the church should every where be called to the preservation of the truth and the increase of religion, if we are to be saved from the evils of a fatal apostacy. Mr. Eells, in a prefatory note, says "The doctrinal defections set

forth have been taken from the notes of lectures delivered by a most popular professor of theology." We must express our disapprobation of any such method of attaining evidence. No man should be held responsible for the notes of a hearer. Every teacher knows that he is liable to be misapprehended even from notes literally correct. Much depends on the connexion, and much on the explanations given at the moment. It is, however, not merely an account of a liability to error that we object to this method, but we regard it as unfair, to the lecturer. His lectures are not public property until he gives them to the public, and therefore no one has the right to use them as such. These remarks apply only to a subordinate point. To the zeal for the truth evinced by Mr. Eells under trying circumstances, no one can be insensible, and when a man so venerable, and so full of experience, as Dr. Dana, is found uniting in these admonitions, we trust they will be seriously pondered by all the friends of "the Faith of Former Times" throughout the land.

Lecture on the Formation of Female Character, by the Rev. Charles C. Beatty, D. D., Steubenville, Ohio.

Dr. Beatty is well known as the founder and head of one of the earliest and most successful Female Academies in the west. It is beautifully situated on the banks of the Ohio, in Steubenville: and for extent, appearance, and convenience, the buildings and the grounds are among the most imposing with which we are acquainted; while the interior arrangements, the number and character of the pupils, and the general celebrity of the institution, all evince the wisdom, tact and experience of the principal and proprietor. We mention this to show that Dr. Beatty is just the person to discourse about the *formation of female character*. We might on a priori grounds expect from such a source, a thorough, discriminating discussion, and one, above all, of a sound, practical character. In vindicating the rights and duties of women, Dr. Beatty seems to us to have hit the true *via media*, which, upon our ideal chart of female education, lies about equidistant from the low utilitarianism of old-fashioned housewifery and the high-flying pretensions of an "accomplished" young lady in the modern sense of the word. We have neither sympathy nor patience with those who would train females on the hypothesis that the only proper sphere of

woman is the kitchen, the dairy, or the nursery. And on the other hand, we must own that there are few characters whom we should encounter with more dread, than a professed "literary" lady; always of course excepting those amazon philanthropists of the Garrison school, of whom we know nothing save by the hearing of the ear; but who are the legitimate and full grown offspring of the hypothesis, which denies all fundamental distinction between the intellectual and moral constitution of the sexes. Under the guidance of revelation, which sheds the only satisfactory light we have upon this subject, Dr. Beatty points out with great discrimination and justness the true characteristics of the female mind and heart, and the true sphere for which every female should strive with holy emulation to qualify herself; while with equal discrimination and admirable delicacy he puts his finger upon the true dangers and weaknesses of the sex, and indicates with earnest and hearty kindness the source of their strength, as well as the solemnity and vastness of their responsibility. It is hardly necessary, after what we have said, to add that the author finds the vital germ of all that is worth cherishing, in the religious element of the soul; and the quickening power of all that is worthy to be called education, in the religious element, which appertains to all truth.

Devotional Guides. By Rev. Robert Philip, of Maberly Chapel, with an Introductory Essay, by Rev. Albert Barnes. In two vols. New York. R. Carter. 12mo. pp. 345, 334.—*The Hannahs*: or Maternal Influence on Sons. Third Edition. 18mo.—*The Marys*: or the Beauty of Female Holiness. Sixteenth Edition.—*The Marthas*: or the Varieties of Female Piety. Twelfth Edition.—*The Lydias*: or the Development of Female Character. Fifth Edition. New York. R. Carter.

All these are reprints of works by the pious and excellent Mr. Philip of Maberly Chapel. The number of editions, which some of them have attained, shows conclusively the favour they have found with the public. The author's manner of treating his topics is peculiar; we think he sometimes sacrifices simplicity for effect; but he is always impressive and always evangelical. In the wide circulation of such books every Christian ought to rejoice.

Sickness Improved. 18mo. pp. 153.—*Country School House.* 18mo. pp. 69.—*The Young Jew:* by the Author of the "Peep of Day."—*Sketches of Home Life.* 18mo. pp. 126.

All from the Press of the American Sunday School Union, and all beautiful little volumes. The name of the author of the "Peep of Day," is a passport to any volume. The book first named is truly welcome, and likely to be useful.

Leaves from the Book of Nature, interpreted by Grace. By Robert Davidson, D.D. New York. Gates & Stedman. 18mo. pp. 176.

Under an exterior more than usually fair, the author has given us a series of attractive sketches with the intention of connecting associations of religion with the visible works of God. The style is ornate, and the whole treatment judicious. It is one of a class which ought always to be kept full; and we wish it might ever be with productions as deserving as this little volume.

Orators of the American Revolution. By E. L. Magoon. New York. 1848. pp. 456. 12mo. Baker & Scribner.

The work is embellished with six plates. The subject is a good one, and has been treated with great animation. Though the author betrays too great fondness for stilted diction, and herein falls below the first class of writers, he is by no means devoid of genius, and frequently carries us up with him in his soarings. He would have rendered his work more valuable, if he had inserted more numerous specimens of the Orators. As it is, it will have a patriotic tendency.

The Course of Time; a Poem. By Robert Pollok, A. M. With an Essay on his Poetical Genius, by James Scott, D.D., Pastor of the First Reformed Dutch Church, Newark, N. J. New York: R. Carter. 1848. 12mo. pp. 433.—*The Life, Letters and Remains of Rev. Robert Pollok, A. M.* By James Scott, D.D. R. Carter. 1848. 364 pp.—*Tales of the Scottish Covenanters.* By Robert Pollok. R. Carter. 1848. 12mo.

These works, by and concerning the poet Pollok, have been known to the public before. The present reprint of the cele-

brated poem is a beautiful one, and is preceded by a warm and generous tribute from the American editor, who here, as in the Memoir, evinces a heart that beats in unison with his subject.

Memoir of the Rev. Henry Duncan, D.D., Minister of Ruthwell, Founder of Savings Banks, Author of the Sacred Philosophy of the Seasons. By his son, the Rev. George John C. Duncan, N. Shields. N. York. R. Carter. 1848. 12mo. pp. 323.

WE wish we had time and space, to treat this delightful volume as it deserves. It is anything but a common-place biography. We heartily commend it to all who wish to gain glimpses of the interior of Scottish ministerial life, as exemplified in a clergyman of great scientific accomplishment, and unwearied philanthropic labours. Dr. Duncan's native manliness, sympathy with the poor, devotion to natural theology, and ultimate zeal for the Evangelical movement, awaken a continual interest. We see with interest, that he was exempt from the prevailing British prejudice against the Liberian Colony.

Memoirs of an Old Disciple and his Descendants: Christian Miller, Sarah S. Miller, Isaac S. K. Miller, and Rev. John E. Miller. By Francis M. Kip, Pastor of the R. D. Church, Fishkill. With an Introductory Chapter, by Thomas De Witt, D.D. New York. R. Carter. 12mo. pp. 309.

Seldom have we been introduced to a more edifying or delightful family cluster of piety than this. As Dr. DeWitt remarks, in his excellent Introduction, a great truth is here exemplified, namely "that God connects his covenant blessing, set forth in promise, with parental fidelity in the exercise of faith, prayer, vigilance, and faithful labour in behalf of our children."

The Life of Rowland Hill, A. M. By the Rev. Edwin Sidney, A. M.—*The Listener:* by Caroline Fry; from the seventeenth London edition.—*The Greatness of the Soul:* by John Bunyan, with an Introduction by Mr. Philip.—*Baxter's Choice Works.*—*The Redeemer's Tears wept over Lost Souls:* by John Home, A. M., with Life by Dr. Urwick.—*The Jerusalem Sinner Saved:* by John Bunyan, with Life by Mr. Hamilton.—*The Anxious Enquirer after Salvation, Directed and En-*

couraged: by John Angell James.—*The Convert*: by R. Mc-
Crindell.

Of all these republications, by Mr. Carter, of excellent works, we have on former occasions, taken notice. The first of them received an extended review in our pages. All are books from the circulation of which the greatest usefulness is to be expected. The select treatises of Bunyan are well worthy of perpetuation, especially that most cordial work, the "Jerusalem Sinner Saved."

The Women of the American Revolution. By Elizabeth V. Ellet, author of the "Characters of Schiller," &c. In two volumes. New York. Baker & Scribner. pp. 348, 312.

While we have not fully read these sightly volumes, we know enough of the author, to be safe in recommending them, as both pleasing and profitable. A more felicitous plan has seldom been alighted on; the selection is promising, in a high degree; and the embellishments enhance the value of the memoirs.

Our Saviour's Example: a Discourse delivered at Lagrange, Georgia, before the students of the Lagrange Female Institute, Nov. 28th, 1847. By the Rev. Samuel K. Talmage, D.D., President of Oglethorpe University, Milledgeville.

It is well when important institutions of learning are committed to the guidance of men whose ability and heart are such as here shine forth. The Discourse, though delivered on a particular occasion, contains principles of eternal interest; and these are presented with perspicuity, good taste, and strength.

A History of the Purchase and Settlement of Western New York, and of the rise, progress and present state of the Presbyterian Church in that section. By the Rev. James H. Hotchkiss. New York. M. W. Dodd. Octavo. pp. 600.

What is technically called "Western New York" is in all respects the most enterprising portion of our country. There American enterprise has exerted all her energies, and there the church has extended her conquests with a rapidity truly wonderful. It has been the scene of modern evangelism, and where those *new measures* for the promotion of revivals of religion have been mainly pursued, which have done so much to cast a cloud of suspicion over all revivals. The book before us is a religious

history of this section of the country, and mainly in reference to the Presbyterian Church. Although we object to the entire correctness of some of its statements and narratives respecting the division of the Church in 1837, yet we esteem the book on the whole a very valuable addition to the religious history of our country. And the author who, as we learn is approaching the fiftieth year of his ministry, is deserving of all praise for the diligence and industry and skill manifested in its preparation. A copious index would be a great addition to the volume.

Has not the time come for a true, and faithful, and full history of the schism of 1837, as to the doctrines and measures and causes which led to it, and its effects? Such a history should come from the pen of a candid but thorough Presbyterian.

Spiritual Heroes; or Sketches of the Puritans, their Character and Times. By John Stoughton. New York. M. W. Dodd. 12mo. pp. 334.

Puritanism, in its true sense, has ever been, and now is the soul of protestantism. Subtract its spirit and its principles from the protestant Church, and we have only a body without the animating spirit—a form without the power of godliness. The cause of puritanism is the cause of spiritual religion, and its history and its heroes are worthy of universal study. The book before us is not a continuous history, but a series of brilliant pictures, admirably sketched, of the men and incidents which give so much interest to the old puritan times. The picture of “the brave Lord Brooke,” and of “Oxford under Owen” are full of interest. Indeed the same may be said of every picture in the book, of which there are thirteen. We commend the volume to all who love fine writing, or who desire a more intimate knowledge of the men to whose piety, firmness and principles we owe all that we possess in the way of civil and religious freedom.

Family Secrets revealed. A true story for Boys and Girls. Philadelphia, American Sunday School Union.

An interesting little narrative, apparently founded on fact, and intended to show the power of true religion to make a vain and selfish little girl humble and benevolent,—a poor little blind boy contented and cheerful in life and calm and peaceful in death, and a whole family truly happy and useful.

The Grand Defect; or Ellen and her cousin Julia. Philadelphia, American Sunday School Union.

This is a story contrived to illustrate the evils growing out of a want of correct principles in a young lady of wealth, who is represented as a leading patroness of all the charitable societies of Philadelphia, while she allowed a poor seamstress to die of want, by refusing, or rather delaying, to pay a bill of three dollars due for work. There is a vast deal of *real* truth in this story, even though it may not have been *actual*.

1. *Magic, Pretended Miracles, and Remarkable Natural Phenomena*.—2. *Sketches of Eminent Medical Men*.—3. *The Life of Martin Boos, a Roman Catholic Clergyman in Germany*.—4. *The History of Protestantism in France*, from the earliest Ages to the end of the Reign of Charles IX. Philadelphia: American Sunday School Union, No. 146 Chesnut St. London: Religious Tract Society.

The publications of the London Religious Tract Society have long been known to the religious public, as characterized by sound evangelical scriptural views, a warm tone of religious feeling, and high literary merit. While they are in general instructive and profitable to the most educated, they are also level to the capacity, and adapted to the wants of the young. The four little books, whose titles we have given, are reprints of those publications. And we are glad to perceive that the American Sunday School Union have commenced issuing them in a monthly series of volumes, of 192 pages each in neat paper covers, for the sum of twelve and a half cents a piece. Such is our estimate of the value of these books, that we should gladly give a full notice of their contents, if we had space to spare. We must be content, however, to refer our readers to the books themselves; promising that they will find them both instructive and interesting. The volume on *Magic* is as philosophical, as it is curious.

1. *Jane Hudson*; or the Secret of Getting on in the World.—2. *The Light and the Dark Path*; or the History of Mary Lester and Eliza Bruce. Embellished with twenty-four engravings.—3. *The Silver Dollar*.—4. *The Boy and the Birds*. Philadelphia: American Sunday School Union, 146 Chesnut Street.

Such are the titles of another set of small volumes, from the same prolific source. The stories are so told that we have no doubt they will hold the attention of some who can scarcely claim a place among the ranks of juvenile readers: and the moral lessons they are intended to teach, are not only sound, but important. The Boy and the Birds will undoubtedly be a great favourite among the younger sort of our little friends.

The Communicant's Manual; or a series of Meditations designed to assist communicants in making Preparation for the Holy Supper. By J. J. Janeway, D.D. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. pp. 219. 18mo.

From the well known character of Dr. Janeway, our readers can easily conceive what are the characteristics of this little volume. Very many pious persons, even among the more intelligent classes, find a great difficulty in conducting profitably such meditations as they may earnestly desire, in connexion with the ordinance of the Lord's Supper. Part of the difficulty is due to the want of fertility of mind, to suggest sufficiently varied and appropriate themes: but still more to the want of that mental discipline, which will enable them to keep their thoughts fixed upon a given subject, long enough to exhaust its riches. We take for granted, therefore, that very many feel the want of some assistance; and would esteem it a great privilege, to be permitted to hear an experienced Christian minister, like Dr. Janeway, *think aloud* on such occasions. This little volume contains twenty-nine different exercises; to each of which an appropriate form of prayer is appended.

A new Token for Children. Compiled for the Presbyterian Board of Publication. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

This is a collection of twenty-six narratives, going to show the power of religious truth as exemplified in the life and death of remarkable children. We confess that upon our own mind this book produces an impression far more powerful and salutary in consequence of the conviction that we are dealing with actual facts. The interest awakened by these remarkable examples of the beauty and power of religion in moulding the character of mere children, and changing the whole aspect of their death, is absorbing to a degree that is almost painful.

1. *Old Anthony's Hints to young people to make them both cheerful and wise.* Embellished with six engravings. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.—2. *Walks of Usefulness in London and its Environs.* By the Rev. John Campbell, Kingsland, near London. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.—3. *Causes and Cure of Scepticism.* Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

The first of these three little books, is entertaining in its matter, and benignant and earnest in its spirit; the second is instructive and full of piety, zeal and wisdom in teaching us how to do good: and the third is a discriminating and thorough analysis of the causes, tendency and treatment of the scepticism of the human heart, enlivened by narratives of actual cases, illustrating each of the topics. It is an extract from a work attributed to the author of "*Domestic Portraiture, or Leigh Richmond and his family.*"

Antichrist; or the Spirit of Sect and Schism. By John W. Nevin, President of Marshall College. New York: John S. Taylor. 1848. pp. 89.

The doctrine of this book is the doctrine of the "Mystical Presence" by the same author. Dr. Nevin's mind seems possessed with certain ideas, which are reproduced every time he puts pen to paper.

All Christians agree in regarding the person of Christ as the centre of the gospel. The answer to the question, What think ye of Christ? determines not only a man's theology but his character. Christology, therefore, takes the first position in the Christian system. If a man reject the truth as to Christ's person, if he denies that God has come in the flesh, he is antichrist. But what does this mean? Does it mean that the eternal Son of God took upon him a true body and a reasonable soul, and so was and continues to be, God and man, in two distinct natures, and one person forever? So the church says, in all her creeds, Greek, Latin, Lutheran and Reformed. In opposition to this church doctrine, which is founded on the assumption of an essential difference between the divine and human natures, which natures the church declares to be distinct, and therefore to imply different attributes, and different activities, there is a modern doctrine, founded on the assumed identity of the divine

and human natures, and which teaches there is but one life in Christ, which life is truly and properly human. He is the ideal man. Our nature is restored and healed in him. Of his one theanthropic life all his people partake. As all men partake of the life of Adam, and therefore of his corruption, so we must partake of the life, the human life of Christ, and with that life, of the righteousness inherent in it. It is thus we are justified, sanctified and saved. The incarnation is therefore continued in the church. God is manifested in the flesh; not in Christ only as an individual, but in human nature. The commencement of this process, the constitution of Christ's person is miraculous, or supernatural, but afterward it is a natural organic historical development. His life being diffused through the church, is propagated by its grace-bearing sacraments and ministry. Hence sect and schism, separation from the church as a historical organism and organization, is separation from Christ; and anti-christ and anti-church become synonymous terms.

Such as we understand it is the doctrine of Dr. Nevin as set forth in this and his previous writings. In our number for April last, we said that this, as far as it goes, is Schleiermacher's system, a declaration, which seems to have given Dr. Nevin and his friends very unexpected and, as it seems to us, very unnecessary trouble. Prof. Schaff felt called upon to assert for his colleague the character of an independent thinker. And Dr. Nevin himself in his review of our April number and in his preface to the present Tract, devotes no little attention to the consideration of his relation to Schleiermacher, "with whose whole system" he says, "that article has found it convenient to invest me, in the way of borrowed drapery, for the purpose of bringing my theology into discredit."

Dr. Nevin is very often much too careless in his assertions. It is not true that we charged him with "the whole of Schleiermacher's system." We took great pains to say distinctly and repeatedly that we attributed nothing to Dr. Nevin but what he had advanced in his book, that his system as *far as he went* was Schleiermacher's, but how far he carried it out we had no means of knowing beyond what he had furnished in his writings. It was only as to the person of Christ and the associated doctrines, that we spoke at all, and we attributed Schleier-

macher's system, even on those subjects, to Dr. Nevin, only so far as he had avowed it. We do not know what "the whole system of Schleiermacher" is. We do not know whether his system admits the existence of a personal God. We very much fear it does not. We fear he did not acknowledge any such thing as sin, and of course any such doctrines as atonement, justification, sanctification, in the scriptural and church sense of those terms. We know he denied the doctrine of the Trinity. We were therefore very careful to avoid attributing to Dr. Nevin, whom we regarded as a friend and as a Christian brother, one iota more of Schleiermacher's system than we found plainly avowed in his work on the Mystical Presence.

Neither Professor Schaff nor Dr. Nevin, though exhibiting such undue sensitiveness on this subject, pretends to question the correctness of our representation. They do not deny that every one of the ideas brought out in our review as constituting the system of doctrine taught in the "Mystical Presence," belongs to Schleiermacher's system. There is not a thought in that book nor in this, of any consequence; not an idea which gives any character or form to the doctrine taught, which is not to be found in the writings of Schleiermacher and his acknowledged followers. What we have said therefore is undeniably true. Dr. Nevin's system, *as far as he goes*, is Schleiermacher's system. In this there is nothing derogatory to our author. The character of such men as Lücke, Ullman, Dörner, &c., for scholarship or independence, is not impugned by those of their countrymen, who speak of them as disciples of Schleiermacher. No man feels himself insulted by being called a Calvinist. Nay, we were not much disturbed by Professor Schaff's informing his readers that our review of Bushnell's *Christian Nurture* was taken substantially from Dr. Nevin's strictures of the same book; nor did we feel called upon to defend ourselves from the charge made by both of those gentlemen, that the authorities quoted in our *Review of the Mystical Presence*, were taken second hand from that book itself. We should be very glad if Dr. Nevin would father both of those reviews, authorities and arguments together. We should then have a much better opinion of his theology, to say nothing of his good sense, than we have at present. We have said nothing, therefore, of Dr. Nevin's rela-

tion to Schleiermacher that is not consistent with his taking his place along side of Ullman, Dorner and other eminent men of the same class. More than this he ought not to claim or desire.

There are, however, two points as to which there is a striking contrast between those theologians and Dr. Nevin. They openly repudiate the church-doctrine as to the person of Christ. Dorner, for example, to whom Dr. Nevin refers in terms of unmeasured commendation, insists that two distinct natures in Christ of necessity suppose two activities, and two activities two persons. He discusses every attempt made by the church to save the unity of Christ's person, on the theory of a twofold nature, and endeavours to show that they all, even the Lutheran, failed. The new doctrine, therefore, is different from the old. Dr. Nevin insists that the new is the old. He is thus in an entirely false position. He lacks either the light or the courage to do as his German friends do, that is, to cast off the trammels of the old doctrine, and to teach the new as new.

Strauss says that the great majority of modern theologians, have made Schleiermacher's Christology, their own, nay, their darling and the child of their bosom. The old building with its towers and corridors, its wasteful halls and spacious apartments, he says, Schleiermacher could not undertake to repair. He therefore erected in its stead a new and modish pavilion, suited to modern tastes and modes of life. To this new building, he adds, all the inhabitants of the old, except a few old house-cats, have passed over—none of them having eyes to see that the iron and stone of the old, as mere material, is worth all the new put together. Now the trouble is, Dr. Nevin wishes to live in both these houses at the same time. He wants the eclat, the tasteful and commodious apartments of the new, and yet is unwilling to give up the security and respectability of the old. It is, however, out of the question for him to be in two places at the same time; and it is no less impossible for him to hold at once the Christology of Schleiermacher and the Christology of the church.

Again, these German theologians above referred to, hold their opinions with calmness and dignity. They believe them to be correct, and maintain that they serve to present important truths in a clearer light, and to free them from difficulties. Still they

see that it is only a new philosophy. They never denounce as heretics those who differ from them. The case is far different with Dr. Nevin. He holds these doctrines with a vehement and even fanatical spirit. No Dominic could be more denunciatory, no Pusey more exclusive. If a man does not believe in the continued incarnation of God in the church, he denies that God is come in the flesh, and is antichrist. If he does not believe that the church, as an historical organization, is instinct with the theanthropic life of Christ, which it propagates by a regular development, he does not believe in the church at all. He is a sectary and a schismatic. The professions of faith of all such men are set down as infidel cant; and their exhibitions of piety as pretended or delusive. Now all this is simply ridiculous. It is but just to say that Dr. Nevin does not get this spirit from Schleiermacher. It has much more the appearance of the working of a Hegelian leaven.

With Professor Schaff's course in this matter we have been somewhat disappointed. We had looked to him as a kind of guardian of Dr. Nevin. His work on Protestantism, in which there was such a discriminating and definite assertion of the doctrine of justification by faith and of the normal authority of scripture, as the two great principles of Protestants, led us to hope that his influence would be really conservative. His chivalry, however, has led him to throw away his own standard and to raise that of his colleague. We are sorry for it. It is a real loss, for he has too much of an English mind to allow him to think that his new doctrine is the same with his old. He is not the man to be the subject of the hallucination that he can live in two separate houses at the same time.

